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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation advances theoretical and empirical knowledge on an ongoing challenge 
throughout the developing world: synergizing livelihood enhancement and agro-ecological 
sustainability. Systematic knowledge of synergies and causal pathways through which they 
are generated remains limited. This study addresses this gap by examining the role of 
institutions as drivers of synergies and tradeoffs between social and ecological outcomes in 
rainfed agriculture. Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative evidence collected over 
sixteen months of fieldwork among 212 smallholder households in six villages and over 
sixty institutions in Telangana, India, I examine the influence of five institutional pathways on 
livelihood and landholding effects. I find that the pathways generally improved livelihood 
and landholding conditions. However, these improvements are unevenly distributed even 
among marginalized social groups. National level policies strongly affect livelihoods and 
agro-ecological conditions. However, failure to adequately acknowledge the processes by 
which target groups access benefits led to social and power relations threatening effective 
benefit delivery. Civic institutions play supporting roles by filling voids left by public 
interventions and channel benefits to their constituency. Findings show that indebtedness 
to formal and informal institutions shape vulnerability of smallholders by moderating 
livelihood strategies and agricultural practices. Scholars and policy makers interested in 
institutional dimensions of agriculture must attended more carefully to the complexity in 
local-level institutions, examine non-linear relationships between institutions and social-
ecological outcomes and associated political arenas to better design interventions. 
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CHAPTER 1. INSTITUTIONS AND SMALLHOLDER AGRICULTURE, AND SYNERGIES 
AND TRADEOFFS 
 
Institutions are ways of organizing human life. They are framed in rules that vary form 
shepherding of human behavior to enforcement of sanctions and assigning punitive 
measures, and influence human actions to achieve specified outcomes. As social beings 
dependent on natural resources, human interactions with each other and their environment 
are shaped by institutions. Within this broad idea of institutions, several scholars have 
contributed to our understanding of the evolution of institutions, their design and principles, 
the embeddedness of individuals in informal social norms and more formal settings. This 
scholarship has boiled down the essence of institutions to those rules that regulate human 
motivations, behavior, expectations, and practices towards outcomes that are of some 
social need. In this dissertation, I use an institutional lens to analyze environmental 
governance. The objects of study, specifically, are local institutions and smallholder farmers 
in rainfed agricultural areas. The main question that this dissertation seeks to answer is: 
What are the institutional conditions of social-ecological synergies and tradeoffs in 
smallholder agriculture? To answer this question, I will explain institutions, farming 
practices and their ensuing outcomes in a community of smallholder farmers in Telangana, 
India. I will do so by addressing two goals: to explain institutional conditions of smallholder 
agriculture, and to analyze the combinations of social and ecological outcomes. The 
working definition of institutions I use is that they are rules concretely manifested in 
organizations that shape agricultural outcomes. I frame outcomes broadly along two 
dimensions: social and ecological. Income generated from agricultural and allied livelihoods 
represent the social dimension. Agro-ecological conditions of landholdings inclusive of crop 
diversity, its pattern, intensity of practices and biophysics of the land operationalize the 
ecological dimension. 
 
The first goal: To explain the institutional conditions under which social and ecological 
outcomes are observed. Key terms: Access and Interplay. 
 
I will propose a theoretical framing of institutional conditions within which agriculture is 
practiced and outcomes observed. This theoretical framing accounts for a) the differences 
in farmers and b) the relations that institutions have with one another. First, inequalities 
among farmers surface along the lines of social status, economic conditions, and 
demographic characters. Institutions are designed to either consider these inequalities by 
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targeting marginal groups or provide universal benefits across the board. Benefits such as 
material resources (fertilizers, seeds, credit) and information (technology, prices, weather) 
shape the way farmers practice agriculture depending on whether a particular group is 
explicitly targeted or if all socio-economic groups have equal provision. The idea of 
institutional access captures these differences in farmers’ ability to gain and maintain 
benefits from institutions. Second, institutions provide benefits by working with other 
institutions. The diversity of institutions that are active even in administratively remote rural 
areas can be rich and textured. These local institutions are mindful of specific contexts, 
meaning, they understand the lay of the land, the people and the similarities and differences 
among them. They are able to acknowledge these textures in ways that institutions at 
higher levels cannot. The key mechanism that puts to use this knowledge is institutional 
interaction. Interactions can occur for various reasons. Not only are they ad-hoc and policy 
driven, but they can also be motivated based on strategic, cooperative and competitive 
agendas. Further, relationship factors such as reciprocity, trust, and power differentials 
develop and/or maintain interactions. Simply put, interactions determine what benefits are 
channeled toward local areas, after which, access kicks-in to shape how these benefits are 
distributed and to whom. This dissertation argues that variations in interplay among 
institutions and differences in access together make the institutional benefit pathway (briefly 
in section 1.2.2, and with empirical details in Chapter 3) that drives synergies and tradeoffs. 
 
The second goal: To analyze the combinations of social and ecological outcomes.  Key 
terms: Synergies and Tradeoffs. 
 
When two or more outcomes are jointly manifested, the resulting combinations can tradeoff 
or synergize each other. Outcomes falling along social and ecological dimensions are of 
special interest because, they place normative social goals in competition. Tradeoff analysis 
is gaining rapid prominence largely due to programs and policies that aim for multiple, yet 
simultaneous goals, which requires an understanding of how these goals tradeoff or 
synergize each other. In agriculture, these goals are toward betterment of livelihood 
conditions and wellbeing while simultaneously increasing agricultural yield and decreasing 
impacts on the environment. In this dissertation, I select two outcomes of immediate 
societal relevance – livelihoods of smallholder farmers and agro-ecology of their 
landholdings. The reason for this selection is two-fold. First, the desire to enhance 
agricultural livelihoods will have effects on the practice of agriculture, which in turn either 
trades-off or synergizes with the agro-ecology of landholding. I try to make clear the mutual 
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effects of outcomes that are initiated by institutional interventions. Second, with current 
debates in food security and sustainability literature questioning food production and its 
consequences on conservation, the focus has moved beyond areas of traditional 
conservation areas. These areas happen to be human-dominated landscapes where 
agriculture is the dominant landuse. Aligning these outcomes in contrast to each other 
enables the identification of instantiations where livelihoods and agro-ecologies synergize 
each other. 
 
1.1. On drunk crops, preferred beneficiaries, the wait for rains, and the last mile conundrum 
 
“The helicopter landed not far from here. Indira Gandhi got off and 
waved at us. We waved back and were amazed at how big the helicopter 
was. It was many decades ago when the congressman, a lawyer, 
brought her here. She spoke for a while and then said that we would all 
get DAP at subsidized rates. For us girijans, it was free. I was anxious to 
know what it was. When I saw that it was a sack of powder I did not 
understand it. So, I sold it for ten or twenty rupees a bag. Next season, 
we again got free DAP. I sold that as well. Somehow, a few years later, I 
felt I should try it. In one small and not-so-great patch of my land next to 
the nala there, I sprinkled some of the DAP on paddy. One week later, 
my eyes fell out when I saw the plants. The plants where I sprinkled the 
DAP seemed drunk. They were robust, ferocious, and bold like a drunk 
person. Other plants growing on manure seemed lean, weak, and like 
children compared to the DAP drunk crops. The yield of these crops was 
unbelievable. After two years of DAP use, with the extra money, I had 
bought a pair of oxen. Ever since then, I have been using DAP”. 
– Ramulu, farmer. 
 
“Those settlements you see over there are tandas. That’s where the 
girijans were settled. They used to roam about in this area, grazing the 
few sheep and goats they had and doing odd jobs. They speak another 
language - Lambadi - and we hardly understood them. Children would 
be locked-up inside our homes when they passed by our village. It was 
said that they stole children. We would be wary and never considered 
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them much. They brewed sendi and kallu and sold them. If they did not 
sell, they enjoyed it themselves. Drunks. 
Look at them now. They own more land than me. They grow more crops 
than anyone in my village. If there is a new way of growing crops or 
anything new for that matter, they will be the first (to adapt). They are 
more educated than my sons, and I sent mine to school too. They are 
now officers, in the army and in the government. And I am just the way I 
am. In fact, I sold my bullocks to one of them last week. They are sharp 
and intelligent and can learn any trade. They are experts. The 
government has given them lands, has set-aside positions in almost 
every department you can think of. They get most seeds and drip-sets 
for next-to-nothing. If they are smart, even a little, just a little, they make 
the best use of all programs. And, I am a Muslim, a minority. What do I 
get?  
– Ali, farmer.  
 
“The last few years have been dry. The chervu was last full, I think 
around 2010-11. What you see now cannot even water that herd of 
sheep over summer. In 2011, water went over this road and we had to go 
all the way around the chervu. It has not rained enough and at times we 
are used to. It is the same story everywhere. Lakes and small ponds are 
drying up. There is no rain to fill it up. Wells? Where are they? Even when 
it rains it is hard on us. This year I had to plant phalli twice. I tilled, used 
the rotatvator, and planted right after the rains. Then, no sign of rain. 
Seeds hardly germinated and even those that did died. Kandi is little 
sturdier. But you may have seen, even those are not doing very well. 
Farmers who grow cotton can water plant by plant. Paddy and 
vegetables are grown only by those owing a bore that has water. When 
there is no rain, bore levels either decrease or go dry. But for all other 
varshadharita panta, we have to wait. And when it rains it’s a scramble. A 
very busy time. Labor becomes scarce, tractors are all booked-up, 
fertilizers and seeds may run-out or prices may increase. The wait for 
rain makes it difficult to prepare”. 
– Sayyappa, farmer. 
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“My senior officers called me and said that I had to co-operate with 
NGOs for implementation of the millet program. There was no letter and 
no formal guideline on how to collaborate. A few days later, two NGO 
representatives showed up and provided me with a list of beneficiaries 
for the program. I was happy that my work load had lessened a bit. 
Beneficiary selection is most difficult. The program guidelines say one 
thing and when I go the field the beneficiaries that fit the criteria are 
either not willing or are available in areas that not included in the 
program. These criteria are set higher up. In this case, I was happy. So, 
last rabi, I sanctioned free millets - ragi and jonnalu - to everybody on the 
NGO list. Then there was a delay in urea and DAP provision, which was 
part of the package. I am not sure what motivations were provided to the 
beneficiaries by the NGO, but they did not plant them. I suspect they 
were really waiting for the fertilizers and not interested in millets. Who is 
to monitor whether urea and DAP provided under this program will be 
used for millets alone? When I went on inspections, it was a 
disappointment. There was hardly any program uptake and where taken-
up, growth vitals were not satisfactory. So, at the end of the season, the 
production increase and coverage of millets was negligible. Now, who is 
answerable? The NGO? No, I am answerable. These programs are well 
designed and with good intentions. But, I have no idea what happens to 
them”. 
– Ramesh, officer with the Department of Agriculture. 
 
Farmers and the institutional representative quoted above illustrate two aspects of rainfed 
agriculture that form the basis of this dissertation. First, benefits do not fall from the sky. 
Only in exceptional cases like that of Ramulu, the person instrumental in providing benefits 
came from it. Benefits are channelized by an institutional pathway that direct and redirect 
benefits at each turn of similarity and difference, administrative criteria and local norms, 
expedience and procedure, and power and powerlessness. This pathway does not flow 
uniformly to all beneficiaries, even among the marginalized, as Ali grumbles. Second, the 
precariousness of rainfed agricultural conditions, described by Sayappa, sets the stage for 
the ways in which farmers adapt – especially in response to the rediscovered love towards 
‘local varieties’ like jonnalu, institutional attention to ‘improve’ agricultural practices, and 
infrequent biophysical opportunities. Institutionally mediated benefits are based on a set of 
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criteria beyond which they are not fully realized. Ramesh aptly questions the efficacy of 
interplay between institutions and origins of these criteria. For rainfed agriculture to provide 
a secure livelihood, multiple factors need to align. For rainfed agriculture to sustain the 
agro-environments together with livelihoods, these factors need to align in particular ways. 
This dissertation is about examining one set of factors relating to local institutions and 
unpacking the alignments that produce synergies or tradeoffs between livelihoods and 
agro-environments. 
 
1.2. Cultivating institutions. Theorizing the role of local institutions in agricultural 
development and environmental governance. 
 
Institutions are ways of organizing human life. They make it cheaper, easier and profitable 
for people to invest in activities and secure livelihoods. And, lack of these functions is often 
blamed for development failures. Institutions also interact with each other and the specifics 
of these interaction combinations are suggested to lead to different outcomes. Institutions 
also mitigate factors contributing to entrenched vulnerabilities and offer a space for people 
to participate, voice concerns, articulate rights, assist in rule-making and help integrate with 
other institutions. For farming households, institutions offer opportunities (and barriers) to 
link with economic, resource and information sources. 
 
While some scholars use institutions and organizations synonymously (Young 2002), others 
make an explicit distinction (Uphoff 1993). Multiplicity in definitions stems partly from 
disciplinary views and partly because institutions is a tantalizingly catchall term. Further, 
literature on institutions demonstrates the diverse ways to categorize them. These 
approaches have focussed on function and purpose (e.g., regulatory, enforcement etc.), 
level of formality (formal or informal), specificity (sector-specific or multi-purpose), 
properties (e.g., authority, legitimacy, accountability) and domains of social action (market, 
civic, public). While acknowledging the ambiguity and features of institutional 
categorization1, this proposal uses a definition of institutions as formal and informal 
mechanisms that shape individual and collective expectations, interactions, and behaviour, 
and operationalized in concretely manifested organizations (Agrawal 2008). This definition 
considers the inconclusiveness within social science literature on the distinction between 
																																								 																				
1 Agrawal (2008; 2009), North (1990), Ostrom (2011; 2002), Young (2002; 2010), and Uphoff (1993) 
provide overviews on the blurred boundary between institutions and organizations. Organizations are 
defined as structures of recognized and accepted roles that serve particular purposes.  
	 7 
institutions and organizations. Institutions in this sense have grounding in organizations that 
deliver benefits to farmers depending on formal and informal rules. 
Within this broad idea of institutions, several scholarships have contributed to our 
understanding of the evolution of institutions, its design and their principles, and its 
embeddedness as social norms. Studies focusing on diverse themes such as climate 
change adaptation (Naess et al. 2005; Eakin & Lemos 2010), forest governance (Ostrom & 
Nagendra 2006; Chhatre & Agrawal 2008; van Kerkhoff & Szlezák 2010), policy and 
boundary organizations (White et al. 2010; Clark et al. 2011), rural livelihoods (Vogel et al. 
2007; Ziervogel et al. 2010), livelihoods and power (Jakimow 2013) and environment-
society relationships (Leach et al. 1999)  highlight the importance of institutions. In the next 
section, a review of institutions from the perspective of natural resource governance and 
development is presented. First, scholars of resource governance, have identified 
institutions as a key towards environmental outcomes of societal need (Ostrom et al. 2002; 
Schlager & Ostrom 1992; Lemos & Agrawal 2006). Second, scholars of rural development 
have considered the capabilities and functions of institutions, and the combinations or 
networks of institutions that may lead to positive development through an increase in 
productivity, number and sustainability of livelihood opportunities (Ellis 1998; Scoones 
2009). 
 
1.2.1. Review of literature on institutions from a natural resource governance perspective 
 
The rich literature on environmental governance acknowledges the role of institutions in 
determining the success of policies and socio-environmental outcomes. Within geography, 
institutions as facilitators of changes in human-environment interactions are well 
documented. For example, Robbins’ (Robbins 1998) work on the role of institutions in 
managing communal lands in Rajasthan, India, describes the institutions and political 
ecology nexus. Comparing state and non-state institutions that have different systems of 
authority and power over management of common lands, Robbins finds that the social 
responses to institutions (e.g., mutual coercion, cooperation, encroachment) vary by 
gender, caste, and class and the institutional type. This leads to variations in individual 
decisions depending on whether they consider an institution legitimate, how fair the 
enforcement procedures are, and the stakes they hold in protection of common-pool 
resources. In another study, exploring impacts of institutional change and market shocks 
on smallholder coffee farmers in Mexico, Guatemala and Honduras, Eakin et.al (Eakin et al. 
2005) underscore the importance of the public institutions on farmer’s livelihoods. They find 
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that this relationship influences farmers’ perception of climatic and market risks, and hence 
their ability to respond. Jepson et.al in their study of land-use change in the Brazilian 
cerrado (Jepson et al. 2010; Jepson 2006) use ‘access regimes’, defined as interrelated 
institutions and organizations, as a lens to describe the process of private colonization, 
agricultural development, and land-cover change. Here, institutions and organizations that 
provide access to credit, land titles, and government subsidies explain colonization process 
and subsequent reduction in the cerrado. Institutional benefits also motivated farmers to 
expand and intensify agricultural production and adapt to the changing political economy 
between 1972 and 1986. 
 
While the above scholarship draws on understanding of institution from political science 
and economics perspective, a sociological view highlights the mechanisms of institutional 
reproduction and change that influence livelihoods over time. Institutions, according to this 
perspective, if organizing human life and enable or constrain behavior, expectations and 
outcomes, then are intimately connected to power in its broadest sense to make rules, 
dispel conflicts before they reach arenas of contestation and constitute interests (Lukes 
1986). This view suggests that the analysis of institutions requires the analysis of social 
relations and power (Scott 2013). This is because, subjects of this organizing are covertly or 
overtly managed by those who wield power via particular sets of relations. Institutions are 
thus a means by which power works though individuals resulting in a set of power relations. 
The guiding questions of this perspective broadly are (Jakimow 2013): What are the 
mechanisms through which institutions regulate behavior? What is the aggregate outcome 
of individual behavior for maintaining or challenging social order? The roles of institutions in 
response are bolstered by three pillars: regulatory – where institutions constrain actions 
through coercion and sanctions that would otherwise maximize self-interest; cognitive – 
where institutions provide moral or cognitive templates for interpretation and action to 
individuals embedded in a world of institutions; normative – where institutions construct 
what is desirable, appropriate, and necessary and grounds individuals in a social context 
that specifies “appropriate means to particular ends” (Scott 2013). Further, the sociological 
perspective synthesizes the three pillars with the three prominent schools of institutional 
thought: rational/rational choice – conceives individuals with a fixed set of rational 
preferences and who act in strategic and calculative fashion to maximize self-interest; 
cultural/ sociological – conceives individuals with cognitive possibilities and imaginations 
limited by demarcated by institutions; historical/historical comparative – where individuals 
and collective actions are principally determined by political economy whereby some 
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groups have disproportionate access to institutions resulting in unequal outcomes. Taken 
together, the three pillars and schools offer a more comprehensive view of the different 
pathways by which institutions effect individuals, and provide entry points to evaluate the 
influence of institutions on social-ecological outcomes.  
 
In sum: studies of environment and development identify the central role that institutions 
play in mediating the flows of benefits towards rural populations and that institutions are 
divisive and dynamic, remade through resistance and re-interpretation by individuals and 
embedded in a larger political economy. What is clear from this review is the existence of 
two institutional determinants: 1) variations in caste, gender, and class, determining benefit 
distribution among social groups, and 2) interactions that institutions have with each other 
and with beneficiaries that determine the type and availability of benefits to social groups. 
Social variations and institutional interactions together influence the choice of agricultural 
practice and outcomes along social-ecological dimensions. This dissertation advances a 
theoretical framework in Chapter 2 called the ‘institutional benefit pathway’ that synthesizes 
the two determinants to explain how the combination of institutional interaction and access 
produce synergies or tradeoffs.  
 
1.2.2. An overview of institutional functions and benefit pathway 
 
The framework combines the two mechanisms – access and interplay – to take account of 
the two institutional determinants of agricultural practices (Figure 1.1). Institutional access is 
the ability of individuals to benefit from institutions. Access not only regulates the flow and 
distribution of benefits but also makes explicit the socio-economic inequalities that 
determine the opportunities to obtain benefits or not. At the level of the individual farmer, 
variations in socio-economic characteristics suggest that actors maintain, control and gain 
access to benefits via relations that temporarily crystallize around access to benefits (Ribot 
& Peluso 2003). Differences in socio-economic status, ethnic or caste groups, and gender 
inequalities all affect the ability of individuals to access institutional benefits. Scholars of 
gender studies, and political ecology of natural resource governance highlight the negative 
effects of social inequality on resource outcomes (Sikor & Lund 2010; Agarwal 2010). In the 
context of common pool resource management, many scholars observe a positive 
relationship between greater socio-economic equality and ecological sustainability, and 
point to the adverse effects of inequalities on natural resource governance (Andersson & 
Agrawal 2011). In agriculture, when institutional benefits are provided universally, without 
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acknowledging social inequalities, there is a demonstrated increase in income disparity 
(Freebairn 1995). The implications of inequalities is that powerful social groups and 
institutions have greater influence in determining access to benefits and creating classes of 
‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ (Sikor & Lund 2009). Agricultural poor suffer not because they lack 
skills but because they lack opportunities to benefit from institutions and raise their income 
and quality of landholding. This suggests that when access is targeted towards 
marginalized social groups, benefits can become available in a more equitable manner. 
Targeted access aims at providing preferential treatment to marginalized groups and offers 
a means to address existing socio-economic gaps that they experience with other 
communities. Motifs from universal to targeted institutional access is useful to unravel 
patterns of access, where universal access leads to elite capture, while targeted access 
makes the playing field a little more even.  
 
Institutional interplay refers to interactions among different types of institutions. Interplay 
has been theorized in the context of international environmental governance (Young 2002; 
Ostrom et al. 2002), where new activities, polices, or external interventions bring together a 
set of institutions together. First, with respect to institutional interactions, interplay is 
focused primarily on locally active institutions that have relations with other institutions at 
multiple levels. This is because local institutions have the potential to interact with farmers 
on a face-to-face basis that provides opportunities for benefit sharing. Locally active 
institutions which share jurisdictions are more also likely to interact frequently, share 
location-specific histories, and be more aware of local agro-ecological contexts (Agrawal et 
al. 2012). For example, non-governmental organizations (e.g., women’s Self Help Groups, 
co-operatives) that provide support and services to rural poor, women and marginalized 
groups will have natural affinities with other local institutions. On the other hand, local 
institutions can also interact with institutions at different levels of decision-making and 
activity. Such multi-level institutions make available new kinds of information from their 
extended network that be contextualized to local conditions. They also bring innovations, 
channel diverse benefits and provide a vertical scaffolding for benefits to flow to localities. 
In this dissertation, I specify eight levels of interactions that locally active institutions have 
with other institutions. Local interactions contain three levels that are commonly understood 
levels at which decision-making affect households (Uphoff 1993; Agrawal & Perrin 2009). 
They comprise institutions at social group level, village level, and up to a cluster of villages. 
These local institutions may have multi-level interactions with other institutions at sub-
district, district, regional, national and international levels. Second, interplay also focuses on 
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three types of institutions: civic, private, and public. This classification captures the 
institutional richness in any rural area as civic/community (membership organizations, co-
operatives), private/market (service organizations, private businesses) and 
public/government (local agencies, local governments) (Agrawal 2008). Functionally, civic 
and public typically advance some common interest of their members and provide 
products, capital and services that are targeted towards marginalized groups. Private 
institutions on the other hand, operate on market economy that less often prioritizes 
marginal groups. Drawing on level of relations and representation of institutional types, 
interplay is considered low or high. When institutional interactions are local and not all types 
of institutions are active, interplay is low. Interplay is high when interactions are multi-level 
and consist of all three types of institutions.   
 
Local institutions provide several functions in support of livelihoods, agriculture and the 
environment. A few key functions relate to information gathering and dissemination, 
resource mobilization and allocation, skill development and capacity building, providing 
leadership, and relating to other decision makers and institutions (Agrawal et al. n.d.). 
Broadly, the range of institutional services can be categorized into four categories: 
information provision, resource provision (direct), linkages and facilitated access, and 
enabling environments (indirect). Simply put, institutions provide services or facilitate its 
access. And, the diversity of institutions and the mechanisms they deploy contribute to the 
complexity of institutional function. First, information on skills, alternative or appropriate 
technologies, extant rules and laws, market and pricing, and climate and weather are 
representative of the institutional benefits. Second, resource benefits offer some material 
substance such as a public utility service (e.g., water, electricity), land and its rights, credit, 
or agricultural inputs (e.g., fertilizers, seeds, pesticides). Third, institutions without direct 
access to information and resources can create links to other institutions and facilitate 
benefit flow towards their institutional constituency. Institutions at non-local levels of 
decision-making also provision benefits indirectly by linking with local institutions privy to 
intimate knowledge that fine-tune benefit targeting. Fourth, institutions create environments 
that favor secure livelihoods and sustainable lands. They do so by improving social security 
and welfare programs, enriching the cultural atmosphere, promoting literacy, improving 
infrastructure and safety, and providing opportunities to participate in rule making.  
 
The multiplicity of institutions within a given context enhances the potential for such 
transformations. People are influenced by and strategically use multiple institutions in their 
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livelihood strategies (Leach et al. 1999). These in turn influence individuals’ identity and 
roles in, at times, competing ways; the identities implied in one set of institutions may 
cause reflection on the identities required of another. The multiplicity of institutions can 
erode taken-for-granted truths and lead to questions about the inevitability of “realities” 
(Clemens & Cook 1999). Ideas are particularly important in this context, as their introduction 
(either purposefully or organically) can spark a process of re-evaluation and transformation. 
Strategic action occurs as actors recombine elements and ideas from different institutions 
to create new institutions or transform existing ones (Campbell 2007; Powell & Oberg n.d.). 
It is therefore important to examine how multiple institutions (an institutional context), 
including exogenously established institutions, may incrementally shift identities, roles and 
meanings, with the potential for ruptures in the dialectic between agents and institutions. 
 
1.2.3. A historical of institutions in agriculture and birds-eye view of local institutional 
landscape 
 
In order to understand how institutions matter to natural resource governance, to whom 
and under what conditions, it is important to map the institutional landscape. In this section, 
I present a brief history of the political economy of agricultural institutions in India and a 
birds-eye view of institutions active in Daulatabad is presented.  
 
First, the history. Since India’s independence, development has been gradual and 
contested by entrenched institutions. The purpose of this section is to provide a historical 
account of India’s economic development since its independence in 1947 and the role that 
agriculture and its played in it. In this review, I draw on three major works: Francine 
Frankel’s India’s Green Revolution Economic Gains and Political Costs (Frankel 1971), and 
India‘s Political Economy 1947 – 2004, The Gradual Revolution (2005) (Frankel 1971); 
Pranab Bardhan’s The Political Economy of Development in India (Bardhan 1999), and 
provide a summary of the Abridged Report of the National Commission on Agriculture 
(Mirdha 1976) as an endnote. These works together provide a view of how and why India’s 
economic development took the form it did. I begin with Frankel’s India’s Political 
Economy, followed by a summary of India’s Green Revolution. Next, I provide some 
highlights form the National Commission on Agriculture and wrap up with Bardhan’s 
arguments about the “constraints that blocked (India’s) escape from a low-level equilibrium 
trap of slow growth”.  
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This gradual revolution started with the first elected government of India, headed by Nehru, 
who torn between Gandhian socialist views and capitalist agendas committed to 
democratic social transformation that would avoid a social upheaval while reducing 
disparities. The faith in this ‘third way’ dimmed and did not solve India’s problems, whether 
in production or distribution. During this time more than 80% of India lived in rural areas, 
and most of them gained their livelihood from agriculture. However, small islands of rapid 
growth in agriculture (e.g., India’s Green Revolution) demonstrated the potential of 
agriculture in development of rural areas. However, these examples failed to make inroads 
during much of the 1960’s and 1970’s.  
 
Post-independence, the Congress party was divided between those who supported the 
Gandhian socialist ideology and those who believed in liberal philosophy that supported 
private investment. This lead to the formation of planning committees with directives 
emanating from New Delhi and the diffusion process were hoped to reach cities, towns, 
and villages. At the same time, regional princely states were annexed into the country and 
these elites had to be on board for the diffusion to occur. The aspiration for a state that was 
beyond the grasp of elites, was autonomous and strived for social development embodied 
itself in the Planning Commission and the Five-Year Plans. These plans would provide a 
model to funnel resources towards productive areas of economic growth. One of the first 
steps in this direction was the identification of the inefficiency of smallholder agriculture and 
favoring farms of ‘intermediate size’. The precursor of this conclusion was the creation of 
the Agrarian Reforms Committee in 1949, which developed four standards for agricultural 
policy: agriculture should provide an opportunity for the development of the farmers’ 
personality; there should be no scope for exploitation of one class by another; there should 
be maximum efficiency of production; and the scheme of reform would be within the realm 
of productivity. This report however, acknowledged the tensions in capitalist production 
that would drive large farmers to achieve maximum production via mechanization and force 
smaller and less efficient farmer into ‘mere wage–earning’ livelihoods. This committee 
therefore arrived at a middle ground of favoring ‘intermediate-size farms’ and 
recommended two types of farming in relation to size of landholding: lands below the 
‘basic’ size which are ‘uneconomic’ were to be amalgamated into joint cooperative farms2. 
Second, family farming was recommended for landholding sizes between ‘basic’ and 
																																								 																				
2 This was based on the observed success of cooperative farming in China. Examples such as food 
grain production increases between 15 and 30% over a two to three-year period in villages where 
cooperative farms had been formed were used to justify cooperative farming. 
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‘optimum’ size, which was a limit defined at three times economic landholding with the aim 
to establish ceiling on individual ownership. By 1949, therefore the dominant classes stood 
warned of long-term threats to their economic interests in social reforms in agriculture.  
 
After 1947, the Congress party was dominated proprietary classes. Notables of former 
princely states, local elites, educated classes, industrialists formed the core of the party. 
Members often held differing interests based on need to either maintain elite power or 
regional dominance. And, these differences manifested over land reforms and co-operative 
farming. Nehru believed that new institutions such as the panchayat would generate 
popular leadership drawn predominantly from the poorer sections and peasantry and drive 
social reform. This could, he believed, be achieved when political parties had little role to 
play in the self-organization of these committees. It was after this self-organization that 
democracy would emerge and weaken the links of dependence on proprietary classes. It 
was against this backdrop and hope that development planning was made with as minimal 
social polarization and clashes as possible. The goal of increasing production and 
developing the economy within a gradual process of social reform would therefore 
materialize only when institutions fulfilled their potential.  
 
The Planning Commission saw its powers and status increase with the Prime Minister as 
the Chairman of the Commission. However, approval of the Commission’s recommendation 
required approval of the elected cabinet, which increasingly opposed the socialist 
‘doctrine’. Furthermore, the Commission permitted a handful of members to determine 
national economic and social policy and the methods for development who were 
committed to the midway between Gandhian and socialist views. The Commission included 
state ministries only towards the advanced stages of formulation and used the economic 
leverage to guide acceptance of states. It is at this stage that the principles of import 
substitution, expansion of village and small-scale industries were furthered. The result was 
favoring public sector investment over private sector that would create a foundation for 
industrial economy. This meant solving the unemployment problem and hastening the 
agrarian reforms. However, hastening agrarian reforms could not materialize because large 
industrial programs pre-empted the share of available state resources for their own 
investment, offering no possibility for increasing agricultural output. Hence, an ‘efficiency’ 
argument was proposed where, productivity increases were achieved by efficient use of 
resources (land, labor and inputs) in agriculture. Or, minimal investment in agriculture was 
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expected to increase productivity by efficient practices and simultaneous linkages to the 
emerging industrial sector would set in motion the process of overall development.  
However, this policy could only progress if it achieved the gradual re-stratification of social 
order that required on the one hand assuring the proprietary classes against the threat of 
expropriation, and on the other hand stimulating rural mobilization via self-organized 
institutions. Meanwhile, the Second Five Year Plan created the National Cooperative 
Development and Warehousing Board to co-ordinate all India planning and organizing for 
the cooperative policy. This lead to providing numerous concessions on the scope and 
pace of agrarian reorganization that undermined the utility of cooperatives as the instrument 
of agrarian development. A key concession made to state leadership was regarding the 
timetable for cooperative re-organization of agriculture. These events combined to create 
conditions for conflicts between Planning Commission and states during the 1957/58 years 
when crop yields declined, food shortages mounted and food grain prices increased. This 
was the year when the central government was determined to hasten the pace of agrarian 
reform, especially related to enforcement of land ceilings and re-organization of 
cooperatives.  
 
Coinciding with the slow progress of agrarian reform was the emergence of political 
discontent. Several new parties – the Jan Sangh, Communist Party of India (CPI), Swatantra 
Party – eroded the dominance of Congress, which found itself in the thick of communal, 
regional, and linguistic battles3. Adding to this list of troubles was the failures of land reform 
implementation. While the land reform laws (e.g., Zamindari Abolition Act) transferred 
property rights from handful of absentee landlords to governments, it stopped short of 
expropriating the zamindars. This was because, even though proprietary rights were vested 
in state governments, zamindars could keep in their direct possession land in their 
occupation. Demonstration of land under ‘personal cultivation’ drove landholders to show 
as much land as possible, as under their operational control. In most states, tenancy acts 
provided that if tenants could ‘voluntarily surrender’ their holdings to the landlord in such 
cases, no ceiling restriction would apply. These provisions invited landlords to evict tenants 
under the guise of voluntary surrender and show large areas under personal cultivation4. In 
																																								 																				
3 Also undermining the agrarian reform and cooperative movement was China’s suppression of Ti-
betan revolt with blatant disregard for India’s policy and territorial encroachments in India, both of 
which questioned the fundamentals and exemplars of cooperative agriculture. 
4 This condition became problematic in cases where no land records existed or oral tenancy agree-
ments were made.	
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this context, intermediaries and large occupancy tenants benefited while the weakest 
sections of the rural areas were overlooked. 
 
In parallel to the land reforms, the cooperative movement established the Department of 
Cooperatives at the state level. An entirely new tier of cooperative administration staff was 
created at the divisional level to create a far reaching administrative apparatus, which linked 
credit (to an approved plan, repayable in kind, directed in the Planning Commission) to a 
cooperative marketing society. However, the Department of Cooperation functioning in 
local environments reflected the entrenched hierarchies and was unsympathetic to 
egalitarian goals. The failure of cooperatives to implement crop loan system distorted the 
intended flow of credit from substance cultivators to the upper 20-30% of agriculturists to 
satisfy criteria of ‘credit worthiness’. This created a reinforcing feedback, where 
agriculturists in particular geographies flush with cooperative credit were able to risk 
adoption of new technologies, and hence identified as ‘progressive farmers’ for further 
development attention. It was in this political milieu that India’s green revolution occurred. 
Towards the end of the second Five Year Plan (1956 – 1971) and the middle of the Third 
Plan (1961 – 1966), agricultural sector became a limiting factor on the overall economic 
growth. Static agricultural production convinced the Planning Commission that the 
continual shortfalls would seriously hinder the goals of industrial development. This lead to 
deviations from the original policy and a systematic effort to extend the application of 
science and technology to raise yields. For example, development efforts now focussed on 
agricultural areas where water supplies were assured to create ‘fair prospects of achieving 
rapid increases in production’. In 1965, this new policy was put in practice in 114 districts 
selected for an Intensive Agricultural Areas Program (IAAP). The model for this 
implementation was the Intensive Agricultural Development Program (IADP) implemented in 
15 pilot districts. Started in 1961, the IADP was the precursor of green revolution program 
in India that sought to replicate the ‘package of practices’ approach pioneered by the Ford 
Foundation, which had resulted in massive yield increases in Mexico and other countries. 
These yield increases were possible because of breakthroughs in plant breeding 
techniques. New varieties of rice and wheat that could potentially double the yield 
compared to indigenous Indian varieties became policy favourites. Frankel provides a 
ringside view of this implementation where, in almost all cases, cultivators experienced 
some improvement in yields from the introduction of ‘modern’ techniques of agriculture.  
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Describing five administrative districts where IADP was implemented (Ludhiana in Punjab, 
West Godavari in Andhra Pradesh, Tanjavur in Tamil Nadu, Palaghat in Kerala and Burdwan 
in West Bengal), Frankel underlines the fact that gains from the new technology has been 
uneven, with larger landholders benefiting substantially more than small farmers. This was 
because of availability of savings, capital through loans, and investment in land and 
machinery. The small farmers could not procure loans (from cooperatives, from the 
preceding discussion) for inputs (fertilizers, seeds, land improvement) since they lacked 
land for collaterals and consistently failed the ‘credit worthiness’ criteria. This also meant 
that tenant farmers, sharecroppers, and laborers were unable to benefit from the program.  
The IADP increased the rate of polarization in the already economically divided rural 
landscape. This forced an “agonizing change from security in the midst of poverty to 
growing insecurity with poverty” (Frankel 1971). Erosion of traditional social relationships, 
and conflict between landed and landless farmers rekindled ambers of land reform that 
been simmering quietly since the first Five Year Plan. This visible disparity and helplessness 
on part of small, marginal and tenant farmers in their inability to benefit from green 
revolution technology lead to mobilization by radical communist parties (CPI, CPI-Marxists) 
to question the gradual institutionally-mediated development. It was in this context that, 
after Nehru’s death and split in Congress, that Indira Gandhi could capitalize on a poverty 
reduction platform to win an electoral majority in 1971. This shifted the focus from 
production – development agenda to the problems of income distribution, land reform, 
secure tenures, and reduced land rents. Problems that meant challenging the proprietary 
classes. Problems that were the same that post-independence policy had put away in the 
backburner.  
 
Bardhan provides the broad contours of these problems and the development paradox in 
India, where the powerful regulatory and interventionist role of the government fails to 
commit to long-term policy and deviates under the pressure of populist pressures (Bardhan 
1999). The main question that he addresses is why is India’s growth so poor despite the 
clearly developed policy prescription in the Highlights of the National Commission on 
Agriculturei? The answer according to Bardhan lay in the politics of economic development 
and its selective response to demands and challenges. He focuses on political and 
economic constraints and the role of public investment in agriculture, infrastructure and 
public management of capital as key determinants of economic growth. Exploring the 
nature of Indian state, he identifies the origins of these constraints on the dominant 
proprietary classes. He recognizes three broad categories of proprietary classes – the 
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industrial capital class, the rich farmers, and public sector professionals. Conflicts between 
these dominant classes without a single strong power source created implementation 
barriers for the land reform polices and development policies. The farmers’ strength in 
numbers matches the industrialists’ strength of money power, which is matched by the 
educated urban lobbies that manage bureaucracies. The state provides the arena where the 
trinity struggles among themselves resulting in no clear winner. In addition to these class 
struggles, rent seeking by state officials, lack of accountability of state affairs and lack of 
institutional insulation prevent following through on commitments.  
 
Huge subsidies from the government to maintain the support prices for farm products, 
lower prices for grains to public, and credit, fertilizers, water, power to rich landowners. The 
Indian public economy has therefore become “an elaborate network of patronage and 
subsidies” where the proprietary classes fight over their share in the ‘spoils of the system’. 
Under these circumstances, the question for the government is problematic in that, while 
large-scale investment in industries, infrastructure, and credit was necessary in the early 
stages of industrial and agricultural transformation, the fight over these subsidies by 
dominant classes wasted away much of the benefits of investment leading to observed 
poor development. He suggests that after the 1991 liberalization efforts lead by P. V. 
Narasimha Rao and Manmohan Singh, reform has traversed a midway between 
implementing dramatic changes on one hand and easier reforms on the other. The midway 
between these two is what he and Jenkins (Jenkins 1999) call ‘reform by stealth’, where, 
substantial reforms have been accomplished without creating headlines or political 
confrontations. This stealth approach has been recognized in the reforms of Rajiv Gandhi, 
P. V. Narasimha Rao, and subsequent leaders who have wanted reform but not at the cost 
of toppling the apple cart. Currently, this mid-way approach has been supplemented by the 
rise in the power of regional political parties whose populist measures lead to massive 
commercial losses, such as those observed when water and power subsidies are offered 
and electoral promises of credit waivers are fulfilled. With these mounting losses at state 
level, the central government is currently asking states to pay those bills leading to 
undermining some of the same institutions that were created to stimulate rural mobilization. 
Within the influence of these historical moments, a dynamic shift is ongoing, that has 
moved the power of institutions from the centre to regions, from public to private, and 
sometimes from elite to coalitions and social groups. 
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Second, back to the present and to Daulatabad. Scanning the range of institutions helps 
locate them at once in wider realms of theory as well as at the heart of everyday agricultural 
practices as explained in sections 1.2.1 and 1.2.2. Exploratory fieldwork in Daulatabad 
confirmed that several institutions were active. The scale of ‘several’ however, was 
astonishing. For example, women’s Self-Help Groups (SHGs, Image A.1) are common 
across the region resulting from a strong historical policy focus on micro-credit-based 
women’s development. Each village has tens, if not hundreds in large villages, of SHG’s 
each with five to ten members. Every SHG has unique characters shaped by, for example, 
the characters of members (e.g., book keeping skills, confidence in articulating demands), 
their needs and social-economic conditions, the identity of their husbands and their political 
clout, and networks with other SHG’s and so on. The SHG’s are federated at the mandal-
level5 called the Mandal Mahila Samakhya (MMS) established by the Society for Elimination 
of Rural Poverty (SERP) of the former Andhra Pradesh government to “facilitate mobilization 
of rural poor women”. Interviews with SERP, MMS and SHG members suggests that the 
number of active SHG’s is unclear and an estimate of SHGs in Daulatabad puts the total 
number at over 1100.  
 
Similarly, farmer clubs, fishermen associations, shepherd and credit groups provide an 
overwhelming array of institutions active locally. Few representative snapshots of active 
institutions are presented in images A.2, A.3, A.4, A.10, A.13, A.16, A.17, and A.34. Public 
and private institutions add to this richness. Traditional and extra-legal institutions are also 
in the mix. Two traditional institutions deserve mention – the “naagu system” and “karthe 
calendar”. The “naagu” system is an informal institution of seed exchange where a 
borrower repays 1 to 1.5 times the quantity of borrowed seed. The “karthe” refers to a 
month, and is based on the traditional Telugu calendar. This calendar is based on lunar 
cycles and position of stars in the night sky that is also followed as the agricultural 
calendar. Extra-legal institutions take on forms of corruption and bribery, middlemanry, 
usury, threats and violence, and theft. 
In this world of rules and regulations, and exchanges and enforcements, a close 
consideration of all local institutions is a grueling task. Thus, the focus of this study is less 
on all local institutions and more upon those institutions physically manifested in 
organizations that directly influence livelihoods and landholdings. A birds-eye view of the 
institutional landscape in Daulatabad, categorized as public, private and civic (Table 1.1) 
provides an entry-point for analysis in subsequent chapters. In sum, the institutional 
																																								 																				
5 Mandal is an administrative unit similar to a taluk or county 
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landscape of Daulatabad is comprised of local administration (e.g. Mandal Revenue Office 
in Daulatabad), membership organizations (e.g. Varalakshmi women’s SHG in 
Gokafaslawad), cooperatives (e.g. Daulatabad Mandal Mutually-Aided Credit Cooperative 
Society), service organizations (e.g. Commitments), private business (e.g. Om Prakash 
Traders). Institutional access is turned-on at certain points depending on agricultural 
activities and livelihood needs while interplay is turned-on based on policy directives and 
agenda setting. Institutions (Table 1.1) mediate (Uphoff 1986) livelihoods and landholdings 
by 1) providing inputs (materials, capitals, general and indirect inputs); 2) assisting 
production activities (pooling or providing labor for land preparation, and crop and animal 
management); 3) supporting decision-making (information on input procurement, 
mobilization of labor, cultivation practices); 4) facilitating post-harvest activities (storage, 
processing, transportation, marketing).  
 
1.2.4. Livelihoods and landholdings – towards synergies or tradeoffs 
 
Livelihoods and its dynamics 
 
Livelihoods are mainly related to self-employment and wage earnings. The self-employed 
smallholder livelihood is a mix a match of work on small farms, petty entrepreneurial 
ventures and skill-based artisanship, and household-based enterprises. The concept of 
livelihood dynamics has attracted attention from multiple disciplines. This body of work 
provides diverse framings of essentially the same question: What are the transformative 
structures and processes that influence livelihoods? From a sustainable livelihoods 
(Chambers & Conway 1992) framing, assets available to households determine the viability 
of a livelihood strategy to provide adequate food and income support. Such assets take the 
form of five capitals: natural, physical, human, financial, or social. From a strategies 
perspective (Ellis 1998; Barrett et al. 2011), households accumulate, consolidate, 
compensate, and secure livelihoods depending on the objectives and priorities at particular 
instantiations of economic and biophysical conditions. Meanwhile, scholars on adaptation 
to climate change viewing livelihoods through an institutional mediation lens suggest a set 
of five adaptation practices (mobility, storage, diversification, communal pooling, and 
market exchange) that households undertake to maintain and recover the capacity to deal 
with changes (Agrawal 2010).  
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Another way of approaching the question of livelihood dynamics is through poverty 
alleviation (Banerjee et al. 2015). Here, development economists suggest a set of stages – 
buying food to eat; sending children to school; possessing clothes to wear outside the 
house; and retiring debt – through which households pass as they transition out of poverty 
(Krishna & Shariff 2011). From a pathways approach (Leach et al. 2010), multiple pathways 
of livelihood change conditioned by institutional arrangements and differences in social-
economic-environmental situations create self-reinforcing trajectories of change that benefit 
few systems (households, social group, polices and narratives) more than others. From this 
overview, two aspects of livelihoods research are evident: it is situated at the crossroads of 
several disciplines and this body of work is yet to be integrated, and presently available 
data limits us to empirically analyze the insights gained from literature.  
 
Agro-ecology of landholding 
 
Across the developing world, agricultural systems are evolving rapidly under pressure from 
multiple fronts – demographic, market, climate change etc. This evolution overall, is toward 
an intensive, simplified, replicable, and high-input system that pays less attention to the 
diversity in rural agriculture. In parallel, there is mounting evidence that conservation of 
natural areas alone may not be sufficient since a large proportion of world’s species remain 
outside traditional protected areas (Persha et al. 2010). These areas mostly comprise 
agricultural landscapes “where people live and work” (Miller & Hobbs 2002; Naughton-
Treves et al. 2003). Many studies now offer evidence that conservation will depend not only 
on patches of protected areas but also on the agricultural matrix (Perfecto & Vandermeer 
2008). Here, the science of agroecology and multifunctional landscapes approach (MFA) 
can serve as a useful entry points to analyze individual landholdings and consequences of 
agricultural practices.  
 
First, agroecology as an applied science and movement adapts ecological concepts and 
principles to agricultural practice (Altieri 2004; Rosset & Martínez-Torres 2012; Méndez et 
al. 2013). It provides a framework for assessing the performance of agroecosystems, often 
toward positive synergies such as sustainability between productivity and conservation. An 
agroecology perspective informs the selection and application of alternative solutions 
focusing on interactions and inter-relatedness among biological components and 
biophysical characteristics to enable these systems to sponsor their own protection, fertility 
and productivity (Uphoff 2013; Vandermeer 1995). The main strategy of agroecology is to 
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harness the synergies resulting from combinations of crops, trees and animals in managed 
or naturally occurring spatial and temporal arrangements. Examples of agroecological 
synergies include agricultural types such as crop-livestock (Lemaire et al. 2014), 
permacultures (Ferguson & Lovell 2013), and polycultures (Lovell & Taylor 2013). 
Management practices that enhance, restore or maintain synergies is much sought after. 
Agroecology knits plant ecosystems within agroecosystems and landscape unit mimicking 
to its best ability, the structure and function of natural ecosystems. 
Second, the MFA approach suggests that agriculture goes beyond food production and 
serves to manage natural resources, conserve biodiversity and enhance socio-economic 
viability (Renting et al. 2009). This approach can be broadly categorized based on two 
dimensions (Renting et al. 2009): degree of attention to governance mechanism and the 
principal unit of analysis. According to these two dimensions, MFA approaches are 
structured into four categories of approaches: market regulation of non-commodity outputs 
of agriculture; landuse-based focus on aggregated spatial issues of multi-functionality; 
actor-oriented attention to decision-making process of actors in the social construction of 
multi-functionality; public regulation of MFA that attends to institutional and policy aspects 
in facilitating and monitoring impacts. Of these approaches, actor-oriented is particularly 
useful and applied in this dissertation. Here, the focus on decisions making process of 
access in social construction of MFA against the background of changes in climate, policy, 
and society at large offers opportunities to identify causal factors for the range of MFA 
currently practiced. This approach broadens the scope agricultural functions and key 
factors in farmer decision-making process, and compared to other approaches are notably 
strong in analyzing synergies and tradeoffs created through the combinations of functions 
and farm-based livelihoods. Further, the landholding unit is the level of organization at 
which management decisions can be explicitly analyzed. Flows of material and natural 
resources into and out of the landholding including income from management activity and 
expenditures involved can be measured with greater confidence. Environmental effects of 
cultivation, however, is dependent on factors such as topography of the land, soil type, 
hydro-geological context at higher scales. A focus on landholding-level decisions and 
outcomes, as this dissertation explains, is therefore important to understand synergies and 
tradeoffs in agriculture arising from actor-level decisions having have effects at higher 
scales.  
 
1.3. Study area: Telangana, Southern India  
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This study is based on sixteen months of fieldwork in Daulatabad mandal in Mahbubnagar 
district of Telangana in southern India (Figure 1.2). This area was selected for four reasons. 
First, Daulatabad consists several types of agricultural practices and is representative of 
other areas in India (Images A.5 and A.6). Smallholder rainfed agriculture is the dominant 
agricultural system (Department of Agriculture and Cooperation 2013) here and includes a 
patchwork of rainfed commodity (cotton, pulses and oilseeds), and multifunctional 
agriculture dependent on livestock rearing, non-farm labor, and fisheries. Irrigated green 
revolution type agriculture constitutes less than a quarter of the cropped area (Department 
of Agriculture and Cooperation 2013). Second, Daulatabad is institutionally diverse with a 
variety of public, civic, and private institutions in the area acting to channel benefits to 
farmers. Third, the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh state into Telangana and the residual 
Andhra Pradesh according to the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act of 2014 provided an 
opportune moment to study institutional mechanisms as they unfolded (e.g., the Runa-
Mukti Pathakam a debt waiver scheme of the incoming government) in the new state, with 
promise of comparative studies in the future. Fourth, from a social standpoint, Daulatabad 
is representative of common landholding classes in India and has a particularly good 
representation of religious minorities and marginalized communities.  
 
1.3.1. Geography, climate and agriculture 
 
Daulatabad mandal in north-western part of Mahbubnagar district of Telangana is the focus 
of this dissertation (Figure 1.2). The mandal shares borders with north-Karnataka, and 
towns in the tristate area of Maharashtra, Telangana and Karnataka such as Mudhol and 
Bidar in Karnataka, Kodangal, Gurmitkal in Telangana, and Sholapur in Maharashtra are only 
a few hours by road. On its north, Daulatabad borders Ranga Reddi district (which includes 
the state capital Hyderabad) and Kurnool to its south. It covers an area of approximately 
fifty-thousand acres spread over twenty panchayats (Table 1.1). The topography of this 
area is gently undulating (Image A.7) with an average elevation of 560m above sea level and 
is located between 17.000 N latitude and 77.5667 E longitude. Climate of the area is semi-
arid with hot summers and mild winters, and rainfall occurring during monsoon months. 
However, there is no clear demarcation of wet and dry spells and the intra-season 
variability is high. Overall, average annual precipitation is low, ranging between 500-800 
mm and a ten-year average rainfall of 680 mm, with 14 of the last 35 years declared as 
drought years (Table 1.2). Rainfall is the main source of recharging subterranean aquifers 
and determine tubewell output and water availability in seasonal lakes and tanks. Reliance 
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on tubewells has seen a sharp increase. The official statistics suggesting the presence of 
2900 tubewells may be an underestimate, since unreported tubewells are not accounted 
here (Table 1.3).  
 
All the 10456 households in the area (Table 1.4) are involved in cultivation and grow a mix 
of sustenance and commodity crops using diverse technologies (Table 1.5 and 1.6, Images 
A.5 and A.6). While the gender ratio is fairly even, female literacy lags behind with only 39% 
of females educated compared to 61% in males (Table 1.4). The area is characterized by a 
diverse mix of social groups and several villages have a particularly high (upwards of 45%) 
representation of scheduled castes and tribes. These pockets of high representation are 
relics of land reform policies that distributed land to marginalized social groups. Agricultural 
land makes up to 78% of the land area followed by fallow lands (9%) and patches of 
forested areas (8%) (Table 1.7, 1.8). Over the last few years 2600 acres (5% of the study 
area) of pastures and grazing land (Image A.26 shows an example) have been distributed to 
landless and/or diverted toward agriculture (Table 1.7). This pattern is observed uniformly 
across all villages with some of the study villages noting greater diversion. Rocky outcrops 
and patches of scrub jungles are scattered among landholdings and constitute the 
uncultivable and non-agricultural lands (Image A.23). Crops in the region constitute a mix of 
cereals, pulses, legumes and oilseeds both for sustenance and grown as commodities. 
Main crops include rice (Image A.27), maize, jowar, redgram, greengram (Image A.21), 
cotton (Image A.16) and peanuts. 
 
1.3.2. Farmers, their livelihoods, and landholding 
 
Smallholders in Daulatabad practice diverse livelihood strategies with agriculture as main 
activity (Table 1.12). Participation in multiple activities represents the multiple economic as 
well as non-economic attributes that are necessary to augment income and assets. While in 
some cases diversification of livelihoods is a necessity, they can also be a proactive choice 
that is shaped by social relationships and institutions. A majority of the smallholders studied 
and in the area are illiterate (Tables 1.4, 1.12). Literacy is especially low among women (1.4). 
These smallholders own multiple small parcels of land that is spatially distinct. Almost no 
smallholder owns or operates his landholding in one location. These parcels are spread 
around villages and sometimes other villages as well. Approximately 90% of farmers in 
Daulatabad own or operate less than 10 acres of land, which is close to the landholding 
pattern in Mahbubnagar district (Table 1.11).  Within the study sample, households 
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constitute between 6 and 9 members and all belong to marginalized castes and tribes 
(Table 1.10). Incomes from livelihoods and expenditure are variable and range between 
approximately INR 30 000 to INR 250 000 (Table 1.10). Smallholders practicing commodity 
agriculture, especially contract cotton, have higher incomes, debt and expenditure. Within 
the sample, smallholders are reliant on social security programs and farmers practicing 
mostly sustenance agriculture experience greater food insecurity than farmers focusing on 
commodity agriculture. Over the last few years, farmers and statistics report that yields 
have been lower (Table 1.5) while expenditures on agricultural inputs have remained 
comparable (Table 1.6).  
 
1.3.3. Precariousness of rainfed agriculture 
 
Worldwide, there is a strong correlation between poverty, hunger and water stress (Wani et 
al. 2009). Countries located in the semi-arid and dry sub-humid hydroclimates are also 
locations where rainfed agriculture is the dominant source of food and livelihood. 
Scholarship on rainfed agriculture paint a grim picture of water scarcity, poverty and lack of 
development with frequent droughts, land degradation and high intra-seasonal rainfall 
variability identified as main causatives. Water stress that underlies rainfed areas can be 
classified as based on whether they are climate- and human-induced. In rainfed 
agroecosystems, rainfall variability generates short periods of water stress during plant 
growth (dry spell) almost every rainfall season along with seasons when rainfall is 
inadequate to generate a crop (drought). A recent study linking change in cropping diversity 
between two time periods (1971 –1990 and 1991 – 2004) and intra-seasonal distribution of 
rainfall in Daulatabad finds that wet spells have decreased in intensity and the total wet 
spell duration has increased (Kondabolu 2014). Rainfall distribution during the 34 years of 
this study suggests that drought (rainfall less than 15% of the long-term mean (679.37mm) 
has occurred in 14 years, with approximately every third year being a drought year 
(Kondabolu 2014). While there is no statistically significant difference over the two-time 
periods (Table 1.2), farmers’ experience and narratives suggest otherwise. A clear response 
to the rainfall precarity is captured in their coping strategies. Rainfall variability and ensuing 
water stress has triggered cultivation of irrigated crops. Alongside this shift, farmers have 
decreased the number of crops grown from 23 in the 1990s to 10 crops in 2000s with 
traditional inter-cropping system replaced by mono-cropping. Current crop choices are 
high-yielding varieties with price supports, buttressed by information and benefits from 





This dissertation adopts an integrated social-ecological approach to understand the 
institutional conditions of agricultural practice (Figure 1.3). Within a mixed-methods 
approach, I use the multiple outcomes research program (Agrawal & Chhatre 2011) and 
contextualization (Vayda 1983) as the guiding themes. Specifically, I used process-tracing 
methods (Beach & Pedersen 2013) where the identified causal mechanisms are traced back 
from the outcomes of interest to progressively wider institutional contexts, outward in 
space and backward in time. 
 
1.4.1. Selecting institutional interventions 
 
I conducted exploratory field work for four weeks between July and August, 2014, 
networking with an NGO partner – Watershed Activities and Support Services Network 
(WASSAN) who extensively work in Daulatabad. During this time, I conducted a series of 
informational interviews with representatives of public and civic institutions. Specifically, I 
met with the block development officer, veterinary officer, agriculture officer, bank officials, 
school teachers, horticulture officers, Women’s Self-Help Group members, leaders of 
farmer clubs and co-operative societies, and watershed project officers to introduce myself 
and my study. Some of these meetings lead to repeat meetings and introduction to other 
officials such as the police inspector, thasildhar, district statistical officer, local leaders, 
elected sarpanchs, women leaders, and two other NGO’s active in the area – Access 
Livelihood Consulting and Commitments.  
 
I shadowed several of these officers, and WASSAN staff for over two weeks, to build a 
close rapport, select key-informants, and understand the intricacies of institutional 
functioning. During this time, I saw a birds-eye view, rather an institutional-view plus 
personal opinions, of Daulatabad and its people. Following several leads provided during 
the exploratory phase, I embarked on a secondary data collection mission that led me to 
several labyrinthine websites riddled with pop-ups, offices in non-descript lanes, and 
several visits to cheap photocopy stores. This process enabled me to prepare a draft of 
project activities in Daulatabad, which unfortunately, never seemed to end. This was 
because of the sheer multiplicity of interventions implemented by institutions and their 
several avatars dating back to pre-independence times, the complicated nature of their 
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implementation status, all amplified by the birthing pains of a new state. For example, 
WASSAN alone has over a dozen programs occurring simultaneously; the agriculture 
department has over forty spread across the financial year; the block development office 
oversees several dozen projects at various stages, some brand new.  
 
With this ever-expanding institutional portfolio and finite time and funds, I decided to 
objectively select five interventions in separate villages. Representing the central theme of 
the dissertation, the interventions engage with scholarship in watershed development; 
adaptation by crop selection; rural credit; and technologies of sustainability. These 
interventions are: the Integrated Watershed Management Program (IWMP), the Initiative for 
Nutritional Security through Intensive Millets Promotion (INSIMP), the Business Services 
and Information Center and a community seed bank, the Non-Pesticide Management 
program, and a micro-credit scheme (Table 1.9). In addition to these, I added a market 
intervention on the fly towards the end of fieldwork – contract farming of cotton seeds. Time 
and resource availability permitted sampling of only 9 of the 200 contract farmers.  
 
Selected interventions are nationally representative both in rainfed and irrigated areas of 
India. I selected the interventions based on its implementation in select villages, which 
allowed me to stratify intervention villages across the twenty-seven villages and control for 
interventions as much as practically possible. Since, this is an in-situ experiment, hard 
controls are not possible. Hence, while each intervention was present only in a cluster of 
villages and villages were randomly selected within each cluster, other interventions were 
also being implemented. Even though the presence of other interventions does not ascribe 
for a clean experimental design, this situation nonetheless is representative of villages 
across India where multiple interventions are implemented by several institutions. At the 
least, public institutions provide basic administration and implement a few programs 
making benefit pathways almost universal. However, a few villages are more favoured than 
others by the development and research community, and government agencies for various 
reasons (Chapter 2).  
 
I identified benefit pathways following institutional causes (e.g., presence of a check dam or 
NPM technology or seed bank) to outcomes. Within these cases, I selected five villages 
where particular types of agriculture were being practiced as a result of the interventions. I 
identified two villages as controls. Compared with the study villages, one village receives 
above-average institutional interest that serves as a positive control, while another receiving 
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below average interest is the negative control.  In the first village, only few public 
interventions exist. Isolated even for the standards of a remote mandal, this village is 
neglected by institutions because of lack of roads, a population migrating for labour, and 
broadly considered as “maddi” (difficult, not-smart). This village had none of the study 
interventions. The second village is the village receiving above-average institutional interest. 
Well connected politically, and by a recently-repaired “tar road”, this village was and 
continues to be, the cynosure of several institutions. Three of the four interventions, and 
contract cotton-seed farming are present here. These two control villages, along with four 
interventions, constituted the six villages that form the basis of this dissertation. 																																										                                                                                                                                                                 
 
1.4.2. Villages and households 
 
The six study villages are: Allapur, Challapur, Gokafaslawad, LG Tanda, Narsapur, and 
Thimmareddipalle (Tables 1.9, 1.10). Challapur was included in the first wave of IWMP in 
late 2000’s. L G Tanda is one of the few villages where NPM continues after its initiation 
under the Indira Kranthi Pathakam in 2005. Thimmareddipalle is serviced by the BSI and the 
community seed bank. Narsapur is recipient of micro-credit. Gokarfaslawad and Allapur are 
controls, with the former hosting most of the study interventions (positive control), and latter 
receiving none of the interventions (negative control). In each village, except Allapur, I 
randomly selected thirty-five smallholders from a publicly available, but notoriously difficult-
to-obtain list of beneficiaries. I contacted each of the farmers on the randomly selected list, 
gauged their interest in my study and if they consented, included them in an intervention 
sample of approximately 30 farmers. If not, I moved on to the next farmer on the list. This 
happened once and almost all farmers were enthusiastic about the study. I used two criteria 
to identify beneficiaries. First, they must have accessed the institution for its benefit, and 
second, they must own and/or cultivate no more than 10 acres of land. Fieldwork and 
secondary data suggested that approximately 95% of farmers in Mahbubnagar district own 
less than 10 acres (Table 1.11, Figure 1.4). So, the second criteria was much easier. The 
first criteria, however, was complicated for several reasons. After a preliminary 
investigation, I found that the list of thirty-five randomly selected beneficiaries needed more 
draws since some of the beneficiaries were deceased, discontinued from the intervention, 
or were used as dummies by local elites. Further, the sample reflects the male-dominance 
in landholding. While women farmers were randomly drawn in two interventions, three 
others were explicitly targeted towards men.  
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Sampling was not as clean as planned. First, several farmers on the beneficiary list were 
non-existent. Some had passed on as mentioned earlier, some had quit or refused 
interventions, and some were simply non-existent. Second, some of the lists exaggerated 
the number of beneficiaries. In one village, focus groups suggested that less than thirty 
farmers were beneficiaries while the list suggested otherwise. Third, farmers did not trust 
institutions. For example, in the control village, farmers had been consistently spurned by 
several institutions who cited variously the lack of education, roads, and simple 
mindedness as causing their neglect. This neglect created an ill-will toward anyone 
remotely connected with those institutions. Fourth, institutions attempted to provide 
sampling direction. In three cases, institutional representatives were wary of random 
sampling techniques and the pre-prepared lists. They pressurized, and in two cases, 
threatened field assistants to include farmers who sympathized with, or as we later found 
were in cahoots with them. Lastly, since many institutions are active in the area, it is 
possible that few beneficiaries accessed benefits from all possible sources. In such cases, 
the sampling design is challenged, and despite much effort, it is likely that the sample 
contains such ‘star beneficiaries’.  
 
1.4.3. Data collection 
 
Data collection comprised of two components, ethnography and survey, conducted in 
parallel (Figure 1.3). First, the ethnography. Following case selection in October, I initiated a 
series of informal interviews with farmers. This helped me understand the language better, 
build a relationship with farmers by progressively breaking my outsider and elite status, and 
appreciate the agricultural practice itself. During this time, I participated in tilling, sowing, 
livestock care, weeding, irrigation, and fertilizer application. With this process, I could 
understand a few dimensions of access to institutions, which may not have been otherwise 
possible. Second, the field surveys. I hired six field staff to assist data collection, I chose to 
hire recent graduates from local colleges, who were aware of local contexts, and were 
ambitious to further their career. I developed a pedagogical method based on the IFRI 
protocol to train field staff in interview and survey methods. This process lasted over four 
weeks, after which we conducted pilots in study villages to get on-ground-experience and 
address field-work challenges. For example, the staff, because of their youth were initially 
not taken seriously by farmers. They lacked self-confidence to introduce the research by 
themselves. They were unable to control ‘extraneous voices’ of gawkers, elites, and 
hangers-on who always have something to say, in addition to the interviewee, or answer for 
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them. After two weeks of supported interviews and field surveys, the staff could conduct 
interviews independently as teams of two. Field surveys included three components. 
Household and agro-ecological surveys were conducted in farmer’s homes based on recall 
methods. These surveys identified farmer-specific agricultural practices, and collected data 
on their income, livelihoods, and landholding conditions. The third component was an agro-
ecological survey of landholding units owned and operated by a household. As is common 
in India, smallholders cultivate multiple tiny patches of land spread across administrative 
boundaries and owned by their immediate or extended family. They may also lease-in a few 
patches. In each of the patches, I collected data on agro-ecological and biophysical 
variables. I devised a cross-checking protocol to ensure uniform performance and iron-out 
idiosyncrasies of field staff. In total I surveyed 212 smallholders and 442 landholdings.  
After obtaining IRB approval (#15706 from the Office for the Protection of Research 
Subjects, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Appendix C) in January 2015, I 
initiated the field survey component. In parallel, I began ethnographic fieldwork with key 
informants identified in the exploratory phase. Over a period of three months I participated 
in day-to-day activities of farmers and institutional representatives. Participant observation 
provided a detailed account of specific agricultural practices, which institutions they 
access, and the kinds of benefits they derive. I joined farmers when they bought seeds, 
tilled the land, sowed seeds and weeded. I purchased chemical inputs and hired tractors. I 
checked plant growth vitals and applied inputs. During this time, I conducted multiple focus 
group interviews within each cluster. Focus group meetings helped get a general sense of 
agricultural practices and institutional access, the events that farmers participate in, their 
perceptions of how to “get institutions to work”, views on officers, and a quick study in 
agricultural history of the area. I conducted semi-structured interviews with institutional 
representatives of the five interventions and several informal meetings. In total, I conducted 
over forty interviews, and I have lost count of informal meetings. I participated in 
institutional activities as well. I spent several days as a bank clerk, an assistant, a visitor, a 
hanger-on, and as a consultant across various government departments; a “para-NGO 
staff” assisting NGO employees, adviser and spokesperson for a government extension 
service, an assistant to traders, a teacher, a scientist during visits by international NGOs 
and a shepherd’s apprentice.  
 
Methodologically based on snowball sampling and recall, I generated a list of institutions 
that each focal institution interacted with. I was attentive to scale of functioning – 
administrative level, scope of activity coverage, and geographic coverage, and the type of 
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relation – cooperative, competitive, supportive, strategic. Sampling was theoretically 
considered as complete when no new institutions come up during the interview. Because of 
the sheer number of institutional players, I was unable to interview every institutional 
representative listed by the five focal institutions. This would require an independent effort 
much larger in scope and resources than a Ph.D. dissertation can provide. Hence, the 
sample is incomplete. I traced interplay up to international levels, but limited personal 
interviews to the regional level – south India. The reasoning here was that additional benefit 
of interviewing representatives at national and international levels is minimal compared to 
cost of procuring data since, they may be located for example in New Delhi or Washington, 
DC. However, I met with several institutions based in Hyderabad and Bangalore, and 
telecommunicated with representatives based in New Delhi. 
 
1.5. Dissertation Overview 
 
This dissertation contains three chapters, bookended by an introductory chapter and 
conclusion. The three main chapters are complementary and together, present a multi-
faceted examination of institutional benefits and its mediation of synergies and tradeoffs in 
rainfed agriculture. I have written each chapter with the possibility of being modified into a 
publishable paper, and as such takes a form required for journal submission. Chapter 2 
examines the household and landholding survey data. Based on results of exploratory data 
analysis this chapter provides partial support to the hypothesis that synergies between 
livelihoods and agro-ecological complexity are only produced when institutions provide 
targeted access and the institutions that provide benefits have high interplay. Findings of 
this analysis suggest that smallholders’ access to institutions is an important determinant of 
agricultural practice and outcomes, and this relationship is non-linear. Chapter 3 focuses on 
interplay of five institutions and smallholders' access to them and develops a benefit 
pathway framework. It argues that natural resource governance has devoted insufficient 
attention to the combined influence of interplay and access. This chapter finds that 
interplay and access unfold in two levels. At the institutional level, institutions deploy 
access mechanisms within their network to channel benefits toward social groups upon 
which, access at user level initiates. I find that interplay is better explained when magnitude 
of benefit is considered, and access is analysed more fully when the process of gaining 
access includes demonstration of interest for the benefit. Chapter 4 complements the 
previous chapters by examining five pairs of smallholder clients and credit sources, and 
their social-ecological consequences. This chapter conceptualizes indebtedness as the 
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obligation to repay another or an institution and applies an integrated vulnerability 
framework. I show the diversity of feedbacks that shape indebtedness and provide 
examples of consequences and demonstrate that indebtedness is an important root-cause 
of vulnerability. I argue that the production of vulnerability is more completely explained by 
history of credit relationships with institutions and identity of smallholders, and that the 
indebtedness process drives social-ecological consequences at four levels – the individual, 
household, community and landscape. These consequences feedback into livelihoods and 
indebtedness to reinforce vulnerability. Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. It summarizes 
the main findings and then presents an extended discussion of institutional pathways. 
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1.6.  Figures and tables 
 
Table 1.1. Institutional landscape in Daulatabad, Mahbubnagar 
Public Civic Private/Market 
Department of Agriculture Akhila Bharatiya Yadava Sangham Access Livelihood Consulting 
ICDS – Integrated Chlid Development 
Services, Anganwadi 
Azim Premji Philanthropic Initiative Andhra Bank 
Annadata Chepala Chervuvu, Mathsya Kaarula Sangam (Fisheries 
Group) 
Andhra Pradesh Grameen Vikas Bank 
AP Vikalngula Scheme Commitments B C Corporation 
Daulatabad Municipal Corporation Farmer clubs (Aanjaneya, Boya Kunta, Buggemolla 
Chelka, Devaragadda, Gangiralla Gadda, Kothakunta, 
Patha, Subbanbavi, Vinayaka) 
Balaji Auto Finance 
Department of Electricity Gorre Kaparla Sangam Balampet Fertilizers 
Excise Department Gowda Sangam Balampet market 
Forest Department Indira Kranthi Patakham, SERP Chandra Singh Traders 
Department of Health (Hospitals in 
Daulatabad, Maddur, Kosigi) 
Mahila Sangham (Varalakshmi, Lakshmi, Teja, and 60 
others) 
Cooperative Society Bank 
Housing Department Mandal Mahila Samkhya Daulatabad market 
Kodangal Government College, 
Kodangal 
Seed bank, Balampet Gokarfaslawad market 
Mandal Development Office Seed bank, Kodangal Gold loans by IIFL 
MLA, Mahendra Reddy Seed bank, Maddur Kodangal market 
MLA, Revanth Reddy Seed Bank, WASSAN, Thimmareddipalle Kosigi traders, Kosigi 
Panchayat WASSAN Kotak Mahindra Bank 
Police Department Cooperative Society Lahoti Fertilizers, Kodangal 
Department of Post and Telegraph Center for Sustainable Agriculture Maddhur market 
Primary School, Gokafaslawad The Federation of Sericulture and Silk Weavers 
Cooperative Societies 
Mallappa Traders 
Department of Rural Development Hyderabad Agricultural Cooperative Association Mana Gromor, Coromandel's 
Agricultural Inputs 
Society for Elimination of Rural Poverty Daulatabad Mandala Raithula Mutually Aided Credit 
Cooperative Society Limited 
Muthoot Finance 
Transport Office Shrama Shakti Sangam Naga Sai Traders 
Veterinary Department Business Service Information Center,  WASSAN Nandi Seeds 
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Table 1.1. (Cont.)	
ZP High School, Daulatabad Revitalizing Rainfed Area - Network Om Prakash Traders, Mahabubnagar 
AP State Agro-Industries Development 
Corporation 
Humane Society International Om Sai Traders, Kodangal 
Mandal Revenue Office  Private money lenders 
Agricultural Technological Management Agency Raghavendra Fertilizers, Kodangal 
KVK - Krishi Vignan Kendra  Ramana Fertilizers 
ICRISAT - The International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics Safe Harvest Private Limited 
ANGRAU – Acharya N G Ranga Agricultural University Sahakara Bank 
CRIDA – Central Research Institute for Dryland Agriculture Sangameshwara Bank 
MANAGE – National Institute for Agricultural Extension Management Singh Market Yard 
ICAR – Indian Council of Agricultural Research Sri Sai Traders, Balampet 
DWMA - District Water Management Srinivasa Traders 
IRRI - Indian Rice Research Institute  State Bank of Hyderabad, Daulatabad 
District Food Security Mission Executive Committee State Bank of Hyderabad, Kodangal 
International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center State Bank of Hyderabad, Narayanpet 
National Centre for Integrated Pest Management State Bank of Hyderabad, Tandur 
Small Farmers’ Agribusiness Consortium  State Bank of India, Husnabad 
Agro-Met  State Bank of India, Kodangal 
MACS –Mutually Aided Cooperative 
Societies 
 State Bank of India, Kosigi 
Department of Water Supply and 
Sanitation 
 Sundaram Finance 
  Tandur market 
  Vaishnavi Fertilizers, Kodangal 
  Varalakshmi 
  Venkataramana Traders 
  Vijay Kumar Traders 
  Vinayaka Automobiles 
  Vysa Bank 
  NABARD (National Bank for Rural 
Development) 
  SHPL (Safe Harvest Private Limited) 
  BSI Center 
Source: Fieldwork
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Table 1.2. Rainfall in Daulatabad. Modified from Kondabolu, 2014) 
Period Average total rainfall 
(mm) 
Wet spell (as percent 
of total rainfall) 
Wet spell duration 
(average of wet days 
per year) 
Wet spell intensity 
(average intensity 
during wet spell, 
mm/day) 
1971 - 1990 679.37 82.36 88.65 6.34 
1991 - 2004 666.24 82.71 92.00 6.00 
 

























Chandrakal 0 0 39 0     
Kuppagiri 0 2 145 66     
Matoor 1 3 100 130     
Neetur 0 2 114 500     
Kowdeed 0 1 90 150     
Nandaram 1 1 98 380 Akul Reddy 
Cheruvu 
42 17 Sep-Feb 
Kudrimalla 1 5 120 244 Kotha 
Cheruvu 
80 32 Aug-Mar 
Saleempur 0 0 60 31     
Suraipalle 1 0 46 25     
Imdapur 0 1 110 70     
Yamki 0 1 100 60     
Daulatabad 1 4 250 150 Pedda 
Chervu* 
680 275 Always* 
Bichal 0 0 92 150     
Anthwar 0 4 178 210     
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Table 1.3. (Cont.)	
Balampeta 1 1 69 95 Pedda 
Chervu 
100 40 Aug-Mar 
Gundepalle 0 2 120 50     
Allapur 0 1 99 60     
Thimmareddipalle 0 2 116 115 Chintala 
Cherruvu 
25 10 Aug-Feb 
Sultanpur 0 1 145 190     
Thirumalapur 0 0 40 120     
Nagasar 0 1 110 160     




60, 30 24,12 Jul-Mar; 
July-Feb 
Polkampalle 0 1 120 145     
















52, 25, 15 21, 10,6 July-Mar; 
Aug-Feb; 
Aug-Mar 
Challapur 0 2 73 250     
At Mandal level 8 46 2900 4469     
No dug wells, lift irrigation, canals (except the one in Daulatabad), *important source, dry through summers of 2014-2016. 




Table 1.4. Demographics of Daulatabad 




















Chandrakal 416 2013 1.04 10.63 14.21 0.05 58.50 41.50 
Kuppagiri 261 1175 0.96 11.91 29.53 0.00 62.39 37.61 
Matoor 403 2009 0.97 12.99 17.37 1.34 60.47 39.53 
Neetur 549 2668 1.00 12.37 6.45 0.00 58.59 41.41 
Kowdeed 141 690 1.08 11.01 13.33 3.04 58.99 41.01 
Nandaram 248 954 1.02 12.79 11.01 0.00 60.76 39.24 
Kudrimalla 624 3118 1.04 11.42 2.79 7.41 59.73 40.27 
Saleempur 86 324 0.93 13.58 16.67 0.00 62.25 37.75 
Suraipalle 232 1058 0.98 15.50 11.72 0.00 59.53 40.47 
Imdapur 297 1324 1.02 14.95 11.71 20.02 64.96 35.04 
Yamki 144 914 0.97 14.22 6.46 12.47 65.59 34.41 
Daulatabad 1598 8170 1.03 14.16 7.28 2.20 60.92 39.08 
Bichal 539 2587 1.05 14.19 6.80 6.53 60.91 39.09 
Anthwar 365 1897 0.99 12.92 9.91 0.00 62.22 37.78 
Balampeta 477 2286 1.01 11.85 4.16 0.44 62.38 37.62 
Gundepalle 248 1125 0.91 12.71 15.20 0.00 63.54 36.46 
Allapur 246 1270 0.98 16.14 14.49 5.91 63.54 36.46 
Thimmareddipalle 531 2525 1.04 14.42 7.25 7.84 61.83 38.17 
Sultanpur 340 1779 0.99 12.70 5.73 0.22 61.97 38.03 
Thirumalapur 78 373 0.93 15.55 13.94 0.00 65.44 34.56 
Nagasar 175 879 1.06 14.33 15.81 25.03 60.12 39.88 
Devarfaslawad 580 3263 0.99 16.43 4.78 45.02 63.45 36.55 
Polkampalle 303 1267 1.05 12.71 8.13 35.12 59.74 40.26 
Gokafasalwad 886 4434 0.99 15.85 8.59 17.70 61.81 38.19 
Erlapalle 319 1501 0.99 12.66 15.99 0.00 62.32 37.68 
Challapur 370 1894 0.98 13.67 3.17 1.74 63.36 36.64 
At Mandal level 10456 51497 1.01 13.68 9.04 8.25 61.36 38.64 
Villages in bold and italics are included in the study. Source: Assistant Statistical Officer, Daulatabad 
	 38 
Table 1.5. Approximate yields of main crops in Daulatabad 
Crop Kharif (quintal/ha) Rabi (quintals/ha) 
Rice 27.8 26.7 
Maize 22.7 41.0 
Jowar 8.9 8.6 
Redgram 6.2 0.0 
Greengram 1.9 5.4 
Cotton 2.6 0.0 
Groundnut 12.6 17.7 
Source: Assistant Statistical Officer, Daulatabad. 
 
Table 1.6. Approximate expenditure for main crops. Based on key-informant interviews. 
Crop Land 
prep. 













Rice 1500 700, 1 
bag 
2000 400 5200  7100 25000 17900 25-30000 10-15000 
Redgram 1500 500 600 4000 1000  7000 15000 8000 5-10000 15-20000 
Peanut 2000 10000, 
3-4 
bags 
2000 200 200 2000 2400 45000 42600 10-20000 30-40000 
Greengram 2000 5000 0 0 0, Watch all 
night 
7000 15000 8000   
Jowar 500 500 500 0 0, Watch all 
night 





Table 1.7. Overview of landuse pattern 
Landuse Area of land 
use (acre) 2011 
Area of land use 
(%) 
Forest area 3930 7.89 
Uncultivable land 408 0.82 
Non-agricultural land 1475 2.96 
Cultivable waste 514 1.03 
Pastures and grazing land now 168 0.34 
Change in pastures and grazing land -2461 -4.94 
Trees and groves 64 0.13 
Fallow land 4457 8.95 
Net sown area 38791 77.88 















































Chandrakal 1613 0 15 56 26 20 -98 1 309 1186 74 
Kuppagiri 1426 0 10 43 17 28 -71 1 195 1132 79 
Matoor 2385 0 0 81 26 32 -109 2 143 2101 88 
Neetur 2155 0 17 75 0 29 -93 1 50 1983 92 
Kowdeed 839 0 0 22 0 0 -29 7 165 645 77 
Nandaram 933 0 25 25 5 5 -58 3 40 830 89 
Kudrimalla 2022 0 47 72 0 0 -121 2 46 1855 92 
Saleempur 370 0 0 18 0 0 -18 0 6 346 94 
Suraipalle 870 0 0 44 0 0 -45 1 165 660 76 
Imdapur 1397 0 0 75 0 3 -76 1 58 1260 90 
Yamki 1622 0 0 86 46 20 -132 0 60 1410 87 
Daulatabad 6392 709 161 252 105 10 -533 15 2142 2998 47 
Bichal 3634 0 6 25 77 0 -108 0 646 2880 79 
Anthwar 2193 0 7 52 43 10 -103 1 15 2065 94 
Balampeta 815 0 0 18 18 0 -37 1 53 725 89 
Gundepalle 1296 389 0 17 24 0 -42 1 30 835 64 
Allapur 1616 157 42 28 48 0 -121 3 48 1290 80 
Thimmareddipalle 2009 0 0 49 9 0 -59 1 35 1915 95 
Sultanpur 1428 0 7 69 20 0 -103 7 42 1283 90 
Thirumalapur 784 0 6 27 8 3 -42 1 17 722 92 
Nagasar 1183 0 0 44 4 0 -49 1 9 1125 95 
Devarfaslawad 2674 1423 6 75 10 8 -94 3 42 1107 41 
Polkampalle 872 0 0 40 2 0 -43 1 14 815 93 
Gokafasalwad 5525 1252 37 76 10 0 -127 4 71 4075 74 
Erlapalle 2204 0 0 47 12 0 -63 4 31 2110 96 
Challapur 1550 0 22 59 4 0 -87 2 25 1438 93 
At Mandal level 49807 3930 408 1475 514 168 -2461 64 4457 38791 78 
Source: Assistant Statistical Officer, Daulatabad. 
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Table 1.9. Summary of institutional interventions 




Challapur Integrated Water Management Programme DWMA, Department of Rural 
Development 
Thimmareddipalle Business Service and Information (BSI) Center WASSAN 
LG Tanda Non-Pesticide Management WASSAN, SERP - IKP 




Contract cotton Contractor for a seed company, 
package deal with traders, markets, 







Initiative for Nutritional Security through Intensive Millet 
Program 
Integrated Water Management Programme 
Business Service and Information (BSI) Center 
Farm credit 
Contract cotton 
Department of Agriculture, 
WASSAN 









Table 1.10. Sample demographics 
























Challapur 33 7.12 SC - 
Mala 
40545 8264 163455 4.24 0.82 57 
Thimmareddipalle 35 7.63 SC - 
Madiga 
36886 17200 185143 0.71 0.86 55 
LG Tanda 28 8.24 ST - 
Lambadi 
32321 21107 243036 0.19 0.72 24 
Narsapur 36 6.11 SC - 
Madiga 
52833 35778 168347 0.56 0.76 32 
Thimmareddipalle CC 3 8.33 OC 246667 106667 350000 0 0.75 57 
Balampet CC 3 6.67 BC - 
Mudiraj 
100000 120000 377333 0 0.67 63 
Gokafaslawad CC 3 7.67 Minorities 116667 100000 200000 0.33 0.83 83 
Gokafasalwad 
(Positive control) 
36 7.17 SC - 
Madiga 
42083 17306 206111 1.86 0.83 40 
Allapur 
(Negative control) 
35 6.37 SC - 
Madiga 
45114 21086 173443 2.29 0.63 25 
*Access ratio out of 4 programs (>0.5=high; 0.5=medium; <0.5=low, ratios possible=1,0.75,0.5,0)  
** Average number days worked for MGNREGA 
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Table 1.11. Landholding pattern in Mahbubnagar district 
Landholding (acres) Cumulative landholding 
distribution (%) 
Number of land holdings 
<1.25 33.06 324726 
1.25 - 2.5 57.94 244407 
2.5 - 4.9 83.33 249386 
4.9 -7.5 92.85 93535 
7.5 - 10 95.97 30666 
10 - 12.35 97.70 16966 
12.35 - 18.5 99.13 14101 
18.5 - 24.75 99.64 4947 
24.75 - 50 99.96 3201 




Table 1.12. Overview of livelihoods 
Population Persons Percent of 
population 
Males Females 
0-6 years 7,046 13.68 3,650 3,396 
Scheduled Castes (SC) 9,426 18.30 4,655 4,771 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) 4,247 8.25 2,131 2,116 
Literates 19,936 38.71 12,233 7,703 
Illiterate 31,561 61.29 13,423 18,138 
Total Worker 29,182 56.67 14,829 14,353 
Main Worker 23,896 46.40 12,837 11,059 
Main Worker - Cultivator 10,797 20.97 7,076 3,721 
Main Worker - Agricultural Laborers 9,425 18.30 3,439 5,986 
Main Worker - Household Industries 480 0.93 257 223 
Main Worker -  Other 3,194 6.20 2,065 1,129 
Marginal Worker 5,286 10.26 1,992 3,294 
Marginal Worker (36 Months) 4,778 9.28 1,769 3,009 
Marginal Worker Agriculture Laborers (3-6 
Months) 
3,540 6.87 1,137 2,403 
Non-Worker 22,315 43.33 10,827 11,488 
Total 51,497  25,656 25,841 




Table 1.13. Definitions 
Synergy: Combined positive or negative effects of two or more outcomes that reinforce each other. Operationalized as the jointly above (or 
below) average outcomes.  
Tradeoffs: Two or more interacting outcomes that offset each other. Operationalized as one of the outcomes being above (or below) average.  
Institutions: Formal and informal mechanisms that shape individual and collective expectations, interactions, and behaviour, and 
operationalized in concretely manifested organizations. Examples: Varalakshmi women’s SHG in Gokafaslawad, Daulatabad Mandal Mutually-
Aided Credit Cooperative Society, Department of Agriculture, WASSAN.  
Institutional interplay: interactions among different types of institutions.  
Institutional access: The ability of farmers to benefit from institutions. Institutions can provide targeted access to marginalized groups or 
universal access to all farmers irrespective of social variation. 
Institutional benefit: Benefits are material resources (fertilizers, seeds, credit) and information (technology, prices, weather) provided by 
institutions.  
Institutional benefit pathway: Combinations of two institutional determinants – access and interplay - that explain the production of 
synergies or tradeoffs.  
Livelihood: Self-employment and wage-based means of earning. 
Income: Household income per year and the diversity of income streams from where it is received. 
Agro-ecological complexity: Conditions of landholding that have heterogeneous plant strata, greater canopy cover, and crop/non-crop 
diversity.  
Agro-ecology: Synergies resulting from combinations of crops, trees and animals in managed or naturally occurring spatial and temporal 
arrangements.   
Benefits: Information and resources provided by institutions that influence the choice of agricultural practice. Examples: seeds, market price, 
weather information, technologies, credit, water.  




Figure 1.1. A conceptual representation of the institutional benefit pathway originally developed in this dissertation based 
on a synthesis of inter-disciplinary scholarship related to role of institutions in natural resource governance. The 
combination of interplay and access lead to agricultural practices that are manifested as synergies or tradeoffs. 
The four types of agricultural practices are depicted in the lower panel. The length of the bars represents the levels of 
livelihood security from income and diversity of livelihoods, and agro-ecological complexity. The institutional mechanisms 
are shown in the upper panel. Institutional interplay is shown by the interaction between three types of institutions – public, 
private and civic. Arrows show access. The size of the circle indicates the importance of each class of institution. For 
example, in the rainfed commodity agriculture, private institutions are hypothesized to play a more prominent role than 
public. On the contrary, in green revolution agriculture, public institutions may play as much an important role as private. 
Interplay is indicated by the arrangement of institutions as horizontally (rainfed) or vertically (rainfed commodity, green 
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Institutions        à Agricultural à




Institutions          ß Agricultural
Practice   
ß Outcomes
Qualitative Data
Participant observation, 6 cases
Focus group meeting, n = ~40
Key-informant interviews, n = ~100
Quantitative Data
Household survey, n = 212
Landholding survey, n = 440
Access Interplay Agricultural Practice Income Agro-ecological 
Complexity
H1 Targeted High Sustainable Above - Average Above - average
H2 Universal High Green revolution Above - Average Below - Average
H2 Targeted Low Rainfed multifunctional Below - Average Above - Average
H2 Universal Low Rainfed commodity Below - Average Below - Average
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Synergies and tradeoffs are common when social and ecological consequences are set-up in 
opposition to each other. This chapter focuses on exploratory analysis of survey data and 
makes four points. First, analysis provides partial support to the hypothesis that synergies 
between livelihoods (operationalized as income) and agro-ecological complexity 
(operationalized as frequency of trees) are only produced when institutions provide targeted 
access and the institutions that provide benefits have high interplay. Second, findings of this 
analysis suggest that smallholders’ access to institutions is an important determinant of 
agricultural practice and it is mediated by benefit provision. Third, the institution and social-
ecological relationship is non-linear. Lastly, a comprehensive examination of joint effect of 




Agriculture has the potential to synergize multiple societal goals. Developing countries like 
India face tremendous challenges to reconcile competing objectives in agriculture. The most 
pressing of these challenges fall along social-ecological dimensions. Along the social 
dimension, calls for achieving food security, securing livelihoods, and increasing agricultural 
productivity are growing increasingly louder. On the ecological dimension, pleas for conserving 
biodiversity, preventing habitat loss, and sustaining ecosystem services are finding 
sympathetic listeners. In many current debates, these outcomes are frequently cast in 
opposition to each other, making tradeoffs or win-lose outcomes seem inevitable. Indeed, past 
agricultural efforts such as the ‘green revolution’ reinforce this perception. Reliance on the use 
of high yielding crop varieties in combination with heavily subsidized chemical inputs and 
irrigation delivers wins in agricultural production but losses in environmental dimensions. In 
India and Asia more generally, cereal production and per capita income doubled between 1970 
and 1995 (Hazell 2009). However, these gains occurred alongside significant environmental 
losses, such as water logging and salinity, eutrophication of water bodies, and increasing 
greenhouse gas emissions (Hazell 2009; Pingali 2012).  
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Tradeoffs are not inevitable. Analysis of agro-ecosystems from various developing countries 
indicates that increases in agricultural yield need not necessarily come at an environmental 
cost (Power 2010; Pretty et al. 2006). A study of fifty-seven developing countries demonstrate 
that increased crop yield can be achieved alongside improved water-related environmental 
services and decreased pesticide use (Pretty et al. 2006). Moreover, positive biodiversity 
outcomes have been demonstrated in profitable agricultural production areas in Latin America 
(Vandermeer et al. 2010; Borkhataria et al. 2012), West Africa (Correia et al. 2010; Norris et al. 
2010; Aerts et al. 2011), and Southeast Asia (Peh et al. 2006; Ranganathan et al. 2008; Jambari 
et al. 2012). For example, productively managed arecanut palm, a rainfed commodity grown in 
the Western Ghats of India, retains 90% of the bird diversity associated with regional natural 
forest (Ranganathan et al. 2008). These studies make clear that it is common to observe a 
positive relationship between agriculture, biodiversity and other ecosystem services. More to 
the central theme of this dissertation, local institutions have been identified as important drivers 
of these synergies (Chhatre & Agrawal 2009; Persha et al. 2011). In this chapter, I examine 
synergies and tradeoffs between social-ecological outcomes. The following section provides a 
brief overview of outcomes selected for the examination – livelihoods and agro-ecological 
complexity – followed by hypotheses of the chapter. I then explain the methods and present a 
discussion of exploratory data analysis and its results. At this stage, advanced multivariate and 
tradeoff analyses are not included. These procedures are included in manuscripts at various 
stages of preparation for publication. Lastly, I offer a discussion of results that set-up the 
upcoming chapters.  
 
2.3. An overview of synergies and tradeoffs between livelihoods and landholdings 
 
2.3.1. Rural livelihood strategies 
 
Almost half of the world’s people live and work in rural agricultural areas (FAOSTAT 2013). In 
India, which constitutes 17% of the world population, more than half depend on agriculture for 
livelihoods (Department of Agriculture and Cooperation 2013). One dominant theoretical 
perspective of incomes and their relationship with rural economies is derived from livelihood 
approaches (Scoones 2009). This scholarship explores how agricultural livelihoods are shaped 
by social, political, and environmental processes. These studies stress that livelihoods are not 
just economic attributes of survival and ways to live. They are broader in scope and comprise 
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social relationships and institutions that mediate people’s access to assets and income 
streams (Ellis 2000; Agrawal & Perrin 2009). Moreover, the diversity of livelihood strategies in 
agriculture is not limited to an odd bit of off-farm work. Rural households have diverse income 
sources that are responsive to risks, seasonality, labor and credit markets while considering 
available assets and coping ability. Analysis of livelihood dynamics and access to market 
institutions suggests that for smallholders, many non-farm activities are directly related to 
agriculture and they lack access to high-return non-farm activities (Dorward et al. 2003). The 
inability to diversify across non-correlated income streams therefore makes them more 
vulnerable to social, economic and climatic risks (Ellis 2000; Ellis 1998). To the extent that rural 
livelihoods are organized to mitigate risks and uncertainty, configurations income streams can 
thus be thought of alternate conditions within which, some combinations of income streams 
are more resilient than others (Marschke & Berkes 2006). Income diversity also reflects crop 
choices. For example, a farmer who practices livestock rearing and bee keeping along with 
agriculture is motivated to maintain fodder crops, flowering tree and shrub species, and use 
less pesticides. But, in contrast to smallholder agriculture, ‘green revolution’ farmers select for 
high-yielding crops and against crop diversity. Thus, incomes and their diversity have widely 
differing impacts on landholding quality and thereby provide a link to agro-ecological 
complexity. To keep our enquiry manageable, I focus on an important variable, income - total 
earnings per year, that most closely, though incompletely, reflect the vitality of rural livelihoods.  
 
2.3.2. Conservation in human-dominated landscapes  
 
Natural areas provide habitats for conserving biodiversity. However, there is mounting 
evidence that conservation of natural areas alone may not be sufficient since a large proportion 
of world’s species remain outside traditional ‘protected areas’ (Persha et al. 2010). These areas 
mostly comprise agricultural landscapes “where people live and work” (Miller & Hobbs 2002; 
Naughton-Treves et al. 2003). Many studies now offer evidence that conservation will depend 
not only on patches of protected areas but also on the agricultural matrix (Perfecto & 
Vandermeer 2008). This agricultural matrix is a mosaic of areas with crops and surrounding 
areas that include non-crop shrubs, trees and epiphytes. It contains for example, old trees, 
snags and fallen logs, and temporary pools that fill key ecological roles while being embedded 
in agriculture. Additionally, this area harbors and permits movement of species among areas of 
natural vegetation. These humanly managed mosaics are emerging as areas of new 
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conservation focus (Karanth & DeFries 2010). Recent conservation debates that question 
whether meeting rising food demands requires either land sharing or sparing between 
agricultural production and biodiversity conservation underscore the importance of agricultural 
areas (Fischer et al. 2014). The results of these studies therefore bear directly upon the quality 
of agricultural landholdings in meeting societal objectives such as biodiversity conservation. 
However, farmer decisions driven by incomes could be misaligned with these objectives. For 
example, subtle decisions by Brazilian farmers to selectively cut key understory species in 
order to create adequate canopy cover for cocoa have altered agro-ecological conditions. 
These practices impoverish floristic diversity and reduce habitats for small mammal species 
(Rolim & Chiarello 2004). Research therefore has come to stress that biodiversity in agricultural 
areas hinge on farmer decisions on how they manage the agricultural mosaic: the areas under 
crops and the surrounding non-cropped areas. They constantly endeavor to rectify, improve or 
sustain land use and incomes arising from them. In this sense, land use and livelihood 
outcomes are coproduced (Carr & McCusker 2009). These agricultural practices include 
management of inputs and resources; controlling ‘disservices’ from agriculture such as loss of 
habitat quality and nutrient runoff, and responding to changing socio-economic and climatic 
conditions. Agro-ecological complexity captures the results of these practices and illuminates 
the link between the condition of agricultural areas and incomes. In contrast to incomes and 
livelihoods, agro-ecological complexity is understudied. In this chapter, I include one measure, 
number of standing trees, that reflect this complexity by way of composition and structure of 
agro-ecological landholding. While I acknowledge that this operationalizing is incomplete in 
many ways, it provides a useful preliminary analysis by detailing the number and proportion of 
tree species, heterogeneity in canopy structure – naturally occurring gaps in tree height 
distribution, and canopy cover – percentage of ground covered by tree crowns. Number of 
trees may also indicate smallholders’ dependence on trees for livelihood and allied activities, 
and the positive influence trees have on biodiversity by providing habitats for species existing 
within human-dominated landscapes. 
 
When actors access institutions to pursue individual or collective goals and these institutions 
provide benefits via interplay, the benefit pathway is formed. Andersson (2013) studying local 
forest governance in Bolivia argues that while the most effective external support may come 
from a wide variety of institutions, under contexts of high uncertainty – high conflict, greater 
income inequality – user groups consistently rate public (municipal government) institution 
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higher than others. This suggests that differences caused by socio-economic conditions and 
variations in access may motivate actors to link themselves with institutions. These institutions 
in turn interact with various types of other institutions. Benefit pathways are thus a derivative of 
the combination of institutional access and interplay. High interplay and targeted access are 
necessary but not sufficient if they are working independently. It is the unique combinations of 
interplay and access associated with suites of agricultural practices that are manifested as 
synergies or tradeoffs. It is consequently reasonable to anticipate that:   
 
H1: Synergies between livelihoods (operationalized as income) and agro-ecological 
complexity (operationalized as number of trees) are only produced when institutions 
provide targeted access and the institutions that provide benefits have high interplay. 
 
Or, synergies are only produced in institutional interventions - BSI, Seed Banks, and 
Microcredit, and in the positive control.   
 
H2: Tradeoffs between livelihoods (operationalized as income) and agro-ecological 
complexity (operationalized as frequency of trees) are produced under any other 
combination of access and interplay.  
 
Or, tradeoffs are produced in institutional interventions - IWMP, NPM, and in the 
negative control.  
 
2.4. Data and methods 
 
This chapter is based on data collected from field surveys. Recollecting from section 1.4.3 on 
data collection, the survey included three components. Household and agro-ecological surveys 
were conducted in farmer’s homes based on recall methods. These surveys identified farmer-
specific agricultural practices, and collected data on their income, livelihoods, and landholding 
conditions. The third component was an agro-ecological survey of landholding units owned 
and operated by a household. In each of the patches, I collected data on agro-ecological and 
biophysical variables. I devised a cross-checking protocol to ensure uniform performance and 
iron-out idiosyncrasies of field staff. In total I surveyed 212 smallholders and 442 landholdings. 
I examined this data for missing values and eliminated those variables with missing values, and 
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selected three variables each on social and ecological dimension. I removed contract farmers 
(n=9) in this analysis since this group of farmers are off-the-charts for several variables and 
offer a much smaller sample size for meaningful comparison. The analyzed data comprises 203 
smallholders and their 393 landholding parcels They are total income of a household from all 
livelihood sources, total expenditure towards all requirements, including agriculture, and total 
household debt; sum of trees on all parcels of landholdings owned or operated by a 
smallholder, number of times fertilizer was applied to all crops, number of crops grown last 
season. I then selected one variable from each of the two dimensions – total income and total 
number of trees for exploratory tradeoff analysis. In households where the income number of 
trees are higher than the sample average, agricultural practice was considered synergistic. I 
then investigated within this cluster, the socio-economic and demographic profile of 
smallholders, the suites of agricultural practices that farmers engage in and the institutional 
interactions that facilitated these practices. If the institutional conditions in this cluster display 
targeted access and high interplay, I can then conclude that the hypothesis is valid. In all other 
households, I can repeat the same hypothesis testing procedure and test whether other 
combinations of access and interplay lead to tradeoffs or negative synergies. These cases are: 
below average income and above average trees or above average income, and below average 
trees, below average income and trees (Figure 2.1). Going beyond hypotheses testing, I used 
the qualitative information and other associated variables (Table 2.1) from individual cases to 
explain the institutional conditions when the two identified outcomes reinforce each other and 




An exploratory tradeoff analysis showed that of the 212 smallholders studied, 29 farmers 
displayed positively synergistic agriculture between total income and total number of trees on 
all landholding parcels. A hundred smallholders displayed tradeoffs and for 74 farmers, income 
and trees were negatively synergized (Figure 2.1). Unpacking the associated institutional and 
social-ecological variables of each of these four groups revealed that they differed and were 




First, the similarities. Across the four groups, literacy among members of household did not 
vary by much. Similar to rest of the mandal, almost half of the household members had not 
received primary education and most of these members were women. All four groups 
depended on social security, workfare and welfare programs offered by civic institutions, and 
the ease of access to these and other institutions was similar as well. Along the ecological 
dimension, landholdings of all groups were approximately distributed into at least two parcels, 
but farmers with greater incomes had fewer parcels of larger area. These parcels of all four 
groups experienced similar wildlife attacks and crop raids, with almost 4 events on almost 
every crop (other than a few millets) every season.  
 
Second, the differences. Smallholders displaying negative synergies were disproportionately, 
rather three times, more food insecure. For example, they experienced on an average, three 
weeks of food insufficiency compared to all other groups. They also had smaller families (with 
only six members) compared to larger (seven to nine members) in other groups, and 
participated ten days more on average in NREGA workfare program. It is interesting to note 
that smallholders showing positive synergies also depended highly on workfare programs (41 
days a year on average) compared to tradeoff groups (approximately 30 days of participation a 
year). Differences were even more stark in household expenditure and debt. While all groups 
had high levels of expenditure and debt, smallholders with below-average incomes spent as 
much as and were as indebted as other groups. For example, the average amount of 
expenditure and debt in groups with negative synergy was INR 1000477 and 1533622, not 
very different from low-income tradeoff group – INR 127568 and INR 153490. However, groups 
with higher number of trees and positive synergy had the highest amount of debt – INR 231633 
and INR 264966. Along the ecological dimension, both positive and negative synergy groups 
practiced input-intensive agriculture with higher fertilizer and pesticide applications. 
Smallholder groups with synergies applied pesticides 8-11 times and fertilizers 13-16 times a 
year compared to 10-13 times in tradeoff groups. However, smallholders with low incomes 
were comparable in their pesticide application (16 times a year) to the positive synergy group. 
Farmers showing synergies grew more crops than those farmers in tradeoff groups. Lastly, 
tradeoff analysis showed that access to institutions was greater in groups with positive 
synergy. They accessed almost two institutions more than any other group and smallholders 
showing negative synergy accessed the least number of institutions.  
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Graphical representations of these variables show a u-shaped curve from negative synergy to 
positive synergy through the tradeoff combinations (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). Here, the average 
number of fertilizer applications and average number of crops grown are high in the negative 
synergy, decrease in the tradeoffs and increase again in the positive synergy. A similar pattern 
is observed in average amount of debt and expenditure, where indebtedness and expenditure 
are higher at the synergies, though the curve for indebtedness is flatter than that of 
expenditure. Exploratory analysis of the three social and ecological variables selected (income 
of a household from all livelihood sources, total expenditure towards all requirements, 
including agriculture, and total household debt; sum of trees on all parcels of landholdings 
owned or operated by a smallholder, number of times fertilizer was applied to all crops, 
number of crops grown last season) for treatment effects, showed interesting patterns. First, 
the social dimension. Income was highest among farmers practicing NPM who were also the 
most indebted (Figure 2.4 and 2.6). They were followed interestingly by the group of farmers in 
negative control who had higher incomes and debt. Contrastingly, farmers in positive control 
had lower than average income and debt, and farmers receiving microcredit loans also had 
lower incomes and debt. Overall, smallholders within the IWMP intervention had the lowest 
incomes and debt-levels (Figure 2.4). Surprisingly, differences in income and debt did not 
follow to expenditure (Figure 2.5), which did not show notable differences in average 
expenditure across all interventions. Second, the ecological dimension. Crop diversity was 
highest among farmers accessing the BSI center and in the positive control group (Figure 2.7), 
with the NPM group planting the least number of crops. Associated with the crop diversity, the 
number of fertilizer application was also highest in the BSI group with NPM group having the 
lowest number of pesticide application (Figure 2.8). However, the NPM and IWMP group had 
the least number of trees on landholdings compared to all other groups (Figure 2.9). 
Smallholders in the BSI and both the controls had greater number of trees than all other 
groups.  
 
Next, to test the hypotheses, I created a matrix of smallholder distribution along synergies and 
tradeoffs, and treatments (Table 2.7). The matrix explains the distribution of smallholders’ 
position on the tradeoff axes and their hypothesized institutional cause. The result is a mix of 
expected and unexpected patterns. First, the expected results. Based on the hypothesis that 
synergies will be observed only under conditions of targeted access and high interplay, I 
anticipated that smallholders in the BSI, microcredit and positive controls would have a greater 
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share of their farmers in the positive synergy group. However, this is only partially observed. 
Over a third of the farmers in these treatments are in negative synergy group. I anticipated that 
farmers in the NPM treatment would be in the low-income, high-tree group. This hypothesis is 
supported, as was the expectation that IWMP will have negative synergy. In limited support of 
the hypothesis, a greater share (17/29) of smallholders in the synergy group have experienced 
targeted access and high interplay of institutions. Second, the unexpected results. One of the 
surprises was the observation of a greater proportion of smallholders in the negative control 
group in the high-income tradeoff and positive synergy group. In addition, a large share of 
institutional treatments with targeted access and high interplay did not or only partially resulted 
in positive synergies. In short: exploratory tradeoff analysis suggests that that the hypothesis 
that synergies will be observed when institutions provide targeted access and the institutions 
that provide benefits have high interplay is not supported. However, as the results are 
interesting in important ways and require further research attention. And, the alternate 




In this chapter, I have offered an exploratory analysis of univariate relationships among social 
and ecological variables and their institutional causes. The findings of this analysis suggest that 
smallholders access to institutions is an important determinant of agricultural practice by 
providing access to benefits. Variations in institutional benefits condition this practice resulting 
in observed variations in outcomes. While the set of determinants is larger than the scope of 
this dissertation, this chapter shows the combination of institutional mechanisms leading to 
synergies and tradeoffs.  The synergies and tradeoffs identified in this analysis suggest that 
only a handful of smallholders are able to synergize social-ecological goals and these farmers 
are those that are while less dependent on social security programs make the most of available 
workfare and institutional interventions. While all farmers face similar ecological and 
biophysical challenges (e.g., pest and wildlife attacks, rainfall variability etc.) adaptation 
strategies vary. Those farmers in negative synergies and tradeoffs spend as much or more than 
those farmers who show positive synergies. When considered together with income levels, 
indebtedness seems a key adaptive strategy to protect livelihoods and standing crops. 
Institutions also have a direct relationship with crop choice, its variety and diversity, and input 
application. However, the paradoxical observation of positive synergies in negative controls 
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and tradeoffs and negative synergies in positive controls suggest that institutional mediation is 
not straight forward and warrants a comprehensive examination of institutional mechanism. 
While the focus of this dissertation is on one institutional mechanism – benefit provision – and 
its determinants – access and interplay – several other mechanisms can be at play making, as 
observed in this chapter, absence of institutional interventions just as or more effective than all 
institutional interventions put together. This suggests that the theorized importance of the role 
of institutions need to be studied with caution and examined for instances where institutional 
mechanisms can stifle opportunities for achieving synergies. The observation of the u-shaped 
curve complements this observation by showing that the institution and social-ecological 
synergy relationship is non-linear. It provides suggestions for hypothesis for future studies for 
the study of institutional mechanisms such as social-ecological synergies in rainfed agriculture 
is associated with greater debt and intensity of practice than tradeoff categories. Testing this 
hypothesis will examine a) how a subset of smallholders is able to successfully adapt even in 
environmentally marginal areas while others are unable, and 2) get at the root institutional 
causes that makes it effective for some and not others.  
 
The analysis presented in this chapter is incomplete in important ways. First, this analysis is 
exploratory without the performance of any statistical analysis. Second, the analysis uses one 
variable while many others could, and will be important. Third, the conceptual interpretation of 
synergies and tradeoffs is undeveloped. It considers values above and below the mean, where 
medians and multivariate analysis could be more meaningful. This chapter unashamedly fails to 
focus on a critical element of tradeoff analysis: the joint effect of variables on each other to 
synergize each other or tradeoff each other. I make no effort to disguise these shortcomings. 




While there have been several ideas about what sustainable agriculture should look like – eco-
agriculture (Scherr & McNeely 2008), wildlife-friendly agriculture (Fischer et al. 2008; Green et 
al. 2005), multifunctional landscapes (Lovell & Taylor 2013), there remains no consensus on 
which vision is preferable. What is common among these studies, however, is the recognition 
of multiple simultaneous benefits along social and ecological dimensions that can be sustained 
into the future. In this dissertation, synergistic agriculture manifested as positive synergies 
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between livelihoods and agro-ecological complexity is of interest. Unpacking the institutional 
benefit pathway leading to synergistic agriculture provides an exciting intellectual challenge 
with the possibility to look at the social and environmental contexts of agriculture in a new way. 
The following chapters address this challenge and examine how specific combinations of 
institutional mechanisms lead to observed synergies and tradeoffs.   
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2.8. Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1. Variable definitions  
Variable  Definition 
Total income  Sum of incomes from the following livelihood streams: agriculture, wage labor, 
livestock, non-timber forest produce, firewood, home production, salaries/pension, 
remittances, trade and others 
Number of trees in landholdings Total number of tees on all landholding parcels owned and/or operated by the 
household 
Average family size Average of sum of household members in six demographic classes: men and women 
under 15 years, men and women from 15 to 60 years, and men and women over 60 
years 
Proportion of family that is not literate Average of proportion of illiterates to educated in each household 
Number of weeks without sufficient food Number of weeks in the last year that the household experienced insufficient food 
Reliance on four social security programs Access ratio out of 4 programs (>0.5=high; 0.5=medium; <0.5=low, ratios 
possible=1,0.75,0.5,0) 
Number of days participated in workfare  Average number of days a household participated in NREGA work 
Average of total expenditure Average of household expenditure on the following: raw food, education, medical and 
health, asset creation, veterinary, fodder and animal feed, agricultural inputs, 
domestic energy, bribes and fines, and others 
Average debt amount Average current household debt from all formal and informal sources of all household 
members 
Average number of land parcels Average number of landholding parcels owned and/or operated by the household 
Average wildlife raids on crops Average of total number of wildlife raids across all crops and landholding parcels in 
the last year 
Average number of fertilizer applications Average number of fertilizer applications across all crops in the last year 
Average number of pesticide applications Average number of pesticide applications across all crops in the last year 
Average number of crops grown Average of number of crops grown by a household in the last year 
Average number of institutions interacted  Average of number of institutional interactions of the household 
Average ease of institutional interaction Average ease of institutional access experienced by the household, between 1 and 5. 
1=Extremely difficult; 2=Moderately difficult; 3=Not very difficult; 4=Easy; 
5=Extremely easy 
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Table 2.2. Negative synergy. Low income, low in number of trees. 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Average family size 74 6.297297 2.688024 2 17 
Proportion of family that is not 
literate 
74 0.4352703 0.2087551 0 1 
Number of weeks without sufficient 
food 
74 2.378378 4.920471 0 30 
Reliance on four social security 
programs 
74 0.7804054 0.1894147 0.5 1 
Number of days participated in 
workfare  
74 50 57.76025 0 300 
      
Average of total expenditure 74 100477 84950.98 15500 570000 
Average debt amount 74 153621.6 128677 0 605000 
Average number of land parcels 74 2.054054 1.157369 0 6 
Average wildlife raids on crops 74 4.108108 1.601092 0 8 
Average number of fertilizer 
applications 
74 8.27027 4.451558 2 28 
      
Average number of pesticide 
applications 
74 13.5 9.424901 2 60 
Average number of crops grown 74 4.527027 1.91764 1 11 
Average number of institutions 
interacted  
74 12.2973 4.186507 2 24 
Average ease of institutional 
interaction 
74 4.288378 0.3862182 2.69 4.93 
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Table 2.3. First tradeoff. Low in income, high number of trees. 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Average family size 51 6.901961 3.651054 3 20 
Proportion of family that is not 
literate 
51 0.4141177 0.2174137 0 0.86 
Number of weeks without 
sufficient food 
51 1.882353 6.736905 0 48 
Reliance on four social security 
programs 
51 0.7745098 0.2015868 0.25 1 
Number of days participated in 
workfare  
51 31.96078 25.87428 0 100 
      
Average of total expenditure 51 127568.4 103155.4 16000 666000 
Average debt amount 51 153490.2 106902.3 15000 530000 
Average number of land parcels 51 2.980392 1.838371 1 10 
Average wildlife raids on crops 51 4.235294 1.975735 0 8 
Average number of fertilizer 
applications 
51 10.05882 6.943808 0 39 
      
Average number of pesticide 
applications 
51 16.19608 12.30125 2 71 
Average number of crops grown 51 5.745098 2.544352 1 11 
Average number of institutions 
interacted  
51 13.62745 2.513649 8 20 
Average ease of institutional 
interaction 




Table 2.4. Second tradeoff. High income, low number of trees. 
Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Average family size 49 8.367347 3.903491 3 20 
Proportion of family that is not 
literate 
49 0.4434694 0.184871 0 0.89 
Number of weeks without 
sufficient food 
49 0.7346939 1.753277 0 10 
Reliance on four social security 
programs 
49 0.755102 0.2008432 0.25 1 
Number of days participated in 
workfare  
49 28.28571 24.20744 0 90 
      
Average of total expenditure 49 141037.8 94790.66 46500 527000 
Average debt amount 49 231632.7 176817 0 850000 
Average number of land parcels 49 2.040816 1.171879 0 5 
Average wildlife raids on crops 49 3.979592 1.819911 0 9 
Average number of fertilizer 
applications 
49 9.489796 5.224631 1 29 
      
Average number of pesticide 
applications 
49 13.89796 6.605695 5 43 
Average number of crops grown 49 5.040816 2.169478 1 11 
Average number of institutions 
interacted  
49 12.83673 3.847872 3 22 
Average ease of institutional 
interaction 




Table 2.5. Positive synergy. High income, high number of trees.  
Variable n Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Average family size 29 7.068966 2.534491 3 12 
Proportion of family that is not 
literate 
29 0.3824138 0.2063052 0 0.82 
Number of weeks without 
sufficient food 
29 1 1.908627 0 7 
Reliance on four social security 
programs 
29 0.7672414 0.1881659 0.25 1 
Number of days participated in 
workfare  
29 40.68966 40.73793 0 180 
      
Average of total expenditure 29 173989.7 142458.1 23000 611500 
Average debt amount 29 264965.5 255100.6 6000 993000 
Average number of land parcels 29 2.413793 1.210585 0 6 
Average wildlife raids on crops 29 4 1.439246 1 7 
Average number of fertilizer 
applications 
29 11.82759 5.695041 2 25 
      
Average number of pesticide 
applications 
29 16.86207 7.204781 9 44 
Average number of crops grown 29 6.37931 2.396631 3 11 
Average number of institutions 
interacted  
29 15.03448 3.659457 5 24 
Average ease of institutional 
interaction 





Table 2.6. Synergies and tradeoffs, together.  
Income - Tree count LL LH HL HH 
n 74 51 49 29 
Average family size 6.30 6.90 8.37 7.07 
Proportion of family that is not literate 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.38 
Number of weeks without sufficient food 2.38 1.88 0.73 1.00 
Reliance on four social security programs 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.77 
Number of days participated in workfare  50.00 31.96 28.29 40.69 
     
Average of total expenditure 100477 127568 141038 173990 
Average debt amount 153622 153490 231633 264966 
Average number of land parcels 2.05 2.98 2.04 2.41 
Average wildlife raids on crops 4.11 4.24 3.98 4.00 
Average number of fertilizer applications 8.27 10.06 9.49 11.83 
     
Average number of pesticide applications 13.50 16.20 13.90 16.86 
Average number of crops grown 4.53 5.75 5.04 6.38 
Average number of institutions interacted  12.30 13.63 12.84 15.03 





Table 2.7. Institutional benefit pathways and synergies and tradeoffs between smallholder income and number of trees in landholding.  
Shades of grey increase with frequency of farmers.  
Institutional benefit pathway n Low-Low  Low-High High-Low High-High 
BSI, Seed banks 35 13 4 12 6 
NPM 28 11 16 1 0 
Microcredit 36 14 10 4 8 
IWMP 33 19 6 4 4 
Positive Control 36 10 5 18 3 
Negative Control 35 7 8 12 8 




















Figure 2.2. Distribution of debt and expenditure along synergy and tradeoff clusters of farmers. 
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Figure 2.4. Box plots of debt levels in treatment (panels 1-4) and control (panel 5 – positive, panel 6 – negative) groups. 
 




















































Figure 2.6. Box plots of total household income in treatment (panels 1-4) and control (panel 5 – positive, panel 6 – negative) groups. 
 








































Figure 2.8. Box plots of number of pesticide applications in treatment (panels 1-4) and control (panel 5 – positive, panel 6 – negative) groups. 
 




















































Institutions determine the range and direction of benefits. Even though rainfed agriculture 
has not been favored by policy, the diversity of institutions active even in an administratively 
remote and environmentally marginal area is rich. This chapter focuses on interplay of five 
institutions and smallholders' access to them and develops a benefit pathway framework. 
This chapter makes five core points. First, interplay and access unfold in two levels. At the 
institutional level, access explains how institutions deploy mechanisms within their network 
to channel benefits toward social groups upon which, access at user level initiates. Second, 
the ability to benefit is better explained when access is expanded to include the magnitude 
of benefit, whereby beneficiaries can be analyzed as having privileged or marginal access. 
Third, an emerging common principle of access is that of demonstrated interest where 
actors desirous of gaining access establish their needs, fit and relevance in intervention 
agenda to agents controlling access. Fourth, when interplay is high, pathway properties 
such as institutional accountability become diffused. Lastly, a broader analytical framing is 
necessary to “get institutions right”6 that includes the nature of benefits, interplay and 
access dimensions, and outcomes.  
 
3.2. Introduction: The institutional benefit pathway 
 
This chapter investigates how institutions shape agricultural practices, which 
simultaneously influence livelihood and landholding conditions. Institutions do so by 
modulating the availability of information (e.g., climate variability, agricultural technology, 
crop prices etc.) and material resources (e.g., fertilizers, water, seeds etc.) to farmers. While 
the theoretical framework is explained in Chapter 1 (section 1.2.2, Figure 1.1), it is 
appropriate to restate here that the pathway is a combination of two institutional 
mechanisms – interplay and access. Institutional access is the ability of individuals to 
benefit from institutions. Institutional interplay refers to interactions among different types of 
institutions. The package of institutional access and interplay operating in a particular 
locality constitutes the benefit pathway, shaping agricultural practice to produce 
																																								 																				
6 Scholars (Barrett et al. 2005; Uphoff 1993; Young 2002) have increasingly believed that “getting in-
stitutions right” is as important as and inextricable from “getting incentives right” if sustainable pro-
gress is to be made in both conservation and development.  
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combinations of outcomes. This chapter investigates four pathways: the Integrated 
Watershed Management Program (IWMP), the Initiative for Nutritional Security through 
Intensive Millets Promotion (INSIMP), the Business Services and Information Center and a 
community seed bank, the Non-Pesticide Management program, and a microcredit service. 
These interventions are described in Chapter 1 (section 1.4.1).  
 
3.3. Benefit pathways 
 
There is a long-standing interest to answer the question: What kinds of institutions and in 
what combinations lead to sustainable livelihoods and environments? Scholars have 
addressed this question using various lenses and find that the evidence supporting the idea 
that better-functioning local institutions produce more pro-poor benefits, is not always 
conclusive (Uphoff 1986). But, the converse, that inadequate institutions diminish people’s 
wellbeing is well substantiated. We have little understanding of a) institutional functions, 
their nature and goals, b) institutional interaction and its consequence on benefit provision, 
c) access to institutionally-mediated benefits. These gaps have been highlighted as 
contributing to the lack of middle-range theories resulting from efforts to either develop 
insights at the global-level with scholarship on mitigation and climate modeling as 
inspiration or a deeper focus on localized case studies of vulnerability (Agrawal 2008). The 
benefit pathway framework attempts to address these gaps by bringing together a network 
perspective to cross-scale institutional relations, and issues of power and ability to benefit 
from institutionally-mediated resources. Institutional benefit pathways are locations where 
access and interplay coalesce. They are situations and events where contents, operation 
and consequences of one institution is affected by another. They are the determinants that 
admit or deny groups to benefits. In this chapter, combinations of interplay and access are 
addressed to bolster the framework, identify future research questions, and applications in 
different development projects.  
 
3.3.1. Integrated Watershed Management Program 
 
In India, decentralized and community-based management of natural resources has been 
applied widely since the 1990s. Decentralization and creation of new institutions has much 
appeal to policy-makers, practitioners and funders for transforming forests (e.g., Joint 
Forest Management), plantations (community forest management), and watersheds. In this 
background, the Integrated Watershed Management Program appears as the latest avatar 
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of the watershed development programs. The goal of this program is the promotion of 
social-ecological-economic development of people and watersheds in areas susceptible to 
drought. Origins of IWMP can be traced to the Drought-prone Areas Program 
conceptualized around the 1970s when drought was the dominant theme of governments. 
Several successive ‘task force’ – committees of experts, judges, scholars, intellectuals – 
from 1970s to 90s have guided the program themes from prevention of silt deposition in 
large reservoirs and controlling desertification to conservation of land and water, 
afforestation and integrated community-based watershed development. Following a fresh 
set of guidelines by the Hanumantha Rao Technical Committee in 1994, the Ministry of 
Rural Development, Government of India issued guidelines7 for watershed development 
that integrated earlier avatars with newer agendas (then) of community participation, 
technical intervention and capacity building. Since then, the guidelines have seen 
modifications via the Hariyali Guidelines of 2003 and nine others (Reddy 2006). These 
guidelines have each modified the program by addition and subtraction of themes 
responding to pressures from international donors, a neo-liberal ethic and broader political 
economy. For example, the 1994 theme of drought gave way to institutions, community 
action and technology-based solutions from 1995 – 2001, which was followed-up with a 
sharp focus on economic development through employment generation in the 2000s to the 
current themes of enhancing agricultural production and “convergence”8. IWMP in 
Telangana aims “to restore the ecological balance by harnessing, conserving and 
developing degraded natural resources such as soil, vegetative cover and water and create 
sustainable livelihoods for asset less”. The program targets a section of a watershed, a geo-
hydrological unit draining into a common point, of about 500 hectares for in situ 
interventions (Table 3.1). These areas are pre-selected based on satellite data-based 
thematic maps, soil conditions, presence of marginalized groups, and land-use/land cover 
maps. The program is applied nationally in a phased manner and implemented locally by a 
project implementation agency (PIA, Figure 3.1), which can be a consultant or an institution. 
In Daulatabad, IWMP is implemented in two watersheds – Challapur/Erlapalle (micro-
watershed code - 4D2B802A) and Gokafaslawad (micro-watershed code – 4D2B802E). A 
similar watershed development program, Watershed Development Fund, implemented by 
NABARD is active in a neighboring mandal and is not covered in this study.  
																																								 																				
7 The National Watersheds Guidelines are rules and procedure codebooks that are extensively used 
and adhered to by implementing agencies 
8 Convergence is a common jargon in development circles that suggests synergy between disparate 
government departmental activities, here, for example IWMP must use NREGA labor, use funds from 
National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture (NMSA) for input subsidy and technology. 
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3.3.2. Initiative for Nutritional Security through Intensive Millets Promotion 
 
In 2012, the Government of India announced INSIMP under the Rashtriya Krishi Vikas 
Yojana (RKVY, translation: National Farmer Development Program) to promote millets as a 
nutritional cereal. The need for this program was based on recognition of two facts: that the 
area under cultivation of millets had seen over fifty-percent decline since 1960s following 
continued policy neglect and support of other cereals (e.g., rice), and that millets are 
nutritionally rich in fiber, minerals and digest more slowly making them suitable for inclusion 
in nutrition security programs (e.g., Integrated Child Development Services Program). 
Further, millets are minor and underutilized crops (Gruère et al. 2009). They are minor 
because of the lack of investment in research and development, and underutilized because 
they are locally abundant, but rare at higher scales – nationally and globally. Millets thus 
presented a “low-hanging fruit” for policy-makers and practitioners who saw promising 
avenues for “convergence” of INSIMP to the public distribution system (PDS, food fare 
program) and addressing nutritional concerns of a growing diabetic population. 
Interestingly, this initiative takes the high-input intensive agriculture path on what is a low-
input intercrop. Farmers in Daulatabad (and elsewhere) grow millets because they are low-
input and are hardy to climate since the land races are endemic and traditional. Efforts to 
move what is largely a sustenance crop toward intensive practices is reminiscent of the 
green-revolution and indeed, policy-makers are tireless in their search a flagship crop to 
lead the new agricultural revolution, and millets, they believe, could be now what rice and 
wheat were in the 1970s. Further, this initiative was unique in that it provided “input kits” 
and post-harvest assistance to beneficiaries. These kits included hybrid millet seeds 
(Jowar, variety SPV 462, in Daulatabad, several others listed table 3.2 were distributed 
across India), fertilizers (mainly di-ammonium phosphate and urea), seed treatment 
chemicals (e.g., Imidacloprid, Captan). They were especially attractive to farmers (see 
section 1.1.1 for farmer’s observation on attractiveness of fertilizers) since the fertilizer and 
chemical pesticides cost upwards of INR 3000, and can be applied to other crops. Post-
harvest value addition took the form of processing units (to de-husk, de-stone, de-hull), 
capacity-building of farmers and extension units, and demonstration and set-up of 
processing technologies. The initiative targets areas with large area under millet cultivation 
but with productivity lower than national average. Areas with higher tribal and other 
marginalized populations were to be given preference with the specific village-level location 
and beneficiary selection made in consultation with the Panchayat, the Agriculture 
Development Officer, and Krishi Vigyan Kendras (Agriculture Research Institution) and 
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Directorate of Sorghum Research, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), and the 
Joint-Secretary of Rashtriya Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY, a state-level plan for assistance 
from national-level). In Daulatabad, INSIMP was implemented by the Department of 
Agriculture and WASSAN, and included over 700 farmers across thirteen villages. These 
farmers were provided Jowar and input packages in Kharif of 2013.  
 
3.3.3. Business and information center. Agricultural extension in India. 
 
Since India’s green revolution, extension service has been central to agricultural programs. 
From efforts to increase productivity by conducting farm demonstrations of HYVs (high-
yielding varieties) and imparting input application knowledge, agricultural extension service 
in India has evolved into a decentralized, participatory, and demand-driven enterprise. 
About a decade ago, the monolithic service wore-off core extension elements based on a 
‘training and visit approach and input delivery principle’, and piloted a ‘knowledge-sharing 
approach’ among farmers and stakeholder institutions through the Agricultural Technology 
Management Agency (ATMA). ATMA is now the main extension agency poised for a major 
revamp and investment from central government and the World Bank. However, ATMA 
continues to be bureaucratic and centralized, contrary to its premise. For example, it 
focusses its activities on extension plans conducted by PRA techniques (which few farmers 
have attended) and approved by the district magistrate signaling the making of the 
important block action plans (which ironically maybe universal across administrative blocks 
rather than customized). Barriers to information use are therefore built-into the extension 
service. Indeed, even after scaling-up of ATMA across India, studies suggest that input 
dealers are the main source of information and not ATMA. They are a distant second, 
followed closely by public television, social networks and progressive farmers, and media 
(Babu et al. 2013; Glendenning et al. 2010). This points at an agricultural extension gap that 
civic and market institutions fill. Recent reviews of India’s extension suggests that 
smallholders’ access to extension service is not well understood, and identifies lack of 
information fit and relevance as potential reasons for ineffective extension service 
(Glendenning et al. 2010). In this backdrop, WASSAN set up a Business Services and 
Information hub (BSI) in Daulatabad together with the mandal-level farmer cooperative to 
promote sustainable agriculture. They seek to achieve this goal through selling agricultural 
inputs (e.g., locally produced, truthfully labelled seeds), providing custom hiring services 
(e.g., sprayers, rotavators, mechanized chaff-cutters, ice boxes), and disseminating 
information (e.g., prices, climate, videos on agricultural technologies). The BSI hub is focal 
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point of visits by senior government staff, researchers and donors during which the promise 
of farmer-owned, WASSAN-supported, hubs is displayed. The center also benefits from a 
sister intervention – CLICS (climate information centers) - in a neighboring district where 
WASSAN is the implementing agency for IWMP. WASSAN has proposed the integration of 
similar hubs with IWMP and other large-scale agricultural programs. WASSAN also brings 
its considerable expertise to BSI through its multiple activities and institutional interplay 
(Figure 3.3), which is leveraged to increase farmer engagement with BSI products.  
 
3.3.4. Non-pesticide management  
 
Pesticides are used to kill undesirable organisms. They act by targeting multiple biological 
and physiological processes that are either common in a wide range (broad-spectrum 
pesticides) or a selection of organisms (specialized or narrow-spectrum pesticides) from 
insects and weeds to fungi and microorganisms. Besides the target pests, pesticides also 
affect ecosystems, environmental media (soils, water, air), foraging livestock and human 
health. Some of these effects are benign, but others are more lethal and problematic. While 
the use of pesticides is not a new practice, the use of synthetic and narrow-spectrum 
pesticide is on the rise worldwide. Herbicides dominate the North American and European 
agriculture and insecticides overshadow all other pesticides in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America (Pretty 2012; Pickard & Needs 2014). In India, use of synthetic pesticides began 
around 1947 with modest application of DDT (p,p-dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane) for 
malaria control and BHC (gamma-benzene hexachloride) for locust control. Now, India 
manufactures over 500 pesticide formulations across all hazard categories (Table 3.4). Over 
150 manufactures are active in the exploding pesticide market and all of them show 
positive growth (Abhilash & Singh 2009). India is also one of the handful of countries 
engaged in large-scale manufacturing and use of toxic chlorinated pesticides (e.g., DDT, 
HCH: hexachlorocyclohexane) and highly toxic organochlorine insecticides (e.g., 
Endosulphan: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 10-Hexachloro-1, 5, 5a, 6, 9, 9a-hexahydro-6, 9-methano-2, 4, 
3-benzodioxathiepine-3-oxide). Overall, pesticides are applied in decreasing share to 
cotton, rice, vegetables (e.g., okra, chillies. An example is shown in Image A.30), plantations 
(e.g., cashews, mango), cereals and pulses, and sugarcane. The use and abuse of 
pesticides in India is a curious mix of media frenzy on health effects of pesticides, lack of 
regulation in pesticide sale and application, emergence of the environmental and health 
conscious urban consumer, and farmer distress. The attention of scholarship and the 
frenzied discourse is directed on the farmer as the culprit. In prominent media and well-
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cited works (Abhilash & Singh 2009; Rao et al. 2005; Pickard & Needs 2014; The Energy 
and Resources Institute 2012), the farmer is presented as lacking training, who ignores 
application guidelines harming themselves and others, is afflicted by poor literacy that 
makes reading complex instructions on pesticide cans impossible, generously mixes across 
chemicals, and “repeatedly and indiscriminately” applies pesticides. It is in this context that 
the non-pesticide management took root in Punukula and Pullaigudem villages in 
Khammam district in Andhra Pradesh where farmers went pesticide-free. In these villages, 
pilot projects were initiated in early 2000s by an NGO - Socio-Economic and Cultural 
Upliftment in Rural Environment (SECURE) that focused on ecological solutions to 
management of pests. Following primary adopters, other farmers in the area and several 
neighboring villages incorporated this practice. The spread of this practice drew the 
attention of media, NGOs (e.g.  WASSAN and Center for Sustainable Agriculture), and 
policy-makers leading to its scaling-up to the state level. In 2006, NPM was integrated as 
the central piece of the Indira Kranthi Pathakam (a poverty reduction program) implemented 
by SERP. Within a training and visit approach, the program taught women members of 
SHGs and a village level technical guide what has now come to known as NPM practices. 
These practices include (Table 3.5) for example, using light traps and bonfires for attracting 
moths, placing colored sticky boards to trap insects, setting-up pheromone traps, altering 
inter-crop distance and growing sacrificial crops along crop boundaries. In Daulatabad, 
NPM was implemented over a decade ago, but has petered out. LG Tanda is a rare 
exception where NPM is practiced.  
 
3.3.5. Microcredit service 
 
Microcredit is the provision of small loans to groups marginalized from the mainstream 
financial services sector. These groups include women, small business entrepreneurs, 
farmers and self-help groups. The premise of microcredit service is that credit access can 
fight poverty and promote economic growth. Pioneered in Bangladesh by Muhammad 
Yunus over two decades ago, microcredit, along with insurance and savings programs, has 
emerged as a prominent financial delivery system in rural areas. Its effectiveness in 
alleviating poverty, however, is still inconclusive (Karlan & Zinman 2011; Banerjee 2013; Bali 
Swain & Wallentin 2009). In India, microcredit and microfinance more broadly, is linked to 
SHG’s, farmer clubs and other “grass-roots” institutions. These groups typically have a 
membership between 5 and 20 people who come together based on affinities, existing 
relationships, homogeneity in livelihoods, shared experience or socio-economic status. The 
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vast majority of microcredit institutions in India are composed of women. They are offered 
training in book-keeping, bank transactions, and livelihood strategies. SHG groups meet at 
least once a month when members deposit money to a common fund, which is then lent to 
other members of the group. When a member avails a loan, they pay a set amount each 
month and over time (usually a year) repay the loan with a small interest. Such lending 
functions on interse agreements – trust in each other for repayment –  to keep the cycle of 
deposits and loans running since collaterals are not required. In some cases, groups 
approach an external funding agency and gain larger loan amounts and in others, agencies 
match the deposit amount doubling the amount available to members (see section 4.5.4). 
Loans are offered among members in a mutually agreed sequence and hence there is high 
peer-pressure to repay on time resulting in above-average repayment rates. In Telangana 
and Andhra Pradesh, SHGs are part of a federation that coalesces at the mandal-level 
called the Mandal Mahila Samakhya (MMS). Nominations for MMS posts are democratic 
and it forms the key link to government convergence programs, NGO activities, and market 
interventions. Studies suggest that microcredit has evolved into a retail or small-business 
lending where, for-profit lenders extend loans based on individual liability (Karlan & Zinman 
2011). Indeed, the microcredit service examined in this chapter is a group of farmers in 
Daulatabad, who are linked to a national-level commercial bank through WASSAN. The 
bank lends money at a lower-than market rate of interest and offers a cut of that interest to 
the NGO. The NGO in return for the cut offers “capacity” and expertise (more details on this 
is available in Chapter 4, section 4.5.4). This service uses the institutional template of the 
MMS, where farmer groups (mostly male) are federated at the mandal level as the 
Daulatabad Mandala Raithula Mutually-Aided Cooperative Credit Society (DMRMAC). As of 
2014 balance sheet, the DMRMAC shows a share capital of INR 20 Lakhs offered to 266 
members at the rate of 14% per annum (Table 3.6), and WASSAN is set to expand the 
service to other groups within its activity area.   
 
3.4. Methods. Progressive contextualization and tracing institutional benefits 
 
The goal of this chapter is to understand the institutional antecedents of livelihoods and 
landholding condition. It is based on interviews with institutional representatives and 
participant observation of smallholder access to institutional benefits. I trace the 
institutional causes by progressive contextualization (Vayda 1983) within cases that are 
hypothesized to demonstrate tradeoffs and synergies between livelihoods and agro-
ecological complexity. I do so by investigating the institutional interactions that have direct 
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consequences on flow of benefits into the case study area. I locate institutional agents of 
agricultural practice within progressively larger units of analysis from operational 
landholding, community, village, and sub-district and up to international levels. To unravel 
the institutional interplay, this study draws on the network analysis methods developed in 
anthropology (Sanjek 1978) to identify key connections and interactions. I complemented 
this institutional mapping by following the flows of information and resources collected from 
my interviews with farmers. I used at least two interviews conducted at different time and 
place regarding identified benefits to triangulate observations of interplay and access. In 
addition, I drew from theory-testing process-tracing methods (Beach & Pedersen 2013) 
where the identified causal mechanisms – institutional interplay and access – is traced to 
observable manifestations of the outcomes (livelihood security and agro-ecological 
complexity). This method is most suitable because the causal mechanisms are traced to 
progressively wider institutional contexts, outward in space and backward in time enabling 
within-case inference about whether the mechanism functioned as I expected. This nesting 
of causal mechanisms in broader contexts goes beyond merely identifying correlations 
between independent and dependent variables and peers into the institutional ‘black box’ 




This chapter examines interplay and access of four institutionally mediated benefits. I use 
institutional interplay as proposed by Young (Young 2002) and Uphoff (Uphoff & York 1993), 
and Ribot and Peluso’s  (Ribot & Peluso 2003) theory of access. Access is ‘a bundle of 
powers’ rather than ‘a bundle of rights’. It is constituted of mechanisms – means, 
processes and relations – that actors exercise to gain, maintain and control access to 
benefits from ‘things’. These mechanisms can be based on rights (those that are 
sanctioned by custom, law or institutions), illegalities (outside of law and institutional 
sanctions), and can also be structural and relational that include access to markets, labor, 
and via identity, authority, and negotiation. This chapter argues that interplay and access 
unfolds in two levels. First, access at the institutional level explains how institutions deploy 
mechanisms within the broader political economy to channel benefits toward communities. 
Second, when benefits are thus made available, access at user level kicks-in which is 
closer to Ribot and Peluso’s recognition of access. These two levels engage interplay and 
access dimensions such that a) interplay analysis incorporates access mechanisms, which 
current scholarship restricts to unraveling linkages, type of interplay, influence, and 
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consequences (Table 3.7), and b) access analysis incorporates aspects of interplay, which 
scholarship overlooks since it considers ‘things’ to exist already. In essence: When there is 
no benefit there is no access. If access dimensions of a benefit are not relevant then 
interplay has become ingrained in social relations and durable institutions. However, if 
benefits are provided by interplay, access analysis must consider how the institutions 
coalesce around benefits. The following sections explain power distribution within access 
relations in the design and negotiation of institutional benefits, and the importance of 
access dimensions (gaining, controlling, maintaining) along with interplay components 
(influence, reciprocity, linkages) within participating beneficiaries and user groups. The 
emerging conflicts in the process of benefit distribution along the pathway are explored.  
 
3.5.1. Institutional interplay in IWMP 
 
The IWMP program works on a decentralization principle, but puts the institution into which 
power is divested, on a short leash. In Daulatabad, IWMP has treated a total of 4563 ha of 
landholdings through its two primary institutions – the Watershed Development Committee 
(WDC) and Project Implementing Agency (PIA). Both institutions were newly created for the 
IWMP program, which interplay with already existing institutions. While WDC is formed by 
drawing representatives from smaller and more homogenous ‘user groups’ of landholders, 
the PIA, usually an NGO or sometimes an individual consultant, is selected by the State-
level Nodal Agency (SLNA) based on proposals submitted for the position. Both institutions 
are meant to be harbingers of decentralized natural resource governance, but instead end-
up becoming political instruments of resource access. Interviews with PIAs and WDC 
members suggest interplay begins with the announcement of watershed areas selected for 
implementation. This happens sequentially starting with the Departments of Land 
Resources (DOLR), Rural Development and Watershed Development (DOLR) and State 
Level Nodal Agency (SLNA) located at state- and national-level institutions flowing to the 
District Water Management Agency (DWMA). While some studies suggest that watershed 
selection at local levels is a matter of administrative expedience (Baviskar 2004), interviews 
and observation suggest that selection is based on expert knowledge that takes the form of 
“digital maps” to identify large swathes of drought-prone areas and demarcate watersheds 
for treatment. Once these watersheds are selected, call for proposals are issued and 
interested PIAs apply. The application review process is a gray area that happens “behind 
closed doors” at DWMA and SLNA, and “it is very likely that NGOs and PIAs already in the 
‘know’ will get the contracts”. The contracts are voluminous. For example, in Challapur, INR 
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108.36 Lakhs is sanctioned to treat 903 ha with an administrative budget at 10.8 lakhs over 
five years of project cycle.  
 
At this point, the watershed institutional pathway is constituted of funds and paperwork that 
get directed towards NGOs and PIAs who “know how to handle situations” and “get 
results”. For example, the ‘Entry-point Activity’ or EPA has a budget of 4% of the total 
watershed budget and is facilitated by a NGO or “PRA person”. The selection of NGO or 
PRA person to implement EPAs is subject to local politics where elected representatives re-
direct this budget item (among others, discussed further on) to party cadre or within their 
social network. It is at this point that villages are selected within the “digital maps” and the 
program picks-up pace. Selection of villages can be a matter of convenience (Baviskar 
2004), but interviews suggest that local politics directs the pathway. The two villages have 
considerable “political clout” in the area. The Panchayats of these areas have consistently 
nominated members to the higher-level Zilla Panchayat, and they sit on boards of several 
committees such as the marketing, grievance and interestingly are much involved in “social 
audit” of government programs as well. Members of panchayat and political groups claim 
IWMP as their “bringing” to the village and score political points. As one panchayat member 
adds, “inter-village conflicts over projects happen all the time, but we have to stake our 
claim forcefully since we cannot cede projects to other villages. It can mean that we are 
weak and more projects can be diverted away from us”. Claiming large-scale government 
projects is a “win”, which political parties use in elections and to one-up rival party 
functionaries. In other cases, where NGOs have stronger community links and have higher 
influence with SLNA and DWMA, they are likely to direct benefit to villages where they are 
most active. This suggests that the strength and influence of institutions to access benefits 
directs the pathway, whether it is the panchayat or a NGO. The selection of the PIA and 
treatment village initiates the making of the all-important Detailed Project Report (DPR) – a 
technical report that provides an overview of social, ecological, biophysical, and cultural 
aspects of the treatment area. Making of the DPR is a lengthy exercise involving village-
level meetings involving the MMS, Panchayat and Gram Sabha (GS, village collective 
organization). During these meetings, project activities are discussed with potential 
beneficiaries to identify problem areas and brainstorm solutions. However, these meetings 
are often hijacked by local elites and(or) shortened by blatant copying of DPRs from earlier 
projects and other areas.  
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After the DPR is approved, the project begins with the PIA (through the Project Officer, PO) 
consulting with Village Organizations (VO, SHGs, part of MMS), Panchayat and GS to select 
members for the WDC and identifying an unemployed youth as Village Assistant of the 
IWMP. At this point, local level interplay is necessitated because IWMP structure demands 
convergence with NREGA, SERP and MMS for beneficiary selection, labor payments and 
livelihood activities, Departments of Agriculture for inputs, Rural Water Supply and Irrigation 
for sanctioning activities, and Horticulture for saplings. In parallel, the PO initiates a search 
for contractors for mechanized land works, suppliers for construction materials, and 
candidates for the position of watershed assistants. At these points of interplay, in addition 
to existing institutional linkages, level of influence and opportunities for reciprocal benefits 
shape which actors are included within the program. Once the IWMP pathway is set-up and 
actors are aware of their respective benefits, the funds begin to flow and the program 
activities listed in the DPR begin. SLNA and a technical team at the state-level then 
scrutinizes activities and if all is well, approves the activities.  
 
All POs are required to meet with SLNA and Project Director (PD) every month. The PD has 
the authority to administratively sanction activities and initiate interplay with other local 
institutions. These meetings happen often via videoconferencing and can be surreal. The 
PD chides, chastises, publicly shames POs for lack of progress. POs are terrified of these 
meetings because, most of them fail to meet approved targets9. PIAs who meet targets are 
a rarity and gain celebrity status. As one PO observed, “it is like a game of musical chairs. 
You are always wondering if you will be left standing. And if you are, you could get fired”. 
Indeed, Challapur has seen multiple PIAs, the appointments of whom go through the 
politics-laden interplay described above. Project Officers, however, have the authority to 
implement all activities (or “works”) and along with the Watershed Computer Center, 
Technical Officer and Village Agents sanction works and submit plans for administrative 
approval via the WCC and create Work Commencement Letters. The pathway then 
undergoes a series of status changes from “sanctioned” to “work start-up”, presenting 
anxious moments to beneficiaries. Then, the PO signals the Technical Assistant – the village 
																																								 																				
9 It is a frequent compliant of POs that works cannot be completed. Barriers cited include lack of 
community interest, labor availability, rains or no rains, institutional structure, and politics. Interviews 
with farmers suggest otherwise. Most common complaints are that they not consulted for works and 
when they have suggestions or oppose proposed works, they are taken off the list. Proposed activi-
ties thus go unfulfilled. This means that at the aggregated district and state level, IWMP funds pro-
vided by the central government to the state government remain unused. Hence, the PD is under se-
vere pressure from Additional Secretaries (high-level bureaucrats) and politicians to use the funds. 
But, because of local interplay funds get backed-up.  
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level institutional representative – to call a meeting of the WDC to explain works and start 
them. Once works begin, payments for material, labor are recorded in “muster reports”. 
After work completion, the Technical Assistant and PO check the works to ensure if they 
meet standards set in the DPR and Watershed Guidelines. Approval at this stage moves the 
‘work’ to WCC where payments are generated to the muster roll and payments are 
uploaded. The PO then checks the muster and works and approves the payment with a 
unique “digital signature key”. Payments for labor and contracts are channeled by MMS 
and SERP to reach bank accounts of beneficiaries. In sum, vertical interplay of institutions 
among state- to local-level directs the movement of IWMP benefits to PIAs and WDC who 
then direct it to beneficiaries by positioning themselves within horizontal interplay of local 
institutions.  
 
3.5.2. Institutional access plus interplay in IWMP 
 
According to official statistics of IWMP, 191 smallholders are listed as beneficiaries. Some 
of these beneficiaries have since been deleted or removed. These beneficiaries constitute 
sixteen user groups, some of which are women-only or SC-only. Livelihood and land 
development benefits have been provided to these beneficiaries. Specifically, land 
development works have involved building loose boulder structures, rock-filled dams and 
check dams, percolation tanks, check walls, farm ponds, mechanized boulder removal and 
stone bunding, and raising horticulture plantations. These benefits are targeted towards 
farmers from the list generated by institutional interplay (Figure 3.1). In addition, some 
benefits are provided by IWMP to all village members. These take the form of street lights, 
reverse-osmosis water treatment and cattle troughs though entry-point activities.  
 
Gaining access to targeted benefits is based on operating/owning land within the 
watershed, identity (groups by caste, belonging to backward caste, scheduled caste and 
tribes), negotiation of social relations via patronage of Panchayat members and elites by 
enduring obligations, and reciprocating access by supporting a positive narrative of the 
program. Social relations with MMS members and SHG groups are helpful in gaining 
access since they are key to beneficiary selection. Farmers who have outstanding loans are 
pressurized to get involved so that the income from IWMP can repay SHG loans. In other 
cases, smallholders can gain access by demonstrating their knowledge of watershed 
technologies such as having check dams or other water conservation structures on their 
land. This directs IWMP works to their land as POs seek to claim benefits of existing works 
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as part of IWMP. It is important for smallholders to maintain access to the program since it 
lasts four to five years. Those having better social relations can gain access within the first 
two years of the program claiming sought-after works like expensive mechanized boulder 
removal. Others must contend with maintaining cordial relations with VOs, POs, and 
Panchayat members to gain access in subsequent years or to preferable works. However, 
in Challapur, interviews suggest that beneficiaries were largely thankful that they were 
recipients rather than claim choices from the menu of works. For example, Kankappa, a 
smallholder grew only jowar in one of his landholdings. This patch had particularly poor soil 
quality and water retention was low (Image A.32). He was offered mango plantations within 
NRM (Natural Resource Management) portion of the IWMP budget. He accepted, not 
because he anticipated benefits from an orchard in the future, but because he could get 
labor payments for the plantation activity.  
 
The discussion of interplay helps understand the diversity of actors who control access. 
While the PD has the ultimate authority on the project, local functionaries like PD, TO and 
VO and WDC members have immense power in controlling and channeling benefits. For 
example, a WDC member’s wife is also a member of the local-SHG. The couple 
recommended a youth in their extended family for the post of village assistant (VA), and he 
was appointed. Since the VA is now obliged to them he responds favourably to their 
beneficiary suggestions. Further, the power of economically-based ties also shapes access. 
For example, a smallholder Anjillappa is well connected not only to the ruling Telangana 
Rashtra Samaithi party but also to former elected members of Congress party and Telugu 
Desam Party. He has used these connections to get a large portion of boulders removed on 
one of his landholdings. He plans to build a “small pond” there. In addition, he is also 
contractor for raising tree saplings for the Forest and Horticulture Departments. Because of 
“convergence” activities, he has paid himself to plant an orchard in his wife’s landholding 
with saplings he raised.  
 
While these actors are direct beneficiaries of the IWMP program, a host of subsidiary actors 
gain and maintain access. One of the key beneficiaries is the JCB10 contractor, and 
contractors make a minimum of INR 1100 per hour of work11. IWMP has spurred the 
livelihoods of JCB drivers, machinists, dealers and contractors. JCBs release the high-
																																								 																				
10 JCB is an acronym for the UK-based J. C. Bamford Excavators Corporation. 
11 To put this in context, an average post-doctoral scholar’s monthly salary is approximately INR 
75000 per month, about 120 hours., i.e., INR 365 per hour. 	
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pressure that POs face from PDs, especially in the second and third years of the project. 
POs take short-cuts to project activities, which involve mechanized works of what should 
be labor works, i.e., JCB contractors siphon off IWMP funds targeted to enhance livelihood 
activities of marginalized smallholders like Kankappa. These works are then legally (or 
illegally, in some cases) passed off and approved as livelihood activities by obtaining 
signatures of laborers (who are indebted to the VO or Panchayat or other elites) on musters 
thereby saving the face of POs during review meetings. This case suggests that even 
though IWMP program is decentralized, beneficiaries have few options to choose from 
because of the complex factors of interplay and access that shape and direct benefits 
(Table 3.8). When the ability to benefit is expanded to include the magnitude of benefit, this 
case suggests that even among those able to gain access, benefits are unequal. There are 
those with privileged access getting the cream and/or the lion’s share of benefits, while 
some have marginal access deriving mediocre or low level benefits from the institution. As 
evident in IWMP (and other governmental programs) coveted activities are directed towards 
those that are slightly more privileged among the smallholders and benefits that are 
considered cumbersome to gain are relegated to the more marginalized.  
 
3.5.3. Institutional interplay in INSIMP, BSI, NPM and Micro-credit 
 
In this section interplay dimension for three institutional benefits – millets, business and 
information centers, non-pesticide management technology, and micro-credit –  are 
explained (Figures 3.2 through 3.4). They are better discussed together since WASSAN 
(http://www.wassan.org) is a common element of each pathway. These four pathways are 
geared towards agricultural development such as landholding improvements, adopting 
innovative agricultural technologies and credit on which rural households depend for their 
livelihoods. 
 
3.5.3.1. INSIMP pathway 
 
The millets pathway is the most direct among the institutional benefit pathways. Two 
primary institutions – Department of Agriculture (DoA) and WASSAN – deliver packages of 
seeds and inputs (Table 3.2) to smallholders in Daulatabad. In theory, the scheme is a 
consequence of interplay between the Panchayat, the Agriculture Development Officer 
(ADO), the Krishi Vigyan Kendras (Agriculture Research Institution) and Directorate of 
Sorghum Research, Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), funded by the Rashtriya 
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Krishi Vikas Yojana (RKVY, a state-level plan for assistance from national-level). In practice, 
however, the ADO identifies beneficiaries for the scheme. In Daulatabad, WASSAN added a 
layer of interplay at the state-level when representatives aware of the scheme 
communicated their interest for its implementation in areas where they were active to the 
District Collector, the highest ranking bureaucrat at district level (WASSAN 2014). This 
initiated a communication to the ADO to liaise with WASSAN to select beneficiaries, as 
described in section 1.1 (Ramesh, officer with the Department of Agriculture). Interviews 
with WASSAN staff suggests that the beneficiaries were part of a running list that each of 
them maintain. With intimate knowledge of farmers’ livelihood and socio-economic status, 
these lists help them identify target beneficiaries for a host of programs. For example, when 
a project that provided livelihood benefits (chick and ram-lamb rearing) for the most 
vulnerable sections became available, WASSAN staff promptly directed the benefits to their 
list of poorest-of-the poor (POPs). Similarly, WASSAN provided a list of beneficiaries to 
ADO who had little choice but to advance the benefits. This method of identifying 
beneficiaries is common in remote areas where local arms of government administration 
supplements its activity by building relationships with civic institutions. Further, during the 
entire dissertation study, Daulatabad did not have a full-time ADO. It was delegated as an 
additional-charge to ADO of a neighboring mandal. With benefits of INSIMP being available 
and the ADO stretched thin with managing two mandals, ready-made lists of beneficiaries 
were welcomed rather than scrutinized. With a high level of influence and diktats coming 
from superiors, the ADO – WASSAN interplay was a marriage of expedience. The material 
benefits – input kits of seeds (jowar, SPV 462) and chemical inputs – had already been 
decided at the state-level in consultation with the ICAR, KVKs and Directorate of Sorghum 
Research and were picked-up (except the chemical inputs) and distributed. In contrast with 
IWMP, the authority to monitor growth remained with the ADO who found the growth vitals 
poor. When confronted, WASSAN staff blamed the poor growth vitals on lack of the 
promised chemical inputs, which were supposed to be delivered as a package of practices. 
With this stalemate and deteriorating relationship among local institutions, WASSAN 
appealed to the DC to provide cash in lieu of fertilizers, which the ADO was opposed to. 
Integrating millets into ICDS programs thus failed to be realized. While INSIMP is a national-
level scheme providing directives to channel benefits to smallholders, this case suggests 
that a focus on horizontal interplay of DoA and WASSAN at local-level is more meaningful. 
This interplay demonstrates the diversion of institutional benefits to preferred beneficiaries 
of locally-active institutions, failure to realize the full potential of projects due to conflicts 
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over timing and delivery of benefits, and the non-existant role of beneficiaries in shaping the 
benefits, ironically meant for them.  
 
3.5.3.2. Pathways of BSI, NPM and Micro-credit 
 
Institutional interplay of the BSI center, NPM and microcredit is as fascinating as it is 
complicated. It represents how national-level NGOs leverage power of knowledge, 
networks and capital to access benefits, and channel them to their constituency and itself. 
WASSAN is part of an extensive network of NGOs, research institutions and donors who 
together form the Revitalizing Rainfed Area network, and is a contributing member of 
epistemic communities brought together within domains of participatory groundwater 
collectivization, water and sanitation, and watershed management. Interviews with several 
representatives of WASSAN triangulates its institutional interplay from a minimum of sixty 
collaborating institutions within the network extending to about 300 local institutions. 
Because of this extensive interplay, the constituency of WASSAN in Daulatabad have 
above-average access to institutional benefits. 
 
Institutional interplay within this benefit pathway is well-worn and new opportunities to 
channel benefits follows the same path. It begins with a knowledge of potential benefits 
that can be delivered to the constituency, such as seeds, credit or machinery. This 
knowledge is acquired through interplay of WASSAN with civic and public institutions 
located at national and regional levels. New opportunities take the form of proposals, 
grants, schemes, budget outlays that are issued in “circulars” or shared though networking. 
Then a proposal is prepared, often with directives to local-level staff to collect specific 
details (e.g., if the scheme involves provision of ram lambs to marginalized, then WASSAN 
staff taps their network to get a feel of location of beneficiaries and gauge their interest) that 
is collated as tables and charts. In some projects, especially with large budget-outlays and 
ramifications for elected representatives (e.g., inauguration of toilets in girls’ schools or 
installation of a reverse-osmosis unit are publicity opportunities that elected representatives 
and government officials embrace) several NGOs may apply. Within a competitive 
environment, NGOs engage in intense networking activities to become successful. In other 
projects, the decisions are already made even before the calls or “circulars” are issued. In 
pre-determined cases, the pathways are based on long-term relationships, trust and 
reciprocity. Influence wielded between institutions in such cases is equal and NGOs such 
as WASSAN can influence the scope and agenda of projects. When the projects are 
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finalized and laborious paperwork complete, the local NGO staff receives directives to 
conduct meetings with VOs, MMS, and farmer groups. If new institutions need to be 
created, they are drawn from the constituency and made. If existing institutions can stand-
in, then institutional representatives are provided training on the activity. Since, most of the 
benefits involve cash exchanges of some form, each group within WASSAN’s constituency 
has a separate bank account that is a joint account of elected members of each group. For 
example, the Sai Baba Rythu Sangam in Thimmareddipalle is one of the 11 farmer groups, 
each having 10 and 15 members. Each group elects a representative and a secretary who 
open a joint account in their names. Transactions can then take place through the joint 
account – a stand-in for shared accountability and liability. This means interplay with local 
banks who abhor rampant group making and account creation. Bank officials are under 
directives of the Reserve Bank of India for account performance and officials suspect that 
these groups are created for a specific scheme or project. In some cases, groups cannot 
gain benefits just because they are unable to open a joint bank account. After bank 
accounts are created member lists are ready, local staff begins works by organizing regular 
meetings where extensive minutes are taken. These meetings lay out day-to-day project 
activities, negotiations, attendance, and goals to achieve by the next meeting. Each of 
these groups elects a member or two to the village-level from which a “palaka vargam” 
(elected representatives) is elected to the mandal-level cooperative. This decentralized 
elected system is common to VOs, MMS, and IWMP, which means some of the same 
people sit on elected groups of multiple programs. For example, it is impossible to not run 
into “adhyaksha” (President) Sitaramulu who is present in almost every meeting conducted 
by civic, public, or private institutions. WASSAN co-opts these elites and gains access to 
his cadre of followers, who then “assists” in beneficiary selection.  
 
Interplay with other local institutions is the responsibility of WASSAN staff. It can happen in 
one of three ways. First, as the INSIMP and IWMP cases show, interplay can be mandated 
through directives issued at higher level or through program structure. Second, interplay 
can occur for functional reasons, such as interplay with the banks for account opening and 
maintenance, or with the Veterinary Department for ram-lamb health monitoring. Third, 
interplay can be strategic. For example, the Agricultural Officer (AO) of a block (which 
includes several mandals) is visited often by WASSAN staff and invited to group meetings. 
During these meetings, he is accorded the role of the guest of honor and is chaperoned to 
several project activities with extreme hospitality (e.g., staff repeatedly bowing and smiling, 
maintaining physical distance, offering bottled water only to him, providing steel lunch 
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plates while others eat on leaves woven together). Sometime during the visit, WASSAN staff 
bring-up projects in the making at state- and national-levels or for benefits (such availability 
of subsidized inputs) in which the AO is the implementing authority. WASSAN staff would 
have been briefed of these projects during their monthly review meetings and these 
meetings serve to strategically place WASSAN in advantage. He is also delicately 
requested, sometimes overtly as well, to “keep project activities in mind” when he meets 
with the District Collector and at the upcoming state-level meeting. Such nuanced interplay 
by seasoned NGOs such as WASSAN shapes which benefits are offered and which are not. 
When interplay is not favorable – such as appointment of a District Collector who was very 
wary of NGO integrity and scale of impact – projects with a good fit to the WASSAN’s 
agenda are let go. This suggests that benefits channeled have a high degree of 
intentionality shaped by a constellation of interplay factors, surprisingly without choice of 
beneficiaries, indicating minimal agency of smallholders to shape the nature of benefits 
approaching them.  
 
In this section interplay of three specific institutional benefits, all mediated by WASSAN, are 
discussed. They are the BSI12, NPM, and microcredit. These benefits result from the 
interplay of two primary institutions – WASSAN and Daulatabad Farmers’ Cooperative with 
a key involvement of MMS. First, the BSI model was piloted to promote sustainable 
agriculture through three goals – business, custom hiring services and information. The idea 
is to demonstrate the financial viability and sustainability of farmer-run hub of services, 
which can function even after the withdrawal of external support. WASSAN has ambitious 
plans for the BSI center. Starting with setting-up a BSI center for each Panchayat in 
Daulatabad, WASSAN plans to converge with IWMP and setup centers in every micro-
watershed in Telangana, and potentially, nationally. With this premise, they successfully 
pitched the BSI idea to DWMA and IWMP and obtained start-up funds of INR 11 lakhs. The 
center is serviced by multiple full-time local employees of WASSAN, each of whom are 
responsible for a portfolio of tasks within a part of Daulatabad – usually an area around their 
home village. These employees are managed by nodal officers in charge of different 
portfolios. Further, since WASSAN brings together benefits from as many as 13 project 
activities, the BSI center offers WASSAN an opportunity to showcase (see 
http://www.wassan.org/rra-cp/page_4.htm) its considerable expertise, network, and funds 
																																								 																				
12 The concept of BSI-like centers is alluring to development sector. They are synonymous with “one 
stop shops”, “all in one” centers, “hubs”, “farmer centers” that essentially seek to provide multiple 
services in one location.  
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to smallholders and visitors. In addition to sale of HYV seeds, the benefits of BSI center 
include 1) “truthfully-labeled13” seeds sourced from farmer groups and ATMA, and available 
at a local “community seed bank” based on naagu system; 2) climate information14 sourced 
from agricultural university and local weather monitoring stations with collaborations with 
the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management (MANAGE); 3) NPM inputs 
prepared by trained women entrepreneurs along with pheromone traps and lures made 
available with SERP and MMS ; 4) custom hiring of agricultural machines that are obtained 
by convergence with various governmental programs such as drip irrigation units from 
Micro-irrigation Project (TSMIP) ; 5) aggregates, processes, and markets redgram in local 
markets; 6) offers training in new agricultural technologies such as pendal (trellis) for 
cucumbers and gourds, pit composting etc., with support from DoA, MANAGE, and ATMA. 
Each of these benefits are sourced through interplay with multiple institutions and 
demonstrate the complexity of interactions at work.  
The NPM pathway (Figure 3.3, Image A.29) in Daulatabad is constituted of three institutions 
– WASSAN, Daulatabad Farmers’ Cooperative and Safe Harvest Private Limited (SHPL). 
Descriptions of WASSAN and the Farmers’ Cooperative are provided in the previous 
section. SHPL markets pesticide-free pulses, cereals, spices, sweeteners and flour under 
its “Zero” label to health-conscious consumers in southern India’s major urban centers. 
They source their products from farmers practicing NPM technologies. They connect with 
farmers through some seventeen NGOs active across India and WASSAN is one of them. In 
Daulatabad, a small section of farmers grow redgram based on NPM technology. Redgram 
or toor dal, is a staple of Indian diet and the “tandur” variety grown in Daulatabad is 
considered of premium quality. This variety is slightly larger, retains more moisture, and 
cooks easily into a uniform smooth consistency – traits that make it especially desirable. 
Adding demand to these traits is the fall in production due to successive droughts that sent 
prices skyrocketing in 2014-15. At its peak, regular non-NPM redgram was priced at INR 
110/kilogram, while NPM certified dal logged over INR 200/kilogram. However, NPM 
practice is not for the “lazy farmer” as Ram Naik in LG Tanda observes. It needs constant 
vigilance, and good understanding of ecological processes and pest cycles. He learnt this 
method though training offered by IKP, MMS and SERP many years ago, acknowledged its 
																																								 																				
13 Truthfully-labeled Seed: A progeny of foundation, certified or labeled seed that the producer guar-
antees for quality as equivalent to a certified seed. This label needs no certifying agency.  
14 Climate information centers (CLICS) have a computer, internet and a public announcement system 
which is operated by a trained staff who collates bi-weekly weather information. Smallholders can 
sign-up to receive information on their mobile phones.  
See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r47NZ5yfi-8 for functioning.  
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benefits, and promptly adapted it. Inspired by him, and cajoled by WASSAN, more farmers 
in LG Tanda shifted to NPM technology. With observed success and certainty in markets 
and prices, most of the tanda followed. As Ali (section 1.1.1) complains, this tanda made up 
of Lambadis became a fixture on donor visits as a success story of NPM and betterment of 
scheduled tribes. Examination of interplay suggests that markets and obligations (section 4. 
5.4) work in together to sustain NPM. Over the last few years, WASSAN brought in seed 
processors to grade redgram, clean and process them, all in an effort to reduce the role of 
traders and middlemen. They hired women from SHGs (some from LG Tanda) and trained 
them in seed processing. However, the redgram quantity procured from WASSAN-
facilitated farmers fell short of the agreement with SHPL. Interviews with SHPL suggest that 
the scale of production in Daulatabad does not make procurement economically viable. 
This lead to re-negotiation of price points of procurement. With SHPL offering lower prices 
than what WASSAN had assured farmers, procurement could not commence. As a result, 
WASSAN itself processed and marketed the redgram in local markets when the price was 
acceptable to farmers. Driven by a high demand for tandur dal with “Zero” label, time-
consuming techniques coupled with low production, SHPL intermediaries and WASSAN 
staff are under severe pressure to bring-in greater area under NPM, while farmers like Ram 
Naik are not incentivized for the substantial additional effort necessary for NPM. As such 
NPM is now relegated to a few clusters influenced by the combination of WASSAN, SHPL 
and DMRMAC. This case shows how a vertical interplay with equal influence between 
institutions can sustain low-intensity agricultural technology even while being susceptible to 
external price and demand shocks.  
The micro-credit pathway (Figure 3.4) in Daulatabad results from the interplay of three 
institutions – NABFIN, WASSAN, and the Daulatabad Mandala Raithula Mutually-Aided 
Cooperative Credit Society (DMRMAC). It begins with WASSAN approaching the National 
Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development (NABARD, an apex bank) to channel loans to 
smallholders via their subsidiary NABARD Financial Services (NABFINS). NABFINS is itself a 
national level interplay of banking giants with equity partnership from half-a-dozen banks. 
Its agenda is to provide credit and allied facilities for promotion, expansion, 
commercialization and modernization of agriculture-based activities. NABARD is India’s 
leader in microfinance and they implement watershed projects (similar in scope to IWMP) 
on a national scale. NABFINS seeks to match heterogeneity in borrowers with customized 
group lending. And, institutions like WASSAN are the key elements that match lending to 
the heterogeneous needs. For example, certain demographics such as people above 65 
years, otherwise able, or unemployed cannot avail loans from mainstream banks.  
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NABFINS seeks out these groups with inputs from local institutions and offers small loans. 
In Daulatabad, WASSAN successfully pitched the idea of providing loans to its farmer 
groups in three mandals. They created the DMRMAC and two similar cooperatives with 
over 30 farmer groups (as explained above) with a total credit outlay of INR 50 Lakhs 
(section 4.5.4 details some aspects of the microcredit process). In Daulatabad, DMRMAC 
decided to avail five times the share amount that is required to buy to access loans, while 
NABARD was willing to sanction up to ten times the share amount. While WASSAN 
suggests that “farmers do not want to avail more credit than income”, farmers suggested 
that they were eager to avail the maximum loan available.  
 
A closer examination suggests that WASSAN was instrumental in nudging the DMRMAC to 
avail only half of the potential loan in the first year as they are instrumental in providing 
“technical assistance" in the form of providing templates for “bye-laws” and “contracts”, 
and hence their advice is in the “farmers’ best interest”. Further with close monitoring of 
institutional function (WASSAN’s local staff attend group meetings daily, record 
transactions and send real-time feeds to their nodal officers via text messaging), farmers 
agenda is guided towards WASSAN’s agenda making them uncommonly similar. With low 
interest rates (2% per month), lack of collaterals and extensive paperwork, and incentives 
(WASSAN pays back a portion of interest for on-time repayment), the credit service has 
attracted attention of other farmers. However, only 266 members of the 800-odd 
constituency is included in NABFIN currently. As the nodal officer explains: “the 
responsibility of program implementation is with all village members. The first priority, 
however, are groups that WASSAN has helped created. WASSAN works with any 
community organization and provides communication from institutions and schemes. 
Initially, when few members are selected and gain benefits, the remaining members of the 
village know of the benefit and share information by word of mouth. These members have 
in the past approached WASSAN employees who then initiate group creation”. This 
suggests that WASSAN has high influence on farmer cooperatives, and individual farmers 
with credit acting as a reward mechanism. This influence is exerted in facilitating other 12 
activities. WASSAN and NABARD can thus report close to a 100% repayment rate, 
interests earned for the bank and livelihoods of smallholders enhanced in their annual 
reports and to donors – a triple win indeed!  
The next section unpacks access dimension of these benefits to reveal factors that 
demarcate inclusion or exclusion from programs.  
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3.5.4. Institutional access plus interplay in INSIMP, BSI, NPM and Micro-credit 
 
Overall, some 800 smallholders access benefits provided by the BSI center, INSIMP, NPM 
and microcredit. And, since WASSAN is an important determinant of access to the four 
benefits, they are discussed together. Beneficiaries are organized into user groups such as 
farmer groups above in addition to kuruvalu sangams (shepherd groups), matsya sangams 
(fisheries groups), sri vari sangam (groups that practice System of Rice Intensification), and 
SHGs. Exception to group-based access are POPs, who are usually targeted individually. 
Group membership is thus the first requirement of access. Membership is thus a means of 
entry to other institutional benefits. Group members have received livelihood benefits as 
well as technologies and inputs to improve landholdings. Benefits travel well-worn paths 
that flow from interplay of institutions to user groups. The promotion of benefits to 
homogenous groups strategizes access since access of one is not likely to depend on 
oppression of another. However, the politics of user group creation is where exclusion or 
inclusion is decided. For example, in one of the study villages, two NABFIN farmer club 
were formed in a span of few days with fifteen members each. Interviews with excluded 
smallholders indicated that they “came in the know of the process and sought access, but 
were given a variety of reasons for refusal”. These reasons related to livelihood strategies – 
excluded relied on milk production; age – deemed too elderly; identity – caste based 
targeting means forward castes but economically poor or OBCs are excluded; previous 
relationship – some had no prior relations with WASSAN staff or were not on “good terms” 
with them.  
 
Not all groups within WASSAN’s constituency were recipients of credit. Those within 
WASSAN’s constituency, but excluded from credit, were those who had recently accessed 
institutional benefits (mainly by public pathways) independently, and had questioned the 
legitimacy and accountability of WASSAN in Daulatabad (similar to INSIMP and what 
Ramesh observes in section 1.1.1). This suggests that WASSAN patrols its constituency 
and strictly controls access to institutional benefits. Access to benefits external of WASSAN 
could lead to exclusion unless, these are gained in consultation with WASSAN. Another 
determinant of access to benefits is current socio-economic status. For example, selection 
of POPs is based on intimate knowledge of WASSAN staff and interviews with their key 
informants in the village, and owning land is an unstated requirement. If adhyaksha Sitaram 
identifies a few village members who lost “a part of their harvest” or “fell ill” these members 
are very likely to end up in the POP list. WASSAN staff also routinely eyeball socio-
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economic status. They have a keen eye for new livestock, machinery or vehicles in the area. 
So, if a livestock program is close to delivering benefits, they select those beneficiaries with 
“few or no more than five” livestock. These criteria are created on the fly and relies on 
intimate knowledge of potential beneficiaries, which means that for access maintenance, 
smallholders need to first gain access to key informants or networks of WASSAN. Agents of 
access control adeptly understand and apply distinctions thereby diminishing opportunities 
of classes of people who they deem as outside of target criteria.  
 
In line with the above discussion about gaining and maintaining access from those that 
control it, an emerging common principle is that of demonstrated interest (Table 3.8). 
Smallholders desirous of gaining access must establish their relevance, need and fit to 
agents of access control. As observed by the nodal officer above, potential beneficiaries 
seek out WASSAN staff or user group members to be included. Greater the frequency of 
seeking out, higher are the chances of gaining access. This principle is widely visible in 
public institutions (e.g., banks, Panchayat and MDO office) where people queue up or wait 
for hours, day-after-day, just to ensure that officials notice them, acknowledge their 
presence and if all goes well, consider their request. While public institutions deploy the 
principle as a way of demonstrating power, civic and market (e.g., moneylenders and 
traders) institutions use it to sift genuine parties from beneficiaries who fake interest (see 
section 4.5.2 – 4.5.4). For example, one smallholder came to know of drip-sets that were 
available through the micro-irrigation project, for which WASSAN controlled access. This 
farmer would show up frequently at the BSI center, chat with staff, and chime-in support 
when donors and officials visited the BSI center. Another smallholder was a fixture in user 
group meetings, even though she was not a member. She was desirous of being re-hired in 
the redgram processing unit. Actors hopeful of gaining and maintaining access are 
inescapable in institutionally-mediated benefits and demonstration of interest is an 
overlooked mechanism that determines access to benefits. Benefits do not fall from the sky 
or reach social groups involuntarily. Even when benefits are targeted, selected group 
members must expend considerable resources to gain access.  
 
Institutional benefits fall along the continuum of universal to targeted access. While the BSI 
center is designed for universal access for residents in Daulatabad, other benefits such as 
credit are directed to target populations. First, even though the BSI is open to all, proximity 
to the center determines ease of access. Farmers in distant villages (e.g., control village 
Allapur) are either not aware or do not access the center and access markets that are closer 
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to them (e.g., residents of Matoor and Neetoor access Kondangal market and traders there 
provide information and services). Smallholders not in WASSAN’s constituency are also 
less likely to access the center. Of the ten-thousand households, only 800 are served by 
WASSAN indicating a gap in benefit pathway and that pathways exist only for social 
relationships around the 13 benefits provided. These pathways are established with 
individual farmers and groups, depending on the type of socio-economic status and 
livelihood strategies existing where pathway activities develop. Membership and contracts 
establish beneficiaries’ roles and responsibilities, and define flow of benefits. The nature of 
benefits determines targeting of groups and individuals from WASSAN’s standpoint, to 
groups and individuals that expend energy and power to keep access to benefits open.  
 
In addition to those targeted for specific benefits, and those gaining universal access, other 
actors also derive benefits. For example, a complementary interplay of institutions – 
between WASSAN and the Veterinary Department has opened WASSAN’s pathways to 
smallholders who are not within its ambit, but will likely be included soon. Here, WASSAN 
staff assist the over-stretched surgeons and veterinary assistants (VA) in publicity 
campaigns for government-mediated benefits such as “vaccination camps” for goats and 
cattle. Since access to the Department’s benefits is universal (for those who own livestock) 
across the mandal, WASSAN’s visibility is increased when in participates in Departmental 
activities. During these events, staff provide information, especially those related to climate 
and markets, and in the process scope for potential beneficiaries as well. In another 
instance, in a neighbouring mandal, smallholder collectives have organized as “producer 
organizations”. WASSAN provides technical assistance informally and explores 
opportunities to include them in the NPM or credit pathway.  
 
These cases suggest the richness in institutional interplay and factors contributing to 
access. While the civic sector is well connected and interacts with more institutions than its 
public counterparts, its reach is limited to its constituency by the magnitude of benefits and 
scale of projects. Strategic and functional linkages help civic institutions to sustain its 
activities and retain its membership. Interplay also suggests a strong conflictual and 
competitive environment for benefits that require interactions between civic and public 
institutions leading to disillusionment of beneficiaries. Institutions control access to benefits 
in multiple ways and call to attention the ways that smallholders expend resources to 
maintain and gain access to preferred benefits. When considered together the pathways 
are ephemeral coalescing around benefits as they become available without consideration 
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of long-term effects of short-term benefits. Lastly, benefit pathways discussed here suggest 
that beneficiaries are unable to control the type and flow of benefits, which suggests that 
benefit pathways are seldom co-produced. They lack the means to negotiate for desired 
benefits unless larger political processes support their claims and establish new pathways 




In this chapter, I have taken a new perspective on institutionally-mediated benefits by 
integrating interplay and access dimensions. I have five conclusions to offer about the 
nature of benefits and associated pathways. First, I have shown that the ability to benefit 
from institutions depends on interplay and access dimensions. Both mechanisms are 
dynamic and tend to shape and re-shape each other. New access mechanisms, at 
institutional level and individual level (demonstrated interest) are identified. Some of these 
pathways have deviated from their original design – this lack of conformity to the 
categorization (vertical v/s horizontal, universal v/s targeted) is well acknowledged (Young 
2002; Baviskar 2004). What is more interesting are points at which apparently universal 
access and vertical interplay are morphed, making different combinations. This suggests 
that institutional mechanisms are dynamic with access and interplay shaping each other. 
Second, all cases demonstrate a fuzzy notion of accountability and responsibility. In 
pathways with high interplay, accountability is more diffused making access dimensions 
more important determinants of benefit delivery. Third, all cases show that beneficiaries 
(and institutions in some cases) have little understanding of the nature of interplay. When 
considered within the context of accountability, beneficiaries are unable to identify the 
locus of accountability among institutions, while in public pathways the locus of authority is 
clear. In such cases, social relations, broadly speaking, stand-in for accountability. Only 
when markets institutions are involved in interplay, primary civic institutions experience 
enhanced demands for institutional accountability. Fourth, while all local institutions studied 
here are indistinguishable in their understanding of local contexts, they vary in their 
susceptibility to benefit capture. Public institutions are especially prone to capture of 
benefits, both by partner institutions and elites and this susceptibility increases with the 
magnitude of benefit. Civic institutions on the other hand make efforts to target those 
overlooked by public institutions but end up channelling benefits to its constituency in 
efforts to legitimize itself. Some beneficiaries, even among homogenous marginalized 
groups, are adept at attracting benefits from multiple institutions. Finally, the local 
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institutional landscape is extremely diverse, even in an area that is administratively remote 
and environmentally marginal, but access to this diversity is uneven.  
 
These findings hint at a broader analytical framing that includes 1) the nature of benefits, 2) 
interplay, and 3) access dimensions, and 4) outcomes. Smallholders are able to benefit 
from a variety of institutional ‘things’. But, do not have any control in influencing the nature 
of benefits, suggesting that recursive mechanisms will potentially lead to benefits that ‘fit’ 
with needs. In all cases, we see that some social groups, localities, and individuals are 
more likely to receive above-average benefits. These ‘star beneficiaries’ represent often 
studied ‘success stories’. This suggests that some pathways are well-worn and potential 
beneficiaries are able to navigate them effectively. In converse, potential beneficiaries who 
are unable to make links and gain access must mediate access through additional linkages. 
More importantly, given the multiplicity of institutionally-mediated benefits, it is evident that 
smallholders stack benefits. This points at how current scholarship is neutral in its 
consideration of benefits (benefit equality information = seeds = technologies) raising an 
important question: Which benefits, mediated by which institutions, are more important in 
structuring livelihoods and landholdings? Moreover, institutions stack benefits (e.g., 
convergence mode of public institutions) and functions (in primary and ancillary roles). The 
stakes of juggling multiple benefits and roles can be higher, and institutions and scholarship 
pay little attention to the resulting tension between roles and benefits. With impacts of 
climate change defining development agenda, adaptation strategies will be inextricably 
linked to benefits mediated by interplay and access dimensions. If adaptation needs to be 
planned and guided towards outcomes of immediate social need, then interplay and access 
will need to be interrogated together. This will help identify which a) partnerships are critical 
for specified adaptation strategies, b) capacities need strengthening and what form they will 





This study advances theoretical and empirical understanding of institutionally-mediated 
benefits. The interest in institutional dimensions of natural resource governance is based on 
claims of significance of institutions as causal mechanisms. It does not mean that 
institutions account for all the variation in social-ecological outcomes. It is important to 
note, however, that even when institutions play modest roles, the specific contributions of 
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institutions needs to be understood. Because institutions are not causes themselves, as 
actors, but affect outcomes by interactions and regulating access, they influence actors’ 
decision-making. The effort of this chapter is to pinpoint two mechanisms through which 
institutions become causes and to demonstrate its connection to social-ecological 
outcomes. Given the diversity of institutional interventions, it is easy for projects to merge 
and embed in each other making causal tracing, particularly over time, difficult. This 
ethnographic account illuminates this complexity in institutional pathways that connect 
benefits to beneficiaries.   
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3.8. Tables and figures 
 
Table 3.1. A sample of IWMP interventions 
Problem area Detail of problem Intervention 
Soil Depth Based on the soil depth, the land in the 
Cluster watershed are comes under 
moderate (56%), shallow (40%) and deep 
(4%) depths 
Tillage practices across the slope shall be promoted.  
Soil fertility improvement measures – in situ, compost 
pits, silt application, and planting manure trees. 
Slope and 
erosion 
Based on the slope, 58% of the land comes 
under Moderate slope, 34% of the area 
under Nearly level and remaining comes 
under Strong slope. Based on the erosion, 
82% of the area under sheet erosion and 
remaining comes under rill and gully erosion  
Soil and moisture conservation activities such as earthen 
bunds formation.  
Afforestation, and other vegetative development 
measures such as seed dibbling, fodder seed broad 
costing shall be taken up 
Soil  Water logged observed during streams and 
down side of the tank 
Diversion of water and promotion of SRI-based rice 
cultivation 
Rain fall Erratic and uneven low rainfall, rainfall is 
confined to period of 30 to 35 days during 
the monsoon period, during the crop period 
long dry spells ranging from 30 to 40 days 
occur which affect the crop yields 
Establishment of participatory hydrological monitoring 
system.  
Preparation of water security plans every year 
Livelihoods The major problems are due to lack of 
adequate investments, adequate market 
knowledge, low level of access to resources, 
absence of backward and forward linkages.  
Group based interventions, upgrading skills, revolving 
fund support, marketing support 




Table 3.2. A sample INSIMP Kit 
Input Sorghum  Pearl millet Finger millet Small millets 
 Quantity Cost Quantity Cost Quantity Cost Quantity Cost 
Micro-nutrients 25 1000 25 1000 5.00+ 1000 - - 
PSB/Azotobacter 3 packets 75 3 packets 75 3 packets 75 3 packets 75 
Seed treatment - 50 - 50 - 50 - 50 
DAP 50 525 50 525 50 525 55 580 
Urea 80 450 80 450 80 450 55 305 
Potash 0 0 0 0 40 290 0 290 
Weedicide - 500 - 500 - 210 - 500 
PP chemicals - 400 - 400 - 400 - 200 
Total (INR)  3000 - 3000 - 3000 - 2000 
Source: INSIMP Guidelines, RKVY. 2012 
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DPAP, DWMA, DoLR, SLNA, PIA, NREGA, 
MMS, DoA, DoH, Panchayat, JCB 
contractors, WCC, Axis Bank, RWS, Irrigation, 
MMS 
Land improvement works 
and livelihoods.  
Examples: Boulder 
removal, Compost pits, 
Labor  
INSIMP Department of 
Agriculture  
WASSAN NMSA, MoA, Secretariat of GoT, IGNAU, 
ICAR, AGTU, Adharsha Rythu, Rythu 
Sangam, HACA 
Seeds, Fertilizers, and 
Pesticides, Information, 
Processing 
BSI, NPM WASSAN BSI center, 
Seed bank, 
User groups 
SHG, MMS, SPIC, NABARD, Banks, Market 
Yard, SHPL, MDO, DoA, DoH, Panchayat, 
NREGA, IWMP, DoV, DoIT, APMIP, DWMA, 
DoF, DoCS, DoAMktg, IKP, DoCoop, HIVOS, 
RRA-N, Sectretariat of GoT, MANAGE, 
GOOGLE, HACA 
Information, HYV and 
traditional seeds, Custom 
hiring, Post-harvest 
processing 
Micro-credit DMRMAC NABFIN, 
WASSAN 
SHG, MMS, SPIC, NABARD, Local market, 
SHPL, MDO, DoA, DoH, Panchayat, NREGA, 
IWMP, DoV, DoIT, APMIP, DWMA, DoF, 
DoCS, DoA, DoMktg, IKP, DoCS, HIVOS, 
RRA-N, Secretariat of GoT 







Contractor Seed company, certification agency, input 
traders 






Table 3.4. Overview of pesticides in India with hazard categories. Adapted from Abhilash and Singh, 2009.  
Hazard category Pesticide  Chemical Family 
I a. Extremely hazardous Phorate Organophosphate 
I b. Highly hazardous Monocrotophos Organophosphate 
 Profenofos & Cypermethrin Combination pesticide 
 Carbofuran Carbamate 
II Moderately hazardous Dimethoate Organophosphate 
 Quinalphos Organophosphate 
 Endosulphan Organochlorine 
 Carbaryl Carbamate 
 Chlorpyrifos Organophosphate 
 Cyhalothrin Pyrethroid 
 Fenthion Organophosphate 
 DDT Organochlorine 
 Lindane Organochlorine 
III Slightly hazardous Malathion  
IV Unlikely to present acute hazard in normal use Carbendazim Carbamate 
 Atrazine Triazine 
 
Table 3.5. NPM technologies 
Strategy Sample of technologies  
Spatial Plant attractor crops along bunds and boundaries 
 Intersperse attractor crops between main crops 
Temporal Plant attractor crops early 
 Use pheromone traps during flowering and seed set 
Attract enemies Plant crops that attract birds that predate insects 
 Plough-in compost and dung to diversify soil microflora 
Synergy Plough during warm days to expose pests in soil  
 Stratify intercrops to break precipitation intensity and conserve rainwater 
Application Create pesticides from natural sources and apply before insect eggs are set 
 Plough-in harvest residue and assist decomposition by inoculates 
Source: Fieldwork 
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Table 3.6. NABFIN loans in Daulatabad between 2014 and 2015 

















Loan in April 15 
Narsapur Sri Anjaneya 15 113250 1133 2265 2265 1133 1133 1133 1133 56625 
Narsapur Vinayaka 15 113250 1133 2265 2265 1133 1133 1133 1133 56625 
Nandaram BC Banjara 10 75500 755 1510 1510 755 755 755 755 37750 
Nandaram Sheragadi 10 75500 755 1510 1510 755 755 755 755 37750 
Nandaram Kothakunta 17 128350 1284 2567 2567 1284 1284 1284 1284 64175 
Nandaram Cheruvumeedi 
ragadi 
14 105700 1057 2114 2114 1057 1057 1057 1057 52850 
Nandaram Lingalaragadi 11 83050 831 1661 1661 831 831 831 831 41525 
Daulatabad Netaji 20 127000 1270 2540 2540 1270 1270 1270 1270 63500 
Bichal Nallaregadi 17 128350 1284 2567 2567 1284 1284 1284 1284 64175 
Gundepalle Raja Raithumitra 14 105700 1057 2114 2114 1057 1057 1057 1057 52850 
Antharam Saibaba 13 98150 982 1963 1963 982 982 982 982 49075 
Thimmareddipalle Boyakunta 13 98150 982 1963 1963 982 982 982 982 49075 
Thimmareddipalle Buggamallachelka 12 90600 906 1812 1812 906 906 906 906 45300 
LG Tanda Sri Anjaneya 15 113250 1133 2265 2265 1133 1133 1133 1133 56625 
LG Tanda Sri Venkateshwara 15 113250 1133 2265 2265 1133 1133 1133 1133 56625 
Urakunta Sunnaponikunta 13 98150 982 1963 1963 982 982 982 982 49075 
Urakunta Chenuguntlachelka 11 83050 831 1661 1661 831 831 831 831 41525 
Balampet Munnurukapu 16 120800 1208 2416 2416 1208 1208 1208 1208 60400 
Chellapur Shivaganga 15 95250 953 1905 1905 953 953 953 953 47625 
   266 1966300 19663 39326 39326 19663 19663 19663 19663 983150 





























IWMP 30 1 3 1 1,2 
INSIMP 3 2 2 2 2 
BSI, NPM 280 3 3 2 1,3 
Micro-credit 30 3 1 2 3 
Contract 
farming 
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Figure 3.3. Interplay of primary institutions in BSI and NPM 
 
WASSAN and 60+
National and State level
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Smallholders borrowing from diverse credit sources are faced with obligations in addition to 
financial repayment. Consequences of indebtedness extending beyond monetary debt and 
its influence on vulnerability are not well understood. Focusing on five pairs of smallholder 
clients and credit sources, this chapter addresses the question: What are the social-
ecological consequences of credit and how do these consequences influence vulnerability 
of smallholders? I follow process-tracing and progressive contextualization methods to 
explain the variegated nature of the indebtedness process through which consequences 
come to be manifested. Conceptualizing indebtedness as the obligation to repay another or 
an institution and developing an integrated vulnerability framework, I show the diversity of 
feedbacks that shape indebtedness and provide examples of social-ecological 
consequences. Unpacking these consequences in individual cases demonstrates that 
indebtedness is an important root-cause of vulnerability. Findings explain how 
indebtedness functions as a root-cause of vulnerability, which is in opposition to 
examination of proximate causes, such as credit policy and capacity or groundwater 




Smallholder farmers in rainfed areas are the principal managers of the world’s food supply 
and they depend on multiple sources of credit ranging from policy-driven formal banking 
institutions to more informal financial intermediaries. Conditions of credit that positively 
enhance their livelihood will potentially lead to long-lasting synergies between multiple and 
often competing objectives along social and ecological dimensions. In this paper, I 
investigate social-ecological consequences of credit in rainfed areas of India. This paper 
addresses the question: what are the social-ecological consequences of credit and how do 
these consequences influence vulnerability of smallholders?  
 
Drawing on the concept of indebtedness, root-cause analysis of vulnerability and a social-
ecological framing of the problem, this chapter attempts to answer the question by 
analyzing associations between sources of credit, and livelihoods and agricultural 
practices. I develop an integrated vulnerability framework of a coupled social-ecological 
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smallholder system and offer explanations for indebtedness as a root-cause of vulnerability. 
I expand credit to include its transformation to indebtedness, explain the social-ecological 
consequences that follow and its influence on smallholder vulnerability. I present five credit 
institutions that smallholders commonly access in southern India: contractors, 
moneylenders/traders (informal), and rural banks, bank - Non-Governmental Organization 
(NGO) – local institution mediated group lending (formal), to show how indebtedness feeds 
back into livelihoods, land and credit. After a review of scholarship on indebtedness in 
rainfed agriculture, I describe the study area and follow it with the concept of indebtedness. 
I then highlight how the indebtedness process unravels differently depending on the credit 
source and explain the social-ecological consequences of indebtedness. Lastly, I discuss 
the findings within the broader scholarship of vulnerability.  
 
4.3. Review of credit landscape in rainfed agriculture  
 
Rainfed agriculture is based on infiltrated rainfall and supplemental water use techniques. In 
rainfed areas, livelihoods are susceptible to social and biophysical changes. For example, 
even though India’s rainfed regions lead the world in area and production (Wani et al. 2009), 
they suffer from crop failures and low yields due to variability of monsoonal rainfall and 
historic exclusion from development policy. Consequently, incomes are volatile and 
livelihoods insecure making rainfed areas hotspots of poverty and hunger. In these areas, 
credit is an important determinant of livelihoods. It facilitates farmers to increase investment 
in agricultural activities and livelihoods, and helps meet consumption necessities. Credit is 
also used to insure against risks common in rainfed areas and buffer against unexpected 
events.  
 
Studies find that smallholders access multiple credit institutions, each of which serve 
different purposes depending on household circumstances, ease of access, and strategies 
to manage risk and livelihoods (Guérin et al. 2012; Schindler 2010; Bardhan & Udry 1999; 
Collins 2010). In this context, a ‘financial landscape’ metaphor captures the complexity of 
rural credit (Bouman & Hospes 1994) where physical features of formal financial institutions 
interspersed with informal intermediaries represents the diversity, dynamics, and 
connectedness of credit sources. This metaphor points at the spontaneity of growth (e.g., 
microfinance movement), planned interventions (e.g., expansion of banking facilities), and 
the endurance of intermediaries (e.g., moneylenders, traders) that together influence local 
credit contexts. Scholarship on rural finance broadly distinguishes credit into formal (e.g., 
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commercial banks, regional rural banks, and credit cooperatives) and informal pathways 
(e.g., moneylenders, traders, contractors, and friends and relatives) that incorporates  
(somewhat incompletely see (Ruddle 2011; Bouman & Hospes 1994)) the complexity of 
linkages and relationships within which rural credit is embedded. The two ends of the 
formal-informal continuum demarcate the formality in terms of agreement between the 
lender and the borrower, and supervision of lending policy through accountable 
procedures. However, credit institutions are interspersed along the continuum with varying 
degrees of agreements and procedures.  
 
With multi-disciplinary attention, different aspects of rural credit access and consequences 
are highlighted. Examining large-n survey data, scholarship on development identifies the 
important role that governments play in shaping rural credit wherein, institutions are 
controlled and regulated, and credit is directed toward specified target groups. For 
example, India’s credit policy has strived toward financial inclusion of backward 
communities leading to lower poverty, expanded non-agricultural growth, and reduced the 
role of moneylenders (Burgess & Pande 2005; Binswanger & Khandker 1989). Critiques of 
formal lending highlight procedural opaqueness, lack of timeliness, and corruption (Kochar 
1997; Kaur & Dey 2013; Rakesh 2006), which along with credit rationing and tightly 
scheduled payments deter vulnerable groups from approaching formal sources (Schindler 
2010). Research shows that these vulnerable groups continue to be excluded from formal 
financial services (Reserve Bank of India 2015; Pradhan 2013; Guérin et al. 2013). As a 
strategy to overcome obstacles of formal lending, they are compelled to maintain links with 
informal sources.  
 
International donor agencies and many NGOs present market mechanisms as the best 
designer of the landscape in which credit institutions are free to expand on terms that 
regulate the supply and demand for capital (Cull et al. 2008; Aitken 2010). This perspective 
suggests that performance of rural credit depends on transaction costs, interest rates, 
information availability, and judicious substitution between consumption and production. It 
recommends developing credit institutions to address market imperfections by clarification 
of property rights, legal enforcement of contracts and diffusion of information (Conning & 
Udry 2007; Banerjee & Duflo 2007a; Besley 1994). However, this scholarship largely 
focuses on the moneylender (and his usurious interest) of ill-repute and echoes an 
antipathy to informal pathways. Studies supporting this narrative find that borrowing from 
informal sources can be socially and economically expensive with unreasonable sanctions 
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and interest rates (Banerjee & Duflo 2007b; Aleem 1990; Shah et al. 2007; Bhattacharyya 
2005). Contrastingly, studies in anthropology and sociology provide contextual details of 
the landscape and propose that well-functioning informal credit institutions are neither 
exploitative nor are uncommon. Informal sources are suggested to play an important role in 
developing a contextual approach to credit policy. Ethnographies of microfinance programs 
(Lont & Hospes 2004), farmer distress (Sadanandan 2014), and contract farming (Little & 
Watts 1994) unpack the effects of credit and debt as producing social ties, allegiances, 
enmities and hostilities, and questions the presumptions of credit as liberator and debt as a 
burden (Blau 1964; Aitken 2015; Gerber 2014). Key insights from this literature are the 
construction of boundaries that include or exclude groups from credit, creation of  
hierarchies for borrowing, and ascription of moral tensions for non-repayment (Peebles 
2010).   
 
4.3.1. Social-ecology of indebtedness 
 
These perspectives attempt to clarify the consequences of credit that are manifested along 
social-ecological dimensions. However, only a handful of consequences are better 
understood, and almost none of them study these dimensions together. For example, in a 
well-cited paper, Binswanger and Khandker (1995) investigating the impacts of formal 
credit on agriculture, found that increased access to formal credit lead to only modest 
increases in crop output coupled with rapid increase in use of chemical inputs and a 
substantial reduction in agricultural employment. With an expansion of credit, they suggest 
that substitution of capital for labour creates opportunities for non-farm employment and 
thus drives-up labour wages. Related to credit and livelihoods, Mosse et.al find that debt 
management of poor households in southern India is critically linked to migration for labour 
(Mosse et al. 2002). Here, the migration serves as a livelihood coping mechanism that 
provides the income necessary to service debts taken from moneylenders and traders for 
agricultural inputs. In the best-case scenario, such households migrate to manage risk, 
build assets, and smooth consumption constraints (De Haan et al. 2002). In more extreme 
cases, debt demands advanced sale of labour, marriage of daughters in return of bride 
price or even sale of landholding (Singh 2002).  
 
On the ecological dimension, literature acknowledges the links between credit and 
environmental quality, crop choice and input application (Narayanan 2015; Singh 2000). For 
example, studies find that a 10% increase in formal credit flow increases fertilizer and 
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pesticide use by 1.7% (Narayanan 2015) and in areas susceptible to groundwater depletion 
and rainfall variability, indebtedness to moneylenders is tightly-coupled with an intensified 
demand for tube-wells (Fishman et al. 2013; Taylor 2013; Pradhan 2013). A social-ecology 
of “debtscapes” identifies smallholder’s attempts to exercise control over water as central 
to maintaining household wellbeing in austere agrarian conditions (Taylor 2013). Further, 
the commonality between opposing sides of the debate that questions whether agriculture 
should spare or share land with conservation is the identification of the detrimental effects 
of agriculture on the environment (Fischer et al. 2011). Here, increasing input application 
and associated ‘package of agricultural practices’ financed by credit are identified as 
causes of environmental degradation. However, in this multi-disciplinary scholarship it is 
unclear a) how multiple credit institutions impinge on farmer decisions and simultaneously 
effect livelihood conditions and agro-environments, b) where the location of the causality 
lies – in proximate causes such as water security or root-causes such as indebtedness. 
There is an immediate need to understand how indebtedness leads to social-ecological 
consequences.  
 




Debt is the obligation that follows acceptance of a credit opportunity. The state of 
obligation to repay (Greenberg 1980) an individual or an institution is indebtedness. An 
interdisciplinary scholarship outlines two factors that contribute to the complexity and 
pervasive nature of indebtedness. They are the duality of credit and debt, and the 
connectedness of debt through space, time and across scales. First, the inseparable dyad 
of credit and debt consistently identifies credit as powerii and debt as a weaknessiii 
associating a hierarchy of meaning and positive and negative connotations more broadly. 
This duality is represented by the transformation of credit from its availability to its 
acceptance occurring over time, or the realization of a potential offer. On acceptance of 
terms, credit transforms into debt and diverges, with credit performing the role of a 
facilitating input and debt socializing consequences, livelihoods, and everyday life more 
generally (Peebles 2010). Thus, both may exist as sides of the same coin, but immediately 
grow more complicated with passage of time, because credit can exist with a potential to 
be borrowed but not realized (Deville & Seigworth 2015; Gregory 2012). Policy and 
scholarship on rural finance reflects this hierarchy in its favouring of credit over debt and 
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exteriorizing poverty (Mosse 2010), making indebtedness less a factor of relationships and 
more a consequence of individual choices. Scholarship on neoliberalisation points at the 
creation of economic space that tasks individuals with household financial management 
and positions them as ‘risk-capable’ agents. These atomized individuals are recipients of 
credit at the tail-end of intricate financial chains placed at regional and national 
environments. Smallholders must bear costs and risks associated with delivery of credit 
and manage oneself as an entrepreneur who takes responsibility for their current social-
economic conditioniv. In this sense, indebtedness is propagated through the evolving 
neoliberlisation process of financial inclusion that inserts itself in existing social, economic 
and political constellations (Carswell & De Neve 2014). However, the superiority of credit in 
policy discourse is tempered by ideas of morality in debt relations, where the inability to 
refuse credit suggests weakness, shame and guilt associated with indebtedness. 
Furthermore, the duality creates contrasting views, which on the one hand demands a more 
effective credit policy of greater scope (Pradhan 2013) while on the other implicates 
indebtedness as causative of farmer distress (Kennedy & King 2014).  
 
Second, indebtedness connects across space, time and scale. As collaterals for loans, 
indebtedness connects spaces such as landholdings with volume of credit. Lenders 
evaluate land quality by the presence of irrigation, soil quality and topography, and estimate 
past crop production to assess a borrower’s income and risk of defaulting. Smallholders 
owning tiny parcels of marginal quality are particularly disadvantaged forcing them toward 
informal sources to improve land quality (e.g., increased investment in tube-wells, fertilizers) 
further increasing indebtedness (Taylor 2013). Across time, credit connects previous 
repayment behaviour and current economic condition to make a claim on future income 
and shape livelihood strategies that farmers engage in to generate it. The maintenance of 
credit relations for future need encompasses past debt relations and opportunities for new 
ones, which become important under uncertain conditions. Scholarship on climate change 
adaptation points at this connectivity, where vulnerable populations maintain access to 
institutional interventions and implement adaptation strategies under present or projected 
conditions of stress and shocks (Agrawal 2008). In this sense, adaptive capacity means the 
ability to secure credit and repay debts while being exposed to stresses and shocks. 
Smallholders’ adaptive capacity hence includes the maintenance of credit relations for 
future use, even if such relations are exploitative. In sum, the indebtedness processv 
explains a set of events, actions and steps that arise from accessing credit sources and 
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how indebtedness and its social-ecological consequences are produced. In the following 




The review presented in the preceding sections identifies two areas in existing understand-
ings of rural financial landscape, credit-debt duality, and social-ecological consequences 
that have received insufficient attention: the institutions – indebtedness – social-ecological 
consequences nexus and indebtedness as an important root-causevi of vulnerability. In 
smallholder agricultural systems, the nexus is negatively reinforced trapping smallholders in 
low-wellbeing states. This negative reinforcement has been implicated in increasing ex-
treme vulnerability of smallholders witnessed by instances of farmer perversities, including 
suicides (Sadanandan 2014; Dandekar & Bhattacharya 2017).  
 
Further analysis of vulnerability is challenged by a growing list of root-causes including 
race, ethnicity, family, gender, age, health, income, class, caste, clan, religion, political affili-
ation, livelihoods, socio-economic status, ideologies, institutions, world views, exploitation, 
marginalization, type of production system, infrastructure status, geographic location, 
physical environment and access to it, representation, political unrest and wars (Ribot 
2014b; Blaikie et al. 2014; O’Brien et al. 2004; Bassett & Fogelman 2013; Bohle et al. 1994). 
And, vulnerability research is dominated by explanations that reduce the root social – eco-
nomic – ecological causes to proximate causes such as climate- and scarcity-related 
causes such as decline in yields, price and natural resources (Shah 2012; Barrett & Bevis 
2015; Challinor et al. 2014) drawing attention away from cause and towards response 
(Bassett & Fogelman 2013; Ribot 2014b). Here, identification of indebtedness as root-cause 
will reflect the exercise and distribution of power in credit institutions and explain the role 
that indebtedness plays in dynamically reconfiguring vulnerability by distributing risk based 
on caste, gender and access to credit (Taylor 2013; Guérin 2014).  
 
A nexus-based focus will be useful because 1) specifying how identified causes of social 
and economic actions linked to consequences explains vulnerability more completely 
(Blaikie et al. 2014), thereby 2) enabling a fuller treatment for vulnerability reduction, and 3) 
offers a means to include interconnected challenges in institutional interventions to address 
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indebtedness, livelihoods and landholdings for the design of synergistic policies. To con-
tribute to theoretical and empirical knowledge of the nexus, this paper develops an inte-
grated vulnerability framework (Figure 5) with indebtedness as its root-cause.  
 
An integrated framework of smallholder vulnerability  
 
I define vulnerability as the degree to which a smallholder system is unable to cope with 
adverse effects of credit and impacts of climate and monetary events. The goal of this 
framework is to draw attention to vulnerability anchored in the condition of the coupled 
human-agricultural system, identify the complexity in linkages and iterative nature of 
components that contribute to vulnerability, and assist in gathering of data that can be 
used for further research and development policy (Turner et al. 2003; Ribot 2014b). This 
framework draws on social-ecological and vulnerability frameworks. First, Ostrom’s general 
framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems (Ostrom 2009; McGinnis 
& Ostrom 2012) shows the importance of linkages among social and ecological variables. It 
has generated great interest for its ability to organize the inherent complexity and identify 
points of inquiry that matter most for governance (Basurto et al. 2013). It has rarely been 
used, if ever, to the study of credit and indebtedness. Second, vulnerability analysis is 
divided between two approaches – the risk hazard and social constructivist frameworks 
(Adger 2006; Ribot 2014b; Füssel & Klein 2006). These approaches differ fundamentally in 
analysis and location of causes. While the risk hazard approach evaluates vulnerability as 
part of multiple outcomes arising from a single climate event, the social-constructivist 
approach drawing on concepts of entitlements and livelihoods focuses on multiple causes 
of single outcome. While the risk-hazard approach traces vulnerability linearly to the 
environmental hazard and placing the risk in the hazard itself, the social-constructivist 
approach trace causes of vulnerability to multiple social and political-economic factors and 
places burden of explaining vulnerability in the underlying social conditions. Linking these 
two approaches, Ribot (Ribot 2014b) suggests a third way where an integrative framing of 
vulnerability includes both biophysical and social factors (Table 4.1). This approach is 
socially-rooted and entitlements–livelihood focused that traces the causes of vulnerability 
from specific events (Vayda 1983) explaining why a given individual, household or group is 
at risk from a particular set of damages.  
 
The framework presented here provides broad classes of components and linkages that 
contribute to the vulnerability of a coupled smallholder system (Figure 4.5). Its construction 
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includes 1) coupled smallholder system where vulnerability resides; 2) credit institutions 
and access to them; 3) indebtedness and obligations associated with each credit 
institution; 4) linkages to smallholder system via social-ecological consequences; 5) 
linkages to monetary and climate events. The coupled system, here a smallholder 
household operating no more than ten acres, which can be applied to whatever spatial 
dimension, is the focus of the vulnerability analysis. Monetary events related to health, 
death, education, cultural ceremonies and so on, and climate events such as variability in 
rainfall and temperature, and pest attacks and droughts present a household with expected 
or unexpected expenditure. These events, especially climate related, not subject to local 
manipulation (Ribot 2014b) are proximate causes. The framework emphasizes that 
indebtedness causes vulnerability even when climate or hazard events are not present. In 
autonomous or planned responses to events or livelihood demands, smallholders access 
multiple credit institutions. Upon acceptance of credit, debt is associated with different sets 
of obligations which feedback as social-ecological consequences to the focal smallholder 
system recursively shaping land and livelihoods though livelihood strategies and agricultural 
practices. The following sections illustrate the usefulness of the framework through case 
studies of three credit institutions and associated events, obligations and social-ecological 




4.4.1. Methods and conceptual frameworks 
 
The focus of this research are smallholder farmers and their credit sources in Daulatabad. 
Telangana witnesses the highest percentage of indebted agricultural households (Figure 
4.4). I studied five credit institutions and their clients between August 2014 and 2015. 
These pairs are 1) Ramulu (contract farmer) – Krishnappa (contractor), 2) Sayappa (small-
holder) – Venkatesh (moneylender/input trader), 3) Krishnaveni Mahila Sangam (women’s 
self-help group, SHG) and 4) Sitamma (housewife, smallholder) – Girish (bank officer in a re-
gional rural bank, RRB), and 5) Sai Rytulu Sangam (men’s farmer group, FG) – Mahesh (of-
ficer at a non-governmental organization, NGO). I used process-tracing (Beach & Pedersen 
2013) and progressive contextualization (Vayda 1983) as guiding themes to contextualize 
indebtedness within credit process and trace its origins and consequences. I started with 
an exploratory conceptual framework based on literature (Figure 4.1) that aimed to map the 
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factors and broader issues that influence indebtedness. I observed credit transactions, at-
tended group meetings, consulted key-informants, and conducted semi-structured inter-
views, and expanded the factors (Figure 4.2). Situating the results within narratives of credit 
transactions that highlight the process of indebtedness and its consequences, I simplified 
the indebtedness system to three main components that feedback into each other (Figure 
4.3): indebtedness, consequences and credit sources.  
 
4.4.2. Study area and subjects 
 
Villages in the Daulatabad have a particularly good representation of marginalized 
communities (Table 1.4. Please refer Chapter 1 for details) and all the five borrowers belong 
to backward castes (Golla, Mudiraj, Madiga) and scheduled tribe (Lambadi). Lenders and 
institutional representatives on the other hand are upper-caste Reddy and Komti, and 
except Venkatesh, are not native to the area. Similar to the five smallholders, 95% of 
farmers in the area cultivate less than 10 acres of land spread over multiple tiny patches. 
The financial landscape of this area is layered with public, (e.g., Departments of Agriculture 
and Rural Development), civic (e.g., SHG’s, NGOs, Primary Agricultural Credit Societies) 
and market institutions (e.g., RRBs) that link farmers to credit and inputs. Informal credit 
institutions include moneylenders, contract farming agents, agricultural input traders, and 
members of farmer’s social network.  
 
The main livelihood of smallholders studied here is rainfed cultivation of legumes such as 
red gram (kandalu) and green gram (pesaralu) intercropped with millets (jonnalu) in the kharif 
(April and October), and peanuts (phalli) and oilseeds in rabi season (October to March). 
Smallholders with access to tube-wells grow irrigated rice (vari) and vegetables. Recently, 
there has been an increase in cultivation of cotton for fiber (patti), and contract farming of 
hybrid cotton seeds and vegetables. Supplemental livelihoods in decreasing order of 
importance comprise migration to urban areas for labor, rearing small ruminants, local 
wage labor, and trading non-timber forest produce. Biophysically, this area is semi-arid 
with poor red soils (chalka, Image A.32) and few perennial water sources. Rainfall ranges 
between 500 and 800mm annually whose pattern is shadowed by agricultural calendar. 
Rains also recharge underground aquifers and determine tube-well (Image A.24) output and 
its improvement or re-investment decisions. Two patches of scrub forests interspersed with 
Eucalyptus plantations provide habitat to small mammals and birds, and fuelwood for 
households. Other common resources include village grazing lands (Image A.23, A.26) and 
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a network of small lakes (Image A.8) and seasonal ponds (Image A.19) that support 
ruminants, cattle and fish farming.  
 
4.5. Institutions and credit, indebtedness and consequences 
 
In this section, I discuss the five credit institutions that form the basis of this study: 
contractors of seed cotton, moneylenders/traders (informal), and rural banks, bank - Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) – local institution mediated group lending (formal), to 
show how indebtedness feeds back into livelihoods, land and credit. I present ethnographic 
accounts of credit process that I carefully selected over several others to provide a feel of 
rural credit. I make my observations and link them to larger conceptual points drawn from 
literature. In each section, I offer a brief summary of the key points.  
 
4.5.1. On contracts  
 
Ramulu grows hybrid seed cotton for Krishnappa on two of the most-fertile patches of his 
land. Over the last eight years, they have had pre-cultivation agreements on the production 
processes and conditions of sale. At the beginning of each season, Krishnappa specifies 
input usage and agricultural technologies. He provides chemical inputs and credit for labor 
and monitors cultivation on his weekly visits. By harvest time, he aggregates seeds, tests 
germination rates, certifies quality and organizes the sale of seeds. From the sale, he 
deducts input costs and pays Ramulu the rest. On one of his weekly visits to Ramulu’s 
field, he notes “the women are experts in crossing”. He says with a grin and within earshot 
of the women pollinating the cotton plants. “The men cross in the city. These women?” And 
grins again. Ramulu offers no protest to the offensive comments made by Krishna. His 
silence is surprising since they are said within earshot of women, including his daughter 
and daughter-in-law. The women look back at him and glare, but Krishnappa’s indifferent 
demeanor suggests that these stares have no consequence.  
 
Krishnappa “manages” two-hundred smallholders like Ramulu. He prefers smallholders 
because they are less likely to default, are not connected to many institutions, and are less 
organized to bargain effectively. As opposed to smallholders, large farmers with more 
endowments and social connections can “take him on” and he can offer no retribution for 
their non-compliance of practices. Smallholders are more likely to remain indebted to him 
and less likely to do anything about it. Without money for labor and inputs, these farmers 
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are nothing”. As part of this management, he closely monitors crop choices to check 
whether inputs he provided are being substituted for other crops. An asymmetric power 
difference is on full display as he regularly chides and reprimands, and in extreme cases 
even threatens punishments. He says “all I have to do is withhold labor payments for days 
to a week, for him (points at Ramulu) to toe the line”. His connections with local elites, 
traders and government officials, further entrench the power differentials leaving Ramulu 
indebted to not just him, but a suite of powerful social actors.  
 
Ramulu and his family tolerate Krishnappa. He says “a decade ago, I barely made enough 
money but owed a lot of money. I sunk four bores (tube-well), but three failed. The one on 
this land is the only functional one and I use it for cotton”. Contracts are expedient for 
Ramulu because Krishnappa reduces transaction costs of procuring agricultural inputs and 
credit, provides technical assistance and access to cotton markets and most importantly 
stabilizes the price. Ramulu says “even in a bad year, Krishnappa provides all input costs, 
and guarantees a break-even return at the least. I had a bumper crop the second year after 
I started. I repaid all debts and brought back my son from Mumbai. He performed coolie 
(wage labor) there. I got him married. But, the last three-four years have been tough. Rains 
are scarce and my bore is running low”. At this time, group of women walk towards the 
field with a thin towel on their heads and clutching lunchboxes. Laxmamma, Ramulu’s 
daughter-in-law yells across the field: “the day is almost done!” She is in-charge of the 
women who perform the arduous task of cultivating ‘hybrid seeds’. The women hand 
pollinate ovaries on every cotton plant from selected male plants and emasculate rest of 
the anthers. “We have to be here every day from the time the plant starts flowering to when 
it stops producing flowers” Laxmamma says. “If the plants cross themselves (self-pollinate) 
then the seed quality is not good, we will lose money”. So saying, she briskly peels off a red 
label under the seed she just pollinated. She is in the third row of a one and half acre cotton 
field, and has another fifty rows to go through. “I will get them all by the end of the day” she 
says. Taking a yellow male flower from a pouch attached to her waist, she peels off the 
petals and exposes the male anthers. Gently rubbing the anthers on the ovaries from which 
she just removed the label she substitutes natural pollination. “This is crossed now. But this 
(pointing to a non-hybridized seed) is a ‘fail’. It is no good”. She plucks the non-hybrid seed 
at its base and discards it. In the next row, a young girl is barefoot. She is looking for 
immature seeds and tagging them with a red label, and emasculating ‘fails’ 
simultaneouslyvii. These two women are part of a group of six women who work Ramulu’s 
fields. A mix of discourse and patriarchy drives the preference of women and young girls for 
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cotton seed labor. As Krishnappa explains and Ramulu nods, “women are nimble and 
easier to control than men. The wages are lesser, and they have greater endurance and 
discipline. No boys or men work the cotton fields. At most men spray pesticides and apply 
nutrients”.  
 
Indebtedness to Krishnappa causes a permeating gender bias that influences livelihood 
choices and household economics resulting in a feminization of agriculture. For example, 
women of Ramulu’s household are obliged to work in cotton fields and young girls in similar 
households are embedded with social skills during their upbringing. Skills that suggest to 
them that women are delicate and have nimble fingers necessary for cotton seed farming. 
Laxmamma and her sister-in-law are told that they work for future gains in their life – 
education of children and marriage respectively. While Ramulu fixes monthly wages for 
Laxmamma and his daughter with Krishnappa, these are merely for accounting purposes. 
He considers them as savings to the input cost and seldom pays his daughter and his 
daughter-in-law. Even though studies find that within a contract arrangement, women 
reported a higher self-esteem, self-confidence, and power in the household (Singh 2002), 
obligations to contractors leads to decrease in choices or usurping of choices by other 
family members. For example, Laxmamma is obliged to work off the contracts made by 
Ramulu, who is obliged to honor his contract to Krishnappa. While she has surrendered her 
right to refuse labor, he has capitulated his livelihood strategies. Involuntary involvement in 
labor and livelihoods is kept in place through indebtedness to contracts. It is this 
encroachment on choices by Krishnappa’s contract that make Ramulu’s household (and 
his daughter and daughter-in-law) ‘unfree’(Venkateshwarlu & Da Corta 2001) to refuse labor 
or opt for an alternative. In this sense, all the trappings of contracts obligate smallholder 
households to continue an exchange that provides better livelihoods at social costs to 
family members. Laxmamma is responsible for cooking, tending to the family’s five goats 
and a buffalo, and caring for two young children in addition to managing the labor and 
working almost eight hours every day. She is unable to satisfactorily attend to domestic 
needs, production labor, and child care. Even if Ramulu decides to stop this contractual 
agreement, his options are less attractive. Intensive farming with chemical inputs have 
decreased fertility of his land that prevents shift from cotton to other food crops. As one 
extension officer observes ‘these lands (cotton farms) have seen much application of urea, 
DAP (Diammonium Phosphate, a chemical fertilizer) and weedicides that now, organic 
matter is less, leaching of nitrogen is more and soil micro flora is almost wiped out’.  
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This case provides evidence for indebtedness as a mechanism that reduces freedom of 
smallholder households with women and young girls disproportionately bearing the 
consequences by their compulsive involvement in cotton contracts. Here, disparities in 
freedoms caused, often not reducible to differential wages or resources (Sen 1992), are 
explained by indebtedness. Indebtedness increases the risk of everyday violence against 
women and their exploitation by creditors and household members. In a male-dominated 
credit landscape, women’s access to credit and inputs is limited because of reduced 
mobility, participation, and activities outside the home (Agarwal 1989). Further, in support 
of the few studies that explore contract farming and environment relationship (Siddiqui 
1998; Singh 2002), I find that contract-mediated indebtedness leads to decline in 
environmental quality of landholding through overexploitation of land and groundwater. 
Intensive use of chemical inputs and associated decline in soil fertility leads to loss of 
agricultural alternatives and reinforces indebtedness to contractors.  
 
4.5.2. On moneylenders 
 
Incense burns steadily, but the smell of chemicals powers through it. ‘I burn 3 to 4 every 
day’ Venkatesh says as he settles into his office-cum-godown (storage area). His family has 
been in the lending business for over four centuries. A meticulous man, his credit records 
date back to late 1800’s – from his great-grandfather’s time. From his desk drawer, he pulls 
two stacks of notecards that record his intimate knowledge of clients. ‘In this business it is 
necessary for me to know what is happening in my client’s life. Who is getting married, who 
is unwell, who bought buffaloes, how their crops are doing, how their children are studying. 
This information is key to understanding whether a person is reliable’. He points at the 
thicker stack ‘these are OK’. The smaller stack he says are ‘kiri–kiri’’ (trouble makers). They 
are ‘political’, he complains. ‘I am obliged to provide money to them. Whether and when I 
will get it back is uncertain’. 
 
Two client’s walk-in, an elder man, Sayappa, resident of a neighboring village, and his son 
Ramesh. Sayappa has had a polio attack and his right arm is bent tightly towards his right 
chest. He raises his left hand and meets the right, with practiced effort and smiles. He looks 
content. “Namaste setu”. Venkatesh barely looks at them and does not stir form his desk. 
He looks for their card, deftly locates it, and scribbles a few numbers and letters. Ramesh 
reminds Sayappa by pointing at a small blue book and hands it to Venkatesh. This book is 
the moneylender’s equivalent of a bank passbook. Venkatesh reaches the page of last 
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entry and examines that with his card. Sayappa reaches his left hand into his shirt and into 
his undershirt that has a secret pocket. He pulls out a thick wad of INR 500 notes, and 
hands it to his son. Ramesh counts it and hands it to Venkatesh. Venkatesh counts it and 
looks at the pair. “How many months”? The son says “two”. Sayappa digs into his secret 
pocket again and pulls out a smaller wad of money, the interest. Money is counted again. 
Venkatesh looks at the pair again and hands them the little blue book. “Look at it. How 
many months”? Son again says “two”. “Check again”. The father and son check again. 
Sayappa, still smiling, chides his son affectionately. “It is three”. The son is little surprised. 
Venkatesh, counts fingers almost mockingly: “April, May, and…June”. “We have interest for 
only two months. I will send my son tomorrow”. As the pair leave Venkatesh says “debt is 
their existence, but only a few of these debts are monetary”.   
 
Sayappa’s debts to Venkatesh extends beyond cash and bundle information and resources 
to credit. With market prices being notoriously fickle, he is in close contact with Venkatesh 
during harvest. “I ask setu before I sell, if this is a good price. I take his advice on which 
seeds to purchase, inputs, and even call him if I observe any problems with crops”. Every 
season, he bundles credit with agricultural inputs and technologies. He does so for two 
broad reasons. First, transaction costs of separately approaching money lenders and input 
traders is decreased or eliminated. Second, lenders offer greater support since repayment 
is tied to crop and provision of better information and inputs buffers against farmer losses. 
As Sayappa says, “a few lenders now send agricultural graduates to check on fields and 
offer advice”. Bundled credit assists Sayappa to navigate the temporal fractures of input 
expenses that do not align with unpredictability of rains, agricultural inputs provided by the 
formal sources such as the agricultural department and incomes. Indebtedness is 
reinforced by technical knowledge of Venkatesh, who fills-in a void left by lack of 
agricultural extension service.  
 
Even though Sayappa’s relationship with Venkatesh appears to contradict the image of the 
usurious and tenacious moneylender (Shah et al. 2007), his obligations suggest ways in 
which trader-moneylenders continue to wield power over smallholders through the process 
of indebtedness. Sayappa is obliged to purchase pre-ordained seed varieties and sell to 
chosen traders, both of which favor Venkatesh. Venkatesh also shepherds his clients 
toward select crops pointing at the power of information asymmetry enforced by 
indebtedness. For example, Venkatesh explains: 
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…neither does the MRP (Maximum Retail Price) reflect the true value of a product 
nor does the market price. Look at this bag (of rice seeds). It is made by an Indian 
company and yields about 30-40 bags per acre if grown “well”. Its MRP is INR 
1080. We get this bag for INR 500. I add between INR 50 and 100 as a profit. My 
competition is not for how much I sell each bag, but how many I sell compared to 
other dealers in the area. With the gap in MRP and trader price, a farmer without 
(intimate) knowledge or relationship (with me) is likely to get skimmed. The 
government does its best to provide seeds. But, it is hardly sufficient. Two years 
ago, there was a riot for phalli offered by the Department of Agriculture and the 
police were called-in. The government supply barely meets the demand.  
 
In the context of cotton seeds he adds: 
…several traders in Mahbubnagar sell cotton seeds at INR 100-200 less than the 
market. Farmers flock to them and get seeds on credit. The seeds fail to germinate 
since they are spurious and they miss the rain. The traders blame farmers for not 
following ‘proper practices’. Now, farmers have two options: buy new seeds and 
risk it all or plant pesarlu. Traders will not return their money, and their investment is 
dead. So, it is better for farmers to get credit, inputs and all other requirements from 
me. That way, they have some insurance.  
 
For Sayappa, under the prevailing credit conditions – as narrated and propagated by 
lenders – Venkatesh is the better choice even though it is associated with a loss of choice 
and bargaining power. In his transactions with Venkatesh he asks for crop choices and 
varieties merely in passing. He understands that Venkatesh already has a plan for him – 
with reduced choices and likely decisions as well. For example, his neighbor planted a new 
variety of high-yielding and pest-resistant ‘Indo-American’ cotton that cost over INR 1200 
per bag. When he asked Venkatesh for that brand, he was refused and offered the more 
popular local brand ‘Mallika’. He was told that he ‘could not afford it’. What this means to 
Sayappa is the demeaning process of valuation of the self by a person to whom he is 
obliged. If he was not indebted, he would have ‘protested and demanded whatever brand 
he wished of whichever crop’. He adds:  
…I belong to the backward caste (BC). How can I grow crops I want? I do not have 
water, and rains were my only source. Others in my village received free bores but 
not me. These bores are for SC and ST. I want to continue agriculture but where 
shall I get the money for the bore? I had to ask Venkatesh, who tells me what I must 
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grow. With my condition, I get a monthly “handicapped pension” from the 
government. It is little, but is steady. However, over the last two years, there has 
been corruption at the mandal level, and I am yet to receive 16 months of pension. 
My son is now able to take care of agriculture, but with his young family, my lack of 
pension, and not much returns over the last two years, we have relied on setu. My 
father borrowed from his father, and now my son goes to him.  
 
This case provides evidence on indebtedness mediated reduction in sovereignty – the right 
of farmers to shape agricultural systems, by privileging credit sources 
(moneylenders/traders in this case) to design agricultural practices. Indebtedness 
circumscribes the boundaries of production and highlights how in local markets and 
production–consumption cycles, inequitable credit relations lead to power over agricultural 
systems through control over credit and inputs. Credit bundled with pre-ordained inputs 
functions as opportunity hoarding (Tilly 2001) where moneylenders and traders confine the 
use of value-producing resource (in this case, high value seeds and technology) to 
members of an ‘in-group’ based on estimates of self-worth. While deliberate and overt 
attempts to subordinate marginalized groups are absent, opportunity hoarding cements 
unequal categories via transactions that bars access to economic opportunities (e.g., 
increased yield by using better seeds) to lesser of the credit beneficiaries. Sayappa’s 
understanding of the subtleties of his indebtedness has normalized the denial of 
experiences (and associated networks and benefits) and effectively stabilized his horizon of 
achievement. This diminishment of his ‘capacity to aspire’ (Appadurai 2004) manifests itself 
as powerlessness in transactions and lack of alternate choices reinforcing impossibilities of 
livelihood enhancement. Vulnerability and an aspiration for security aligns the immediate 
interests of indebted farmers with credit sources thereby perpetuating disadvantage and 
influencing aspirations. 
 
4.5.3. On banks 
 
Two locks on rolled-down shutters guard the entrance to the bank. The locks are opened 
and inside are three rows of metal chairs and a set of tables with glass panels. Two large 
safes made of reinforced steel sit next to a room with glass and wood panelling. The sign 
on the room reads “Bank Manager”. On its left is a room with three brass padlocks and 
inside is the safe that contains money and documents. “There are no ATM’s here” says the 
bank mitra (friend of the bank, an assistant who helps customers). “So, cash needs to be 
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stored in a safe”. It is now 10AM. Three employees – a field officer, a cashier, and the bank 
mitra prepare for the day. People are crowding outside and two men and a woman peer-in 
with anxious faces. The bank mitra opens the door and people file in. Some sit down on the 
chairs, some queue up near the cashier and the rest huddle around the manager’s office.  
Seated on a high stool with an even higher desk, the bank mitra is furiously filling out 
challans and stamping rubber seals. The cashier is yelling at the man who was peering 
through the glass to meet the bank mitra, since he has not filled out the right numbers in the 
right places. He asks a woman to step forward and she sheepishly asks him “how much 
money do I have in my account?” “I want INR 2000”. He punches a set of keys, pulls up her 
account and does not tell her the balance instantly. He unlocks the desk drawer into which 
he had earlier placed stacks of cash, pulls out a wad and turns on a machine. Places the 
cash in the machine and it makes a swift efficient sound. He looks at the machine with 
pride. The number on it reads “10000”. He counts four notes of INR 500 and hands it to the 
woman. She still looks sheepish. Then he remembers her question and by the time he looks 
at the monitor, a man starts yelling in the back. All of them turn. He claims to have 
submitted a form last week and still has not heard what became of it. The cashier says an 
amount and the man next to her is suddenly attentive. No information is private in a rural 
bank.  
 
At the field officer’s desk, Ram Naik, the man who was yelling, is now calm. He is speaking 
with the officer, Girish, who appears competent and answers questions with uncommon 
patience. Answers seem reasonable evident by the ceaseless nodding of Ram Naik. The 
officer hands him two other forms, turns around from his desk to a platform stacked with 
files neatly bound and tied with pink threads. His fingers pick a file which has ‘panta appu’ 
(crop loan) written in bold. He goes over the file, containing a photograph of a Ram Naik, 
only much younger, a set of numbers, a document with a stamp-paper, several signatures, 
and a yellowed out sheet with a very official looking holographic logo. ‘We need to check 
the authenticity of land ownership’ and points at the yellowed-out paper and says ‘we need 
to verify this and make sure it is not fake’. He continues,  
…recently in Makur division, two or three people were arrested and suspended for 
running a fake patta passbook (land deed records) operation. They obtained loans 
on the same land using several fake pattas. If I make a mistake on your application, I 
will be held responsible.  
A flurry of question and answers follow:  
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…I need attested copies of patta, bank records, and a no-objection certificate 
(NOC). Its only then I can proceed with processing appu. How many acres of vari?’ 
‘Two’. Got water? (functional tube-well). I have two, one is OK, I need to lower the 
motor on the second. What soil? Other than the two vari, rest of the four acres are 
chalka. In whose name? Two in my fathers, half in my mother’s, five guntas in my 
wife’s, rest are mine. What crops? Kandalu, persarlu. How much can I get? 18-20, 
000 per acre, let’s see.  
 
Meanwhile Sitamma is now in company of three more women. They approach Girish. One 
member of their sangam (Krishnaveni Mahila Sangam, a women’s SHG) has defaulted on 
INR 20, 000. Question and answers follow ‘there is no evidence of payment. Now, we either 
get her to pay up or you pay up. What will you do? This is your second rotation right? 
Sitamma confirms. She adds  
…crops have just been sown. We haven’t harvested or sold any crop. Where do we 
get the money to repay? The SCs do not repay. They create some problem or the 
other. Earlier, in this village, all sangams paid regularly. Now seeing a few people 
(SCs) not pay, other SCs and communities are not paying.  
 
Girish responds ‘you know your brother-in-law was here the other day for a crop loan. Let 
us meet at the President’s office next Tuesday and go over this’. Sitamma looks even more 
sheepish since she understands that the officer may well contact her brother-in-law to 
mention the non-repayment or even withhold his loan until her group repays. The women 
agree to meet on Tuesday and assure to bring along the defaulter.  
 
The following Tuesday, Girish walks narrow village lanes to speak with the women. They 
are gathered in a small room with pictures of national leaders. The President, an elderly 
man, who started out and remains the President of the mandal credit cooperative, listens to 
Girish and the women. The defaulter is absent. Girish has relied on the President’s advice 
from the start of his employment. Since, he is not native to the area, it is ‘required for him to 
know well-connected people, whom people respect’. In essence, he fosters links with local 
elites and deploys these links in bank activities when necessary. As the head of the credit 
cooperative, the President is responsible for disbursement of annual small loans and 
subsidized agricultural inputs to farmers. He is aware of most loan cases, and as he says, 
‘most loans are renewed’, meaning existing loan beneficiaries continue to maintain their 
balance by seeking a fresh loan each year and paying-off only the subsidized interest. This 
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renewal model is widely encouraged in rural banks and cooperatives to maintain high 
repayment rates (on paper) – a key metric to evaluate performance of the bank and its 
officers. Through the renewal process, the under-staffed bank selects farmers for renewal, 
and positions it to enforce obligations when necessary. Further, a majority of the thirteen 
villages serviced by Girish’s bank are within the cooperative’s coverage as well. When 
farmers apply for bank loans, the President’s office is one of the signatory on the NOC. The 
President is also connected to the division head of agriculture, the sarpanch (head of the 
panchayat) and the tahsildar (head of the revenue department and mandal administration), 
all of whom have discretionary powers that remove (or add) obstacles to loan applications 
and land development permissions through processing of necessary documents such as 
patta documents, NOC, and crop records. This case shows how indebtedness is 
embedded at the community level, where individuals and institutions are mobilized to 
evaluate borrowers, stand as guarantors, construct memories of their loan performance and 
enforce repayment. The President sends a boy to summon the woman. Meanwhile, 
Sitamma narrates the group’s concern:  
…she (the defaulter) bought a buffalo for milk production through one of the 
sangams’ schemes. It came with an insurance, but someone in the insurance office 
did not sign-off on the final document. The buffalo could not take the journey from 
Delhi or Haryana or somewhere North. It died within two weeks. Now, she has to 
pay around INR 20,000. Since others (SCs) have not repaid, she thinks she can do it 
too. We called the insurance office several times. Sir (Girish) helped us too. But they 
(insurance office) say they cannot do anything. Now where can we get that kind of 
money? We cannot get a new loan or renew old ones either, and our expenses will 
increase in the coming months’ (for fertilizers and weeding expenses).   
The boy returns. The woman is not available to come now. Girish and the President suggest 
that the women continue to follow-up with the insurance office. The President offers to 
speak with the woman’s husband, who is supposedly a member of the cooperative and 
recently visited the President regarding his loan and for purchase of urea and DAP. Girish 
assures the women that he will follow-up with the insurance company, but ends with a 
caution that if the insurance does not work, they may have to pay-up. He later notes: 
…I can do nothing. In earlier days, banks would confiscate property and threaten 
legal action. Police would show up, arrest or shame defaulters into paying. There 
were debt collectors. Those days are thankfully gone. So now, I have to use other 
means.’ 
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This event reveals two feedbacks that are deployed by the bank to leverage financial power 
towards repayment. They are direct obligations to the bank functionaries and group 
members and indirect obligations to family members, social group members and local 
elites. These feedbacks lead to smallholder decisions on livelihood strategies and 
agricultural practices. Indebtedness in formal lending is a joint product of obligation 
enforcement by both lenders local leaders. While official pathways of enforcement are open 
to banks, this case demonstrates its interaction with informal pathways, where local elites 
wielding power across multiple arenas enforce compliance in private ways. In this formal-
informal network, smallholders make decisions to minimize their retributions and explore 
opportunities to align this minimization with ways of keeping local elites satisfied at the 
least, in order to avoid further sanctions. This case points at how a strong focus on 
procedural bottlenecks of formal mechanisms (Bertrand et al. 2007; Gupta 1995; Rakesh 
2006; Reserve Bank of India 2015) has neglected the interplay of credit process that begins 
much before the smallholder enters the dysfunctional bureaucratic system and continues 
even after the loans are availed and repaid. On the ecological dimension, this case shows 
that quality of land is linked to the amount of credit. Landholdings with black soils, 
commodity crops and assured supply of water bring much more bargaining power to 
farmers who can then negotiate for a greater loan. Banking rules confirm this link where, 
established “loan rates” consistently provide greater amounts to land under irrigation and 
commodity crops. What this means for smallholders like Ram Naik and Sitamma is that 
they will be sanctioned lesser loan amounts unless they make investments to improve their 
landholding – mostly by sinking new tubewells, application of fertilizers or change their 
cropping pattern toward peanuts, rice or cotton. This is the feedback between bank loans, 
fertility, ground water depletion and investment tubewells.  
 
4.5.4. On NGOs  
 
With the arrival of the six bank officials and the NGO officer in-charge of the area, the 
meeting is ready to start. Some fifty male and six women farmers are gathered at the 
women’s cooperative building. On seeing the procession of cars and exchanges of 
pleasantries by NGO staff, the gathering gets a little less restless. Mahesh has lead the 
multi-utility vehicles to the building on his motorcycle through the dirt roads and hamlets, 
providing a drive-by view of village life for the bank officials. Three of the officials are young 
and are on their first ‘exposure visit’. One of the other officials, a woman, is the liaison 
between the bank and the NGO officer in-charge of the area. The fifth bank official, a 
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middle-aged man familiar with the area is one of the two people who can communicate in 
Telugu, the other being the Director, a senior official, well dressed and quiet. The NGO staff 
and the gathering follow his every move. Mahesh escorts the Director to the stage and 
guides him to the center. The rest of the party flank him on either side, with the NGO in-
charge seating herself next to the Director. The party settles in and looks over the 
pamphlets explaining the numerous NGO activities. Along with the pamphlet, Mahesh has 
placed a bottle of water and a small plate of savory snack. Standing at the periphery of the 
stage, he looks at the other eight NGO staff, who acknowledge that they are ready. Mahesh 
then calls the attention of the gathering, and the farmers by clapping his hands and 
speaking in a loud voice: “we are honored to have the Director of the national bank here 
with us. He has been instrumental in providing loans to your clubs over the last two years”. 
The Director sips on the bottled water, and looks at the experienced officer, who starts by 
asking the gathering about their loan status and how many members have received loans. 
The farmers look toward the NGO staff. Mahesh consults his book and answers “266 
members in 19 groups”. He adds “out of 760 members in 41 groups federated at the 
mandal level as a cooperative”. The farmers nod. “How often do you repay?” “Monthly, and 
we will have paid all dues by a year”.  
 
Mahesh then introduces activities of the NGO conducted via the forty one groups. One of 
the young officers interjects “how do you select groups that will receive the loan, and how 
do you manage risk of defaulters?” The director looks at the NGO staff, who in turn 
translate the question to the farmers. There is a long silence. Mahesh repeats “Say how do 
you select the members and groups?” Still nothing.  The farmers look for leads and as the 
NGO staff answers “we conduct a general body meeting every year and we decide then”, 
they trail the answers and nod in agreement. “But, how are the groups and people selected 
for loans?” A senior NGO officer, to whom Mahesh reports, answers “we have a set of 
parameters in the by-laws of the cooperative: group age, regularity of meetings, 
transactions every month, internal loans structures, and outstanding payment. The 
cooperative selects groups based on that”. The young officer appears less convinced and 
is begins a follow-up question, but the experienced officer interrupts loudly in Telugu: “do 
you borrow from ‘outside’ sources (informal institutions)?” The senior NGO officer 
searchers in the crowd and calls “Pakirappa”. Parkirappa, an NGO staff himself, seated in 
the gathering, rises and explains flawlessly the informal credit market and the wretchedness 
of compound interest. Pakirappa proceeds to explain the NGO-Bank linkage model, its 
assistance to agricultural and labor needs and procedural aspects. He explains the 
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procedures in detail with precision: the regularity of monthly meetings conducted on a set 
day and time, savings amount that each group member has to buy as a ‘share’, collection 
of savings and repayment monies, status updates sent to Mahesh via ‘SMS’ (mobile text 
message) after each meeting, and diligent maintenance of records in a hard-bound book. 
The officer repeats “do you deal with moneylenders?” The answer is slow in coming, but 
most of the gathering agree that “some people still access moneylenders” It is difficult to 
acknowledge private indebtedness in public.  
 
Drawing back the group’s attention to NGO activities, Mahesh adds ‘overall fifteen activities 
are channeled through the groups’. Two farmers, the president of the cooperative and the 
head of the ‘kuruvalu’ (shepherd) sub-group reel out names of programs and activities. The 
officers are impressed. Extolling the virtues of saving and increasing increments, the 
experienced officer says ‘today you save 10,000 and receive 200000 loan, tomorrow you 
save much more and will be allotted over 500000 in loan. Show us that you save and repay, 
and we guarantee an increase in loan allocation’. 
 
Indebtedness that follows the bank loan (and even the potential bank loans to un-indebted 
groups) is the instrument that NGO staff use to incentivize its other 14 activities. Broadly 
these activities fall along four categories: livestock and fisheries based livelihoods, 
agricultural practices and marketing, natural resource management, and welfare. Further, 
these activities are only possible with the NGO’s expertise to align procedures and 
paperwork across multiple institutions. For example, the 41 groups are federated under a 
cooperative law, which permits 1) procurement of seeds and fertilizers for sale to members 
at discounted rates and 2) aggregation and sale of kandalu under a ‘pesticide-free label’. 
While seed and fertilizer sale requires licenses by the agricultural department, the pesticide-
free label is offered by a certifying agency. These links are leveraged as ‘bringing benefits 
to farmers that are additional to loans’. 
 
It is in these activities that social-ecological consequences of indebtedness becomes 
evident – activities championed by NGOs and practiced by farmers. Mediated by NGOs, 
livelihood strategies (e.g. chicken and goat rearing), crop choices (e.g. introduction of 
Quinoa from the Andes), agricultural technologies (e.g. soil fertility enhancement through 
silviculture and composting, sustainable development of rice systems through system of 
rice intensification, SRI) have effects at lager scales that span administrative boundaries. 
Targeted in multiple villages from a ‘watershed unit’ to ‘cluster approaches’ depending on 
	 134 
program goals, development of multi-village agglomeration leads to ecological 
consequences at the landscape level. For example, Mahesh’s NGO promotes soil fertility 
treatments and SRI in contiguous agricultural fields. He brings together multiple farmers 
who own portions of large tracts within a landscape unit, watershed for example. For SRI, 
the goal is to convert a third of the current 4500 acres under paddy, and farmers with 
contiguous fields receive greater NGO attention and persuasion since they lend more easily 
to the ‘cluster approach’. In other cases, groups of farmers dig pits for composting, plant 
fast-growing trees for composting, clear shrubs and rocky areas, and construct check 
dams for moisture retention. Further, smallholders are screened for qualification into 
programs based on criteria such as current livelihood or tribal status. For example, 
Mahesh’s staff maintain a running list of farmers labelled ‘POP’ or poorest-of-the-poor in 
their project area. When new support opportunities (e.g. funds to create labor groups for 
SRI or a government scheme that promotes local goat breed) arise from interplay of his 
NGO with other institutions, Mahesh directs these activities to a subset of the POPs 
effectively linking them upstream to funders and government departments functioning at 
multiple levels. Participation of POPs and marginalized groups in regular meetings and 
more organized meetings narrated above, serves only as an authentication mechanism 
where detailed records of participants’ attendance in meeting minutes disguise their 
ignorance of institutional function, of which they are allegedly beneficiaries. More 
importantly, this case shows consequences of smallholder indebtedness at the community 
and agro-ecological landscape levels through NGO activities into which groups and 
cooperatives are implanted. 
 
While a linear indebtedness process from NGO-bank linkage to smallholder consequences 
is easily apparent, a close examination suggests a recursive feedback as well. This back 
loop is revealed in activities that are not popular with the farmers, but have high impact 
points for the NGO with donors and the government. Two examples of these activities 
flying under the banner of ‘sustainability’ relate to a technology and a practice. First, the 
non-pesticide management technology (NPM) is the core idea of the pesticide-free label, 
where organic pesticides with powerful names such as ‘neem astra’ – weapon (astra) 
sourced from neem tree (Azadirachta indica) leaves and cow urine – substitute chemicals. 
Farmers however, complain of the impotency of astras making crops more susceptible to 
pests. Second, the use of local seed banks exhibited to donors is accessed only by a 
handful of farmers and for popular varieties of commodity crops. NGOs as a consequence, 
trade lofty conservation goals to low level operability. Farmers broadly understand that 
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these practices are less intensive on the environment and are theoretically sustainable, but 
are unwilling to compromise yields and returns. When they do follow these practices, they 
hold NGOs under debt. As Mahesh says 
…I am not sure sometimes who is indebted to whom. We provide the technology, 
inputs and even credit. But, I need to be “on their case” constantly and plead with 
them to continue these practices. NPM is not popular and some farmers spray 
pesticides anyway. The seed bank is barely “alive”. It was an off-shoot of an 
external grant with the aim of conserving local seeds and genetic diversity. It stocks 
only the popular varieties, of two-three crops. Now, with low landholding, how can I 
meet my annual target for NPM acreage and seed purchase in the area? I have tried 
all kinds of negotiation – from requesting to threatening them with withdrawal of 
loan. Nothing seems to work. When international donors and the certifying agents 
stop by, I need to call “select” farmers who are more in-tune with our activities to 
display these activities and provide samples that are likely to pass the certification 
tests.  
 
This case provides shows that interactions between remotely-based formal creditors and 
smallholders mediated by local institutions leverage indebtedness processes to sustain 
(even failing) interventions. Here, smallholders and the NGO are both indebted to each 
other with recursive feedbacks influencing consequences that are manifested at community 
and landscape levels. This indebtedness process could help understand better the 
collaborations of convenience observed in watershed development between government 
officials and villagers (Baviskar 2004). This case demonstrates that indebtedness motivates 
villagers to collude with institutions in order to subvert benefits to a select group, an 
observation familiar to development scholars and practitioners. This case shows the 
willingness of smallholders and NGOs to remain indebted to each other in the hope that 
both parties continue to benefit. Engineered participation and practices show how 
indebtedness process is positioned by NGOs to deal with pressures from donors and 
bureaucracies in order to achieve program goals. Credit creates opportunities for 
advancement of activities and meeting targets for officers like Mahesh while increasing 
legitimacy of his NGO. Selective sampling of pulses for pesticide tests, and maintenance of 
showcase projects (e.g., the seedbank and NPM plots) point at the indebtedness of 
institutions to smallholders. Indebtedness, as shown in this case, is used to sustain 
agricultural practices and introduce livelihood strategies that are critical to adaptation. In 
identifying POPs and maintaining even stagnating interventions such as NPM, local 
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institutions show the strength of targeted benefit delivery and their relationship with 
vulnerable groups indicating the ways in which local institutions can leverage indebtedness 




The concept of vulnerability describing the states of powerlessness, susceptibility to harm, 
and marginality of social, physical and ecological systems (Adger 2006) can be applied to 
indebtedness since it influences the capacity of individuals to cope with stress and shocks, 
and conditions either security or precarity. Vulnerability analysis places emphasis on tracing 
out the causes that enable and disable capacity, and suggests the examination of these 
causes as a productive entry point into a fuller analysis of vulnerability and adaptation. To 
do so, Ribot (2014b) suggests a four-step empirical analysis of vulnerability by synthesizing 
Amartya Sen’s entitlement theory with perspectives that relate climate to risk and 
adaptation studies. I apply this analytical method in this chapter to show that indebtedness 
is one the important root-causes of vulnerability. This analysis starts by 1) identifying 
exposure units (here, smallholders and their landholdings), their distribution and loss (here, 
reduced livelihood and crop choices, freedoms, decision making, and more broadly the 
ability to shape the political economy); 2) linking losses to asset and social security failures 
(here, failure to protect against persistent indebtedness or refuse credit); 3) identifying 
immediate causes of these failures (here, indebtedness to credit sources); 4) mapping these 
identified causes on to social-ecological-economic relations in which the exposure unit is 
embedded (here, smallholders practicing rainfed agriculture embedded progressively within 
larger scales of ecology (landholding to landscape) and political economy (local credit 
linked to national and international credit institutions). 
 
4.6.1 Indebtedness as a root-cause of vulnerability 
 
This chapter has three main objectives: to develop an integrated framework of vulnerability 
with indebtedness positioned as a root-cause, explain the usefulness of the framework 
through selected case studies, and show that different credit sources are associated with 
different sets of obligations that lead to varied livelihood and agricultural consequences. 
Indebtedness through its social-ecological consequences functions as a root-cause of 
vulnerability weakening the ability of smallholders to bargain for a fair deal. It prevents them 
from acquiring wealth beyond mere subsistence levels and engage in political processes 
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that shape their wellbeing. While scholarship on livelihood approaches identifies credit 
availability (or lack of it) as determinant of livelihood diversification via purchase of 
agricultural inputs (Ellis 2000), this chapter contrastingly shows that indebtedness plays an 
equal if not greater role in shaping livelihoods and crop choices. In addition, recent 
suggestions for candidate interventions to address chronic poverty suggests credit-based 
fertilizers to break the soil fertility – poverty trap (Barrett & Bevis 2015). Such studies do not 
take into account how mechanisms of institutional reproduction and change influence 
livelihoods and income over time, and thereby miss the analysis of social relations and 
power. The cases here (especially the case of contract farming and banking) show how the 
drive to enhance soil fertility increases rather than decrease indebtedness. Inclusion of 
indebtedness explains more fully, the mechanism by which smallholders are prevented 
from influencing structures they operate within and those who govern (Sen, Watts and 
Bohle, and Bebbington in (Ribot 2014a)). 
 
Vulnerability analysis places emphasis on tracing out the causes that enable and disable 
capacity, and suggests these causes as a productive entry into a fuller analysis of vulnera-
bility and adaptation (Ribot 2014b). This analysis starts by identifying exposure units (here, 
smallholders and their landholdings), their distribution and loss (here, reduced livelihood 
and crop choices, freedoms, decision making, and more broadly the ability to shape the 
political economy); linking losses to asset and social security failures (here, failure to pro-
tect against persistent indebtedness); identifying immediate causes of these failures (here, 
indebtedness to credit sources) and mapping these identified causes on to social-ecologi-
cal-economic relations in which the exposure unit is embedded (here, smallholders practic-
ing rainfed agriculture embedded within the rural credit landscape).  
 
Indebtedness through its social-ecological consequences functions as a root-cause of vul-
nerability weakening the ability of smallholders to bargain for a fair deal. It prevents them 
from acquiring wealth beyond mere subsistence levels and engage in political processes 
that shape their wellbeing. It explains more fully, the mechanism by which smallholders are 
prevented from influencing structures they operate within and those who govern (Sen 1981, 
1999, Watts and Bohle 1993, and Bebbington 1999 in Ribot 2014). The cases show how 
vulnerable groups come to lack capacity, own inadequate assets, and fail to create adap-
tive strategies. However, the case of NGOs being indebted to their smallholder constitu-
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ency suggests a different side of debt where those with the power of offering credit are in-
debted to potential borrowers. While climatic and life events (Figure 5) can be surprising, 
indebtedness when framed as a cause of vulnerability, persists in plain sight. 
 
As a debilitating position, indebtedness fails smallholders as they articulate their interests 
and oppose those that work against them. Under persistent indebtedness, smallholders, 
marginalized borrowers, and women will likely resort to decisions that are not in their best 
interest. Accounting for these causes and interlinked indebtedness will go beyond visible 
outcomes of programs. And, one way to account is by addressing the consequences of 
indebtedness caused by a complex interplay of social and ecological factors that not easily 
apparent under current framings of rural credit and indebtedness. These consequences of 
indebtedness, following Mosse (2010), mark boundaries (e.g., credit/debt, as evidenced in 
all cases), exclude people (demonstrated in the case of the moneylender), and give 
importance to social identity (e.g., women in cotton contracts, POPs in the Bank-NGO 
linkage, and caste-based identification across all cases). Indebtedness serves as a process 
that makes inequality (and poverty more generally) durable (Mosse 2010) whose effects are 
long-lasting due to its operation across scales and in non-intuitive ways, subdual of 
interests of indebted farmers in democratic engagement, and the complexity in credit/debt 
relations that makes indebtedness invisible. The three cases demonstrate the complexity in 
the institutions – indebtedness – social-ecological consequences nexus and the variegated 
indebtedness processes that stabilize exploitative and unequal credit systems making them 
robust to salutary policies. Driven by necessities to adapt and reduce risk, smallholders’ 
continued access to exploitative credit sources reinforces their vulnerability.  
 
4.6.2. Lessons and pointers for future  
 
For future research and policy makers, this paper has three offerings. First, the goal of this 
paper is to highlight the variations in credit sources and associated obligations, and 
emphasize that smallholders access multiple sources simultaneously. As depicted in Figure 
5, multiple sources of credit accessed by a household come with variations in obligations 
leading to different social-ecological consequences. This accessing of multiple credit 
sources or ‘credit stacking’ while intuitively understood, is an important adaptation strategy 
that is overdue for a comprehensive examination. We do not yet understand the joint effect 
of indebtedness stemming from access to multiple credit sources and how they tradeoff 
consequences. Findings of this study show tangible effects of credit but does not explain 
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how smallholders negotiate among different sources and make livelihood and landholding 
related decisions. This call to research on ‘credit stacking’ contributes to Lazzarato’s point 
that debt at once encompasses and goes beyond finance, and requires development of 
theoretical tools, vocabulary and concepts for the analysis of the economy that are 
currently lacking (Lazzarato 2012). This points to the sparse state of knowledge about 
indebtedness mechanisms that mediate available choices in relation to livelihood 
strategies, information and its uptake, and access to natural resources.  
 
Second, climate and adaptation finance is emerging as one of the main instruments of 
international climate negotiations. In parallel, bilateral and multilateral donors have 
contributed to the integration of vulnerability reduction measures in development 
assistance. However, only a limited scholarship reaches below to local levels to observe 
implications of these instruments where vulnerability resides (Barrett 2013). As this paper 
shows, availing credit influences livelihood strategies and agricultural practices, and 
provides a means of addressing climate variability and risks. Nevertheless, power relations 
within a rural credit landscape negatively affects the vulnerable, determines access to funds 
and assigns obligations. The framework and cases presented here could serve as an entry 
point in the analysis of implications of funding interventions. It can do so by expanding its 
scope to include nexus components such as formal and informal sources of credit that are 
outside of focus of study but effect households, identify potential social and ecological 
consequences of a credit intervention and feedbacks that influence vulnerability. 
 
Third, the problem of smallholder indebtedness and its role in production of vulnerability 
has outlasted numerous theoretical perspectives. The framework of this paper identifies 
areas of research that could build on earlier efforts by aligning credit as a factor of adaptive 
capacity and indebtedness of vulnerability. This alignment will enable us to reframe the 
recalcitrant problem of smallholder vulnerability by asking: How and why do some 
individuals maintain the ability to adapt despite being indebted? Answering this question 
will require a focus on interaction between climate and monetary events with indebtedness 
process as suggested in the framework (Figure 5). At these interaction or ‘coping points’ 
variations in indebtedness process may alter risks associated with climate and monetary 
events potentially separating individuals who develop abilities to adapt from those who 
become vulnerable. Examination of determinants of adaptive capacity from the standpoint 





Any development alternative serious about enhancing social-ecological synergies in a 
changing climate will need to be realistic that indebtedness permeates agricultural systems, 
and that a transformation of credit process rather than credit-based welfare is necessary. 
Combining the concept of indebtedness, vulnerability frameworks, and a social-ecological 
framing, this chapter insists that vulnerability is linked to social structures of credit. If this is 
the case, then how can smallholders adapt within a system that produces vulnerability? 
What is the role of institutions in addressing causes of vulnerability? What will an 
intervention that addresses root-causes look like? Addressing these questions is a long-
term process and is a timely research agenda. It is the hope of this chapter that 
indebtedness and its many dimensions are included into mainstream adaptation and 
vulnerability research.
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4.8. Tables and figures 
 
Table 4.1. Summary of vulnerability frameworks  
Approach Cause Outcome 
Risk Hazard Approach Climate event Multiple outcomes 
Entitlements and Livelihoods Approach Multiple causes Single outcomes 
Integrated Vulnerability Frameworks 
(here) 
Multiple causes Multiple outcomes 
 
An example of integrated vulnerability framing:  






Figure 4.1. Governance for escape. A model of factors that influence debt and broader issues (in italics). Please note that this schematic does 
























































Figure 4.4. Indebtedness of farmers in India. Telangana and Andhra Pradesh have highest percent of indebted households. 
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The desire for simultaneous multiple benefits is ubiquitous. This yearning for positive 
synergies is common in human-environment dimensions as well. Potential triple wins for 
climate change adaptation, mitigation, and food security is gaining centre stage as ‘climate-
smart agriculture’ (FAO 2013). Consideration of simultaneous benefits also has another 
side, the win-lose, or tradeoffs between benefits. Debates of land sharing versus land 
sparing demonstrate the tradeoffs between agricultural production and biodiversity 
conservation (Phalan et al. 2011). Nowhere is this desire for positive synergies and 
addressing tradeoffs greater than in India’s agriculture. In India, less than 2.5% of the 
world’s cropped area supports approximately a third of the global poor and 17% of the 
world population. Agriculture also accounts for 14% of the nation’s GDP and half of India’s 
population relies on agriculture as its main source of income (Department of Agriculture and 
Cooperation 2013). India faces tremendous challenges to reconcile competing objectives in 
agriculture. There is tremendous pressure on agriculture to provide adequate food, 
contribute towards economic growth, and enhance livelihoods. This dissertation has sought 
to advance systematic understanding of synergies and tradeoffs in India’s rainfed 
agriculture. It has done so through an examination of two institutional mechanisms – 
access and interplay – that drive synergies and tradeoffs between social-ecological 
outcomes. Here, I summarize the major findings and contributions of this dissertation. I 
then offer a few areas where anyone who cares about the findings can invest their efforts. 
 
5.2. Summary of findings 
 
The introductory chapter identified that systematic knowledge of access to institutionally-
mediated benefits and their ensuing social-ecological outcomes remains limited. This gap 
highlighted insufficient attention to the institutional causal pathway through which social-
ecological outcomes are produced. Based on exploratory tradeoff analysis of survey data, 
Chapter 2 offered partial support to the hypothesis that synergies are likely only when 
institutions target their access to marginalized groups and show high interplay with other 
institutions. I found complete support to the alternate hypothesis that any other 
combination of access and interplay produced tradeoffs. This chapter showed the non-
linear nature of relationship between institutions and social-ecological outcomes, and 
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demonstrated the relationship between institutional interventions and observed synergies 
and tradeoffs among outcomes. Chapter 3 provided a comprehensive examination of the 
two institutional mechanisms within the five interventions, and provided empirical support 
to the ‘institutional benefit pathway’ framework developed in this study. This chapter had 
four main findings. First, institutional access unfolds at two levels, at the institutional and at 
the individual. Access at the institutional level explained how institutions deploy 
mechanisms within the broader political economy to channel benefits toward communities. 
When benefits are made available by institutions, access at user level kicked-in. Second, 
this study showed how current scholarship is neutral in its consideration of benefits. With 
the multiplicity of institutions, benefits available to smallholders are diverse, raising 
questions regarding the equality and nature of benefits. Third, I showed that smallholders 
were unable to shape the benefits suggesting that designing recursive mechanisms will 
potentially lead to benefits that better fit with their needs. Fourth, the chapter identified 
institutional conditions of two new types of access – privileged and marginal, and one new 
mechanism – demonstrated interest. Smallholders with privileged access gain a greater 
magnitude of benefits, while others having marginal access gain lower level benefits. 
Demonstrated interest is a widely visible, but understudied mechanism that shapes access 
where smallholders desirous of gaining access must establish their relevance, need and fit 
to agents of access control. Chapter 4 applied the institutional benefit pathway framing to 
an examination of institutionally-mediated smallholder vulnerability. Focusing on five pairs 
of smallholder clients and credit sources, this chapter demonstrated indebtedness to credit 
institutions as a root-cause of vulnerability. Conceptualizing indebtedness as the obligation 
to repay another or an institution and developing an integrated vulnerability framework, I 
showed the diversity of feedbacks that shape indebtedness and provided examples of 
social-ecological consequences through which vulnerability is reinforced. While findings of 
this chapter showed tangible effects of credit it did not explain how smallholders negotiate 
among different sources and make livelihood and landholding related decisions. This 
chapter identified ‘credit stacking’ and ‘benefit stacking’, more generally, as a promising 
frontier of research. 
 
5.3. What the findings mean to anyone who cares 
 
This dissertation advances theoretical and empirical knowledge on an ongoing challenge 
throughout the developing world: synergizing livelihood enhancement and agro-ecological 
sustainability. In conducting this research and writing this dissertation I have found more 
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questions than answers. To anyone who cares about topics related to this dissertation and 
the findings I offer these questions and areas that I left incomplete or could not address 
fully. I believe that addressing these questions and suggestions by way of what has been 
found in this dissertation will be useful to researchers and policy makers. First, I find that a 
comprehensive examination of joint effect of variables on each other to either synergize or 
tradeoff each other is much overdue. Second, because institutions are not causes 
themselves, as actors, but affect outcomes by interactions and regulating access, they 
influence actors’ decision-making. This is but one of the many mechanisms by which 
institutions shape outcomes. Some others include enforcement of rules, management of 
resources, and influencing the broader political economy, which needs to be included to 
expand the usability of the benefit pathway framework. In addition, while the focus of this 
dissertation is on individual benefits, the benefit pathway could, as I envision, be applied to 
collective benefits as well. This could provide a new way of integrating issues of power that 
has been missing in institutional studies of common resources. Third, the benefit pathway 
framing allows for a sharper focus on local institutions, which would otherwise be, as I 
found, a daunting exercise. Some guiding questions here could be: How do smallholders 
navigate among multiple institutions and negotiate benefits? What is the role of ‘benefit 
stacking’ and ‘credit stacking’ in adaptation planning and vulnerability reduction? Which 
institutions are minimally necessary to attain basic-levels of social-ecological synergies? 
Fourth, I find the following questions offering avenues for integration of multiple important 
concepts in the institutions – indebtedness – social-ecological consequences nexus: How 
can smallholders adapt within a system that produces vulnerability? What is the role of 
institutions in addressing causes of vulnerability? What will an intervention that addresses 
root-causes look like? Addressing these suggestions and questions, in my view, will likely 
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APPENDIX A: IMAGES 
 
Image A.1. A MMS meeting. The facilitator is on the phone, while SHG members discuss. 
 
 
Image A.2. Men and women wait in a local bank. 
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Image A.3. A IWMP Project Officer discusses watershed activities in Doma mandal. 
 
 
Image A.4. Rewards for on-time repayment of micro-credit loans. 
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Image A.5. A typical rainfed landholding. 
 
 
Image A.6. A typical irrigated landholding. Note the power line next to the tree. 
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Image A.7. Daulatabad, with rains approaching. 
 
 
Image A.8. Sheep and goats graze on a dry lake bed. 
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Image A.9. A certificate of the Runa Mafi Pathakam, a loan waiver program. 
 
 
Image A.10. Stamp papers and thumb impressions of SHG members availing bank loans. 
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Image A.11. A veterinary doctor checks insurance claims with dead goats’ ear tags. 
 
 
Image A.12. An institutional benefit. 
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Image A.14. Smallholders gather at the PDS (ration) shop. 
 
 
Image A.15. Smallholders crowd a popular trader’s shop. 
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Image A.16. A technical visit for piloting a new rice technology. 
 
 
Image A.17. A contractor checks cotton-seed plants of a smallholder. 
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Image A.18. Senior NGO staff and international donors visit Daulatabad. 
 
 
Image A.19. “Out-station visitors” learning NPM and water conservation technologies. 
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I 
Image A.20. Weaver bird nests and a small pond in a land parcel. 
 
 
Image A.21. Bund tree planting with teak and neem trees. 
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Image A.22. Inter-cropping redgram and millets. 
 
 
Image A.23. A check-dam. 
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Image A.24. A rocky area with scrub vegetation. 
 
 




Image A.26. Farmers have brought their rice harvest. It is loaded and ready for the market. 
 
 
Image A.27. A fallow landholding used for grazing. 
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Image A.28. Rice grown using SRI technology, on a rainy day. 
 
 
Image A.29. Redgram grown using NPM technology. 
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Image A.30. Drip-irrigation for seed cotton. 
 
 
Image A.31. A farmer shows pests in okra. 
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Image A.32. Ramesh, a Research Assistant, surveys a land parcel. He was attacked by a 
wild pig later that day. 
 
 
Image A.33. Redgram and millets (not visible) in poor soil.  
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Image A.34. A village deity within a landholding. Note the abundant vegetation. 
 
 




APPENDIX B. SURVEY INSTRUMENTS 
 
Institutions and social-ecological synergies. Household format 
 
 
Village  HH 
number 
 

















Household size       
Permanent residents       
 









Men     
Women     
 
H 3. What is the cash income and expenditure of your household? (Proportions should not add up to 
more than 100) 














Agriculture   Raw food   
Wage Labor   Education   
Livestock   Medical expenses   
NTFP collection   Asset creation   
Firewood sales   Veterinary costs   
Home production   Fodder/feed   
Salary/Pension   Agricultural inputs   
Remittances   Domestic energy   
Trade   Bribes/fines   
Other   Other   
Trend: Decreased greatly=1; Decreased somewhat=2; Remained the same=3; Increased 
somewhat=4; Increased greatly=5 
 
H 4. What was the total cash income of your household last year? 
This year ______        Ten years ago ______ 
 
H 5. How many household members migrate for livelihood opportunities?  
(Fill in number of persons in the household engaged in migration in each cell) 
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Frequency Wage labor Education Employment Livestock 
Never     
Annual     
Quarterly     
Monthly     
 
H 6. How many weeks in the last one year did you not have sufficient food for everyone in the 
household? _____ 
 
H 7. Where and how often do you get information about things that might affect your household? 
Never=0; Annually=1; Semi-annually=3; Quarterly=4; Monthly=5; Weekly=6; Daily=7; 
Newspapers Mobile 
phone 
Television Market Friends Leaders Internet Institution 
        
  
H 8. Do you access social security programs? No=0, Yes=1 
 Present  Present 
Ration card  Health card  
Mid-day meal  Old-age/disability pension  
 
H 9. Do you participate in MGNREGA (Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme)? 
Number of NREGA job members in household  
Number of days of employment (last one year)  
 
H 10. Could you describe the services and household amenities of your household?  No=0, Yes=1 






l (10 years) 
Electricity       
Piped water       
Road access       
 
H 11. Could you describe your household assets? (Number) 






Rooms (Mud)       
Rooms (Cement)       
Water tank       
Toilet       
2-wheeler        
Auto/Goods 
carrier 
      
Television       
Car/Van       
Generator       
Computer       
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H 12. Could you describe your agricultural assets? (Number) 






Plough       
Bullocks       
Tractor       
Thresher       
Dugwell       
Borewell       
Combine       
       




H 13. Could you describe your livestock assets? (Number) 
 Present 10 Years ago 
Stall fed Grazed Stall fed Grazed 
  Migratory   Local Migratory Local 
Cattle       
Buffaloes       
Goats       
Sheep       
Other       
 
H 14. What was your agricultural expenditure last year? ___________ 
H 15. Do you have any debt? (Yes=1, No=0)___________ How much? ___________ 
H 16. What is the change in your debt levels? ___________ 
Decreased=0; Remained the same=1; Increased=2 
 
H 17. What are the sources of your agricultural expenditure? Enter 1=Partially; 2=Mostly; 
3=Exclusively 
 Self Friends/Neighbors Moneylender Trader Institution 
Seeds      
Irrigation      
Power      
Nutrients      
Pesticides      
Rent      
Labor      
      
      
      
      
H 18. What are the sources of energy for household use in cooking and heating? 
Supply from different sources (in %, total must NOT add up to more than 100) 
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H 19. Could you describe how many person days per year you shared your labor with other 
households? 
 Forest (collection 













    
 





Commons Forest Market 
Fodder and livestock 
use 
     




   
Timber and construction      
Hunting/fishing and wild 
foods 
    
Agricultural inputs     
H 21. How many days did you spend in campaigning during the last panchayat elections? Days 
__________ 
H 22. Are you or anyone in your family an elected member of the panchayat?    No = 0, Yes = 1 
__________ 
H 23. If yes, then what level? 1 = Ward;  2 = Panchayat;  3 = BDC;  4 = District __________ 
H 24. Are you or anyone in your family an elected member in SHG, MMS or other institution? N=0, 
Yes=1 __________ 
 
H 25. Could you list social group and institutional membership in your family? 
 
 
































        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
Ease of access: 1=Extremely difficult; 2=Moderately difficult; 3=Not very difficult; 4=Easy; 
5=Extremely easy 
Services or material received: 1 = Very low; 2 = Low; 3 = Medium; 4 = High; 5 = Very high  
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Institutions and social-ecological synergies. Agro-ecology format 
 
Village name___________________ Farmer Name____________________________________ 
 
A 1. What is the size of the landholding? (in acres)____________________ 
A 2. In how many parcels is this landholding? _____________ 
A 3. Do you lease-in land? ________ (Yes=1, No=0); How many acres? ________  
A 4. Do you lease-out land? ________ (Yes=1, No=0); How many acres? ________ 
 
 
A 5. List the most important crops grown in your landholding over the last ten years and describe 
their yield and pricing 























       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
       
Market: Traders or brokers=1; Local Market=2; District Market=3 or fill in Institution ID 
Price Trend: 1 = Decreased greatly; 2 = Decreased somewhat; 3 = Remained the same; 4 = 
Increased somewhat; 5 = Increased greatly 
 




























         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
Cultivation type: Mechanized using tractor=1; Draft animals=2; Both=3 
Agriculture type: Rainfed=0; Irrigated=1 
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A 6. Could you fill in your agricultural calendar? (Enter S= Start, F=Finish) 
Crop name J F M A M J J A S O N D 
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
             
 
A 7. What is the change in wooded area (includes woody trees and shrubs, water bodies and rocky 
areas) in your agricultural land over the last ten years? 0=Decreased; 1=No change; 2=Increased 
7.1. How would you describe the change in trees and canopy? ___________ 
Reason (mark reasons): 1=Institutional guideline; 2=Financial; 3=Increasing yield; Labor cost=4 
 
7.2. How would you describe the change in shrubs? ___________ 
Reason (mark reasons): 1=Institutional guideline; 2=Financial; 3=Increasing yield; Labor cost=4 
 
7.3. How would you describe the change in ponds and water bodies? ___________ 
Reason (mark reasons): 1=Institutional guideline; 2=Financial; 3=Increasing yield; Labor cost=4 
 
7.4. How would you describe the change in rocky areas? ___________ 
Reason (mark reasons): 1=Institutional guideline; 2=Financial; 3=Increasing yield; Labor cost=4 
 
A 8. What are the terms of use of your landholding by others? 








Use: Fruits=1; Biomass=2; Poles and timber=3; Fodder=4; Fuel wood=5, Fencing=6, Agriculture=7 
Terms of use: Free access=1; Monetary=2; Exchange=3; Stealing=4, Lease=5 
 





Planted in last 10 
years 
No=0, Yes=1 
Present 10 years 





     
     
     
     
	 184 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Reason for management: No management=0; Fruits and NTFP=1; Boundary marker=2; Material for 
boundary marker elsewhere=3; Biomass=4; Soil conservation=5; Biodiversity=6; Poles and timber=7; 
Fodder=8; Fuel wood=9 





Planted in last 10 
years 
No=0, Yes=1 
Present 10 years 




     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Reason for management: No management=0; Fruits and NTFP=1; Boundary marker=2; Material for 
boundary marker elsewhere=3; Biomass=4; Soil conservation=5; Biodiversity=6; Poles and timber=7; 
Fodder=8; Fuel wood=9 
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A 12. What nutrients have you used in the last year? 












      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
Fill Institution ID where applicable 
Source of nutrients: Friends or neighbors=1; Market=2; Own landholding =3; Moneylender=4; 
Trader=5 
Effects of nutrient addition: Fertility decreased=0; No change=1; Fertility increased=2 
 
A 13. What diseases have your crops experienced in the last ten years? 
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Fill Institution ID where applicable 
Source of pesticides and herbicides: Friends or neighbors=1; Market=2; Own landholding=3; 
Moneylender=4; Trader=5 
Effects of pesticide/herbicide application: Yield decreased=1; No change=2; Yield increased=3 
Other effects of pesticides: Human health harmed=1; Livestock health harmed=2; Decrease in soil 
quality=3; Decrease in biodiversity=4; Decrease in water quality=5 
 
A 15. What seeds have you used in the last year? 









use of this 
variety 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Fill Institution ID where applicable 
Source of seeds: Friends or neighbors=1; Market=2; Own landholding=3; Moneylender=4; Trader=5 
Effects of this seed: Yield decreased=0; No change=1; yield increased=2 
 
A 16. Water and electricity 










     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
Source of water: Private bore well=1; Private well=2; Canal=3; Lake=4; Shared bore well=5 
Source of power: Own=1; Rent=2; Share=3; Institution ID 
 
A 17. What are the other landholding management technologies that you practice? 
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Fill Institution name where applicable     
Source of information: Friends or neighbors=1; Market=2; Moneylender=4; Trader=5; Newspaper=6; 
Mobile phone=7; Television=8; Leaders=9; Internet=10 
Source of funding: Friends or neighbors=1; Market=2; Own landholding=3; Moneylender=4; 
Trader=5 





Institutions and social-ecological synergies. Agro-ecology survey format 
 
Village  HH # 
 




      
 
1.  Landholding parcel details 
Survey 
number 
Title holder Relationship to 
farmer 
Acres Cultivated area in 
acres 
     
A. Distance to road______________ 
B. Distance to forest and other wooded area______________ 
C. Distance to landholders house______________ 
D. Soil type. 0=Red/Chalka, 1=Black______________ 
E. Main crop______________ 
F. Irrigated or Rainfed? 0=Irrigated, Rainfed=1______________ 
 
2. Bio-physical details 
Soil structure of this parcel (No=0, yes=1) Slope 




(in meters)  Clay Silt  Sandy Rocky  
 
 
      
 
3. What is the topography of the landholding? ______________ 
1=Primarily flat; 2=Mostly flat with some rolling terrain; 3=Primarily rolling terrain; 4=Mostly rolling 
terrain with some steep portions; 5=Primarily steep 
 
4. What is the nature of bund structure? ______________ 
1=High quality; 2=Medium quality; 3= Poor quality 
 
5. Are the bunds covered by vegetation, trees and shrubs? ______________ 
1=Trees only; 2=Shrubs only; 3=Trees and shrubs 
 
6. Water sources. Examples: Canal, dug well, bore well, farm pond, lake, storage tank, truck supply 
Water source Available in Kharif?  Available in Rabi? Shared or Private 
    
    
    
    
Availability: 1=Yes, 0=No; Shared=1, Private=0 
 
7. Bore well information  
Pump HP Summer level (feet) Winter level (feet) Depth of motor changed? 
    
    
    
    






Rocky areas  Area in acres: 
Fallen trees and logs  Number:      
Farm ponds   Area in acres: 
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Open wells  Number:  
Wooded area  Area in acres: 
Canopy   Percent of landholding: 
Tree strata  Number:  
   
   
   
 
9. Grazing. 1=Yes; 2=No 
Summer grazing  
Winter grazing  
All year  
 
11. How do you manage your crop residue?  
0=No management; 1=Burn; 2=Plough into soil; 3=Compost; 4=Harvest for fuelwood; 5=Graze 
 
12. Site quality observations 
Indicators 0=Absent; 1=Present 
Epiphytes  
Climbers and vines  
Bird nests  
 



















      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      











0=Cropland; 1=Bund or 
wooded area 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     





Institutions and social-ecological synergies. Institutional format 
Institution name_________________________________  
 
I 1. Since when has this institution been operational? 
 
I 2. What is the operational scale of this institution? 
Scale of institutional action: 1=user group; 2=village; 3=multi village; 4=district; 
5=state; 6=national; 7=global 
I 3. Does this institution provide public goods that are available for everyone for free? 
 
I 4. Does this institution provide preferential or targeted access to marginalized sections for 
some of its services? 
 
I 5. Does this institution restrict access to some of its services through membership or user 
fee? 
1=Never; 2=Rarely; 3=Often; 4=Mostly; 5=Always 
 
I 6. What are the main activities of your institution?  
 
Please repeat questions I 7 through I 11 for activities listed from the above question  
 
I 7. What type of benefit does this activity provide and to whom? 
Benefit type: 0=none (includes not yet); 1=funds; 2=institutional support; 
3=information; 4= personnel; 5=material 
 
I 8. Which year did this activity begin? 
 
I 9. How are benefits usually accessed by people in this activity?  
 
I 10. What is the operational scale of this activity? 
Scale of institutional action: 1=user group; 2=village; 3=multi village; 4=district; 
5=state; 6=national; 7=global 
I 11. Which other institutions do you interact/collaborate with during this activity? 
 
I 12. Broadly, how many institutions do you interact with? 
 
I 13. Could you list the names of the institutions that are most important to your institution? 
Let us call them ‘key institutions’.  
 
I 14. In the last year, how often did you meet with each of the key institutions?  
 
I 15. How would you characterize the influence that your institution has with each of the key 
institutions?  










The Department of Geography from the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, is 
undertaking a research project to understand the role of institutions in shaping livelihoods of 
farmers and the agro-ecological quality of their landholding. This project has two main 
objectives. First, this research will investigate how farmers gain benefits from institutions and 
how these benefits influence livelihoods and landholding. Second, this project will examine 
the relationships that institutions have with each other and how the constellations of 
institutions make benefits available. 
 
With this study, we expect to obtain the necessary data that will allow us to demonstrate the 
role of institutions in agricultural production and livelihoods, and the consequences of farmer 
decisions on the quality of landholding. 
 
You have been selected for this interview because you practice agriculture in villages that 
constitute the study area that are receiving institutional benefits. You are going to be asked 
to answer a series of questions related to your livelihood strategies, cultivation, infrastructure, 
natural resource availability, livestock, list of currently active institutions, and agricultural 
practices. 
 
The interview will be recorded on a voice recorder. You are not obligated to answer all the 
questions and you can leave the interview at any time and ask for my notes of the interview 
to be destroyed.  There are no anticipated risks to this interview and the only cost to you 
should be your time (approximately one hour).  There is no compensation for the interview. 
 
The information that you give us, as part of this study will be combined with the information 
provided by other village representatives. Your participation is entirely voluntary. A number 
will be assigned to your interview and we will use only the number in all dealings with the 
information you provide. The results of this investigation will strengthen my PhD dissertation 
and will be used to write scholarly articles and reports directed to government officials. By 





If you have any questions or need clarification, you may contact us at the following address: 
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Principal Investigator: Ashwini Chhatre 
Associate Professor 
234, Computing Applications Building, MC-150 
605, East Springfield Avenue 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
Champaign, IL 61820. USA 
Phone (USA): 217-333-1880 
Email: achhatre@illinois.edu 
 
Ph.D. Candidate: Vijay Ramprasad 
Graduate Student Research Assistant 
Department of Geography and Geographic Information Science 
234, Computing Applications Building, MC-150 
605, East Springfield Avenue 
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign 
Champaign, IL 61820. USA 
Phone (USA): (+01) 217-333-1880 
Mobile (India): (+91) 9000951799 
Email: ramprsd2@illinois.edu 
 
Institutional Review Boards   
Suite 203, MC-419   
528 East Green Street   
Champaign, IL 61820   
Phone (USA): 217-333-2670   










Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research
Office for the Protection of Research Subjects







607 S Mathews Ave
Urbana, IL 61801
RE: Institutions and social-ecological synergies in Indian agriculture
IRE Protocol Number: 15706
Dear Dr. Chhatre:
This letter authorizes the use of human subjects in your project entitled Institittions and social-ecologicalsynergies in Indian agriculture. The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Institutional Review
Board (WE) approved, by expedited review, the protocol as described in your WE-I application. The
expiration date for this protocol, IRB number 15706, is 04/28/2016. The risk designation applied to your
project is no more than minimal risk. Certification of approval is available upon request.
Copies of the attached date-stamped consent form(s) must be used in obtaining informed consent. If there
is a need to revise or alter the consent form(s), please submit the revised form(s) for IRB review,
approval, and date-stamping prior to use.
Under applicable regulations, no changes to procedures involving human subjects may be made without
prior IRB review and approval. The regulations also require that you promptly notify the IRB of any
problems involving human subj ects, including unanticipated side effects, adverse reactions, and any
injuries or complications that arise during the project.
If you have any questions about the IRB process, or if you need assistance at any time, please feel free to




Director, Office for the Protection of Research Subjects
Attachment(s)
c: Vijay Ramprasad
U of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. IORG00000Y4 • FWA #00008584
telephone (217) 333-2670 • fax (217) 333-0405 email IRB@iHinois.edu
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APPENDIX D: ENDNOTES 
 
Endnotes for Chapter 1.  
 
i Highlights of the National Commission on Agriculture 
The Report of the National Commission on Agriculture is a comprehensive state-of-affairs 
report that provided recommendations for the improvement of agriculture and rural 
economy. The Report hopes that following these guidelines India’s agriculture can traverse 
the ‘high road’ it is on and enable the vast mass of cultivators and agricultural laborers 
whose production potentials are being ‘wasted today’. For these policies to reach the 
‘humble cottage dweller’ development needs to be ‘linked-up’ and combine the 
preconditions of natural resources with scientific planning. However, the Commission is 
unblemished by the politics of development. The Commission recommends: 
• that the main thrust of policy must be to secure the demand-supply balance in 
agricultural commodities as well as distributive justice 
• integrated development of crop production, livestock, poultry, fisheries, forests 
simultaneously 
• the improvements in agriculture is based on modernization, in which technology would 
be the most important input 
• for realization of full potential of modern technology, a package approach to provision 
of supplies and services (for inputs) be adopted 
• agriculture should facilitate progress towards full employment and needs must be first 
met by draught animals and manpower. Mechanization must be highly selective and 
bridge gap power gap in areas with shortage in man and animal power 
• to lay great emphasis on maintenance of ecological balance 
• overall strategy for improving agricultural production includes: land and land-use policy; 
continuous improvement in yield; increased availability and efficient use of scientific 
inputs; adequate research, education and extension support; simultaneous attention to 
needs and potential growth in areas with different levels of development; improving 
market and pricing structure. 
 
The Commission also points to reordering of agrarian structure, which is an essential 
precondition for development. Such a reordering will involve intensive cultivation, generate 
widespread productive employment and reduce disparity. The bullet points next summarize 
the sections and provide a cursory list of institutions listed. 
• Concerning resource development, the report focuses on water availability, rainfall 
patterns, land reclamation and development and suggests the works on irrigation 
projects. Large scale and minor irrigation are at the center of the thrust following the 
droughts of 1965 – 66. Groundwater development by tube wells is suggested and 
assistance in form of credit, technical support, and equipment is under the joint 
prerogatives of state and private sector. The goal of all resource development activities 
is maximization of production and protection in drought susceptible areas. Institutions: 
Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, Irrigation Commission, Indian Meteorological 
Organization, Central Water Commission, Central Ground Water Board, River Basin 
Commission, National Water Resources Council, Command Area Development 
Authority, Public Works Department, Agricultural Refinance Development Corporation,  
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• Concerning electricity, the report suggests electrification of 110,000 villages and 
installation of 1.5 million pumpsets. Institutions: All India Rural Credit Review 
Committee, Rural Electrification Corporation, and State Electricity Boards. 
• For crop production, the report considers 70 individual crops and aims to double/triple 
yields by 2000. The cropping system is classified into rainfed farming, irrigated farming, 
and mixed farming. Institutions: Not listed in the section, but various. 
• As for inputs for agriculture, the report systematically categorizes them into seeds, 
fertilizers and manures, plant protection chemicals, farm power (human labor, draught 
animals, machines), and farm implements and machinery. Institutions: Not listed in the 
section. 
• Research is envisioned as a driver of higher productivity and improved production. The 
report recognizes, fundamental, applied and adaptive research. Institutions: Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research, Agricultural Universities and State Departments, 
Council for Industrial and Scientific and Industrial Research, University Grants 
Commission, Department of Agricultural Research and Education, Krishi Vignan Kendra, 
National Demonstration Programme, Central Information Unit, Directorate of Extension 
of Government of India, Farm Information Unit of State Governments, Farmers 
Education and Training Programme 
• For supporting services and incentives, the Commission recommends efforts to build 
institutional financing within the Cooperative Credit Societies Act (1904) and nurture 
them as the primary institutions to assist farmers. Institutions: National Credit Council, 
Cooperative Credit Societies Act (1904, All India Rural Credit Review Committee, 
Farmers Service Societies, National Programme for Organization of Farmers’ Service 
Societies, Special Programs for subsidies – SFDA, MFAL, and Integrated Dryland 
Agricultural Development Scheme, Agricultural Produce Marketing Regulation Act, 
Directorate of Marketing and Inspection, Transport - Public Works Department, Storage 
- Food Corporation of India, Central Warehousing Corporation, State Warehousing 
Corporation, Cold Storage Order (1964), All India Khadi and Village Industries 
Commission, All India Handloom Board, Handicrafts Board, Central Silk Board, Coir 
Board, National Cooperative Development Corporation. 
• The report also suggests land reform policy under agrarian reforms that abolishes 
intermediaries, formulates a tenancy legislation (security of tenure, termination of 
tenancy, resumption of personal cultivation, surrenders, regulation of rent), and ceilings.   
The ceilings are predominantly redistributive and remain a ‘nebulous item’ in agrarian 
reforms. Ceiling laws were enforced in two phases, before 1972 and post 1972 period 
that adopted the National Guidelines for ceiling. The agrarian society is classified into 
three sectors, namely, 1) the developed sector of the ‘modern entrepreneur’ consisting 
of rich farmers (capitalist mode of production), 2) the self-cultivation sector by medium, 
small, and marginal farmers (family labor and occasional hired labor), and 3) 
sharecropping sector with various kinds of tenants and sub-tenants. 
• These three classes are in transient states driven by unstable turmoil and conflict with 
each other. For development, the report suggests three scenarios: 1) development on 
lines of modern large-scale capitalist farming, 2) development on lines of cooperative or 
collective farming and 3) development as a peasant-proprietor economy based on 
private ownership of land supplemented by cooperative enterprise. The Commission 
sees the third scenario as the most desirable and suggests among others a minimum 
wage for agricultural laborers. Institutions: Various, State Government, Schedule IX of 




																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																											
Endnotes for Chapter 4.  
 
ii Lazzarato (2012): ‘Debt constitutes the most deterritoralized and the most general power 
relation through which class struggle is waged’.  
 
iii Peebles (2010), Aitken (2015), Ruddle (2011), and Taylor (2013) list various descriptions of 
the burden. Look at Marcel Mauss’s The gift: The form and reason for exchange in archaic 
societies, for a contrasting study on gift and debt. Greenberg (1980) describes 
conceptualization of indebtedness, associated motivations, and cognitive and behavioral 
consequences. 
 
iv Contrast this with Mosse (2010) who presents poverty in a relational context. Here, 
poverty is a consequence of historically, politically and economically developed relations 
and effect of social categorization and identity. 
 
v Adapted from Mosse, Farrington, and Rew (2015), Development as process: concepts 
and methods for working with complexity. They present process oriented approaches in the 
context of development. 
 
vi Proximate causes are defined here as causes or unsafe conditions that existed 
immediately before the event leading to social-ecological consequences. Root-causes are 
defined as social-structural causes that influence social-ecological consequences 
independently or by contributing to proximate causes. Blaikie et.al’s influential work (Blaikie 
et.al. 2014) on vulnerability explores the chain of causation of vulnerability progressively 
backwards from vulnerability to unsafe conditions through dynamic pressures to ultimately, 
root-causes that explains access to power and resources in a political-economic system. 
 
vii Please refer Venkateshwaralu and Corta (2001) for a detailed illustration of cotton seed 
cross pollination process and Singh for contract farming in India. 
